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SUMMARY
This thesis describes the social organisation of Kurdish refugee communities and is a
contribution to the theoretical discussion of the concept of diaspora. Field research
methods were used in this comparative sociological study among Kurdish refugees
from Turkey, Iraq and Iran, who live in exile in Finland and England.
The writer uses rich ethnographic material to describe the social organisation of the
Kurdish refugee communities. The thesis introduces new arguments about, and
suggests a rethinking of, the process of integration among refugees. In many
different ways refugees living in exile have a continuous relation to their societies of
origin. The thesis describes various transnational social relations and networks
among the Kurdish refugees. It is argued that the Kurds in exile can be regarded as a
diaspora.
The concept of diaspora highlights the refugees' continuous relation to their
countries of origin. However, the transnational social networks and associations can
also be important resources for the refugees in their new country of settlement.
There is also reason to remember the importance of social structures and
exclusionary policies in the country of settlement. The comparison of the two
different countries of settlement shows that these structures and policies have a great
impact on how the refugees will be integrated into the receiving society.
It is argued that a study of refugee communities needs to take into account refugees'
relations to both the society of origin and the society of settlement. The writer
emphasises that a diaspora can be understood as a transnational social organisation
relating both to the country of origin and the country of settlement. Thus, it is argued
that the concept of diaspora is a useful analytical tool for an understanding of the
transnational social reality in which refugees live.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
According to the United Nations (UNHCR 1997), there were fourteen million refugees
world-wide in 1995. In addition, a further thirty million persons were displaced within
the borders of their own countries. Most refugees stay in neighbouring counties, but a
small number is forced to seek safety far away from their countries of origin. This
thesis is about Kurdish refugees from Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Since the 1980s
increasing numbers of Kurds have been forced to flee the various conflicts in
Kurdistan. Today, some of these refugees are present in European countries.
Contemporary changes in population movements mean that countries which
previously were unaffected by immigration are receiving increased numbers of
refugees and migrants. These global changes are also altering migration flows to
countries with a long history of immigration (Castles and Miller 1993). Finland, which
traditionally has been a country of emigration, turned into a country of immigration
during the 1980s. Britain, which for a long period of time experienced immigration
and emigration within the British Commonwealth, has received increased numbers of
refugees in recent years from countries with which Britain has very few historical ties.
These new population movements and the consequent establishment of new refugee
communities are relatively little studied phenomena.
This thesis concerns itself with newly arrived Kurdish refugees and their communities
in Finland and Britain. The two countries of settlement are in significant respects
different and this study aims, from a sociological and comparative point of view, to
analyse the process of the refugees' "integration" into these two different societies.
The refugees' relation to the countries of origin from which they were forced to flee is
1
2also of interest here. Hence, this thesis describes the social organisation of the Kurdish
refugee communities and how this is influenced by the refugees' relation to the
country of origin on the one hand and to the country of settlement on the other. By
doing this, this thesis develops an analytical framework which also has a wider
theoretical significance within the area of international migration and ethnic relations.
My interest in questions relating to refugee resettlement and "integration" first
emerged during the work on my MA thesis (Wahlbeck 1992) which discusses Finnish
opinions about refugees and asylum seekers. Following the completion of my MA
degree I worked for one year as a social worker with responsibility for the resettlement
of Iranian Kurdish refugees in a small Finnish municipality. During these two periods
of my life I frequently had to answer the question of how refugees "adapt to life in
Finland". This question seems to imply several things about how the integration of
refugees is understood to happen. First of all is the assumption that refugees should
adapt to (or even assimilate into) their new country of settlement. Secondly, the
question seems to assume that the integration of refugees into the wider society is
dependent on the refugees' own cultural and social resources, or even their own
choices about whether or not to adapt. I also noticed a tendency to emphasise the
importance of assumed cultural differences in the process of "refugee integration." It
was commonly assumed that refugees had a fundamentally different culture which
could not easily be combined with Finnish cultural values and it was believed that this
would inevitably lead to various cultural conflicts.
However, during my job as a refugee resettlement worker I found that the refugees in
the municipality generally were eager to become integrated into the wider society. It
soon became clear to me that the biggest obstacles to the integration of the refugees
were by no means associated with their own cultural "luggage" or with the exercise of
"free choice" on their part in respect of adaptation. Instead the obstacles seemed to be
related to the receiving society itself. Factors like unemployment, social isolation,
discrimination, xenophobic attitudes and racism seemed to play a far bigger role for
the process of integration than was usually understood to be the case by the wider
3Finnish population. At the same time the importance of cultural differences and
conflicts seemed to be widely exaggerated.
Another issue to draw my attention was that of the retention of pre-migration social
networks among refugee communities. When it comes to the issue of resettlement, it is
commonly assumed that refugees have lost everything they have and that, in a way,
they have to start their lives all over again. This approach, so dominant in refugee
resettlement discourse, does not acknowledge that refugees may have resources and
social networks of their own. However, my own experiences as a social worker
suggested to me that, right from the beginning, refugees are able to set up well
functioning social networks through which advice and information can be obtained.
Almost immediately upon arrival in Finland the refugees seemed to be able to get in
touch with compatriots, friends and relatives in Finland, Europe and Kurdistan. Rather
than being individuals totally torn away from their social settings, refugees are able, at
least to some extent, to retain pre-migration social organisations and networks.
These contradictions between my own experiences with refugees on one hand and the
discourse dominating refugee resettlement on the other, provided the starting point for
this research. As a result, I decided to study how refugees themselves experience the
process of integration into their new countries of settlement. My aim in doing so was
to study, from a sociological point of view, the relationships which newly arrived
refugees have both with their countries of settlement and with their countries of origin.
An initial aim of the study has been to develop a theoretical framework that would
make it possible to avoid some of the common misunderstandings and dangers in
refugee research and political discourses. In particular, the study aims to avoid three
common pitfalls in refugee research. The first is the danger that the exoticism or
cultural distinctiveness of refugee groups is excessively emphasised. This approach
can reinforce racist and culturalist discourses which define refugees as the "other" and
can support various exclusionary policies. The second danger is to see refugees as
"problems." This approach is often found among studies dealing with assimilation and
integration from the point of view of the receiving society. Refugees are seen as
4individuals who can choose, more or less freely, whether or not to "adapt," and to the
extent that they resist integration they are defined as "problems". This approach forgets
the profound influence of social structures on social relations. The third and opposite
danger is to overemphasise the importance of social structures. This approach regards
refugees as powerless victims of racism and as totally ruled by social structures. This
view overlooks the refugees' own resources and the fact that social relations consist of
both structure and agency. The challenge for refugee research is to strike a balance
among these three extreme positions.
My initial assumption was that theories of ethnicity and ethnic relations could be used
to highlight these issues. However, during my fieldwork it soon became clear that
refugee issues could not be fully understood with what might loosely be called an
"ethnic relations" approach. Rather, as I will attempt to show in this thesis, an
understanding of refugee issues needs a more sophisticated conceptual framework.
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to present a conceptual framework which besides
explaining the empirical findings in this study, also has a wider relevance for refugee
studies. In this respect it is argued that the concept of diaspora is a useful tool for an
understanding of the social organisation of refugee communities.
The study tries to understand and describe the refugees' own perspective on the issues
under study. Consequently, this thesis uses field research methods which enable the
researcher to take into account the refugees own point of view. This choice of
methodology also supports the aim to avoid some of the earlier mentioned common
pitfalls in refugee research. Since I became acquainted with many Kurds during my job
as a social worker it made sense to concentrate on Kurdish refugees and their
experiences. (However, the empirical material is collected almost two years after I
finished my job as a social worker.) Having had a long-standing interest in human
rights issues, I also became increasingly interested in the whole Kurdish question.
These are the reasons why this thesis is based on field research methods among
Kurdish refugees.
5The comparative perspective in this research required the collection of a good deal of
empirical material. This study describes how the social organisation of the Kurdish
refugee communities is related to both country of origin and country of settlement. In
order to be able to study these relations from a comparative point of view it is
necessary to have at least two countries of origin and two countries of settlement. The
two countries of settlement chosen for this study were Finland and England. These two
locations were regarded as sufficiently different in order to study the influence of the
society of settlement on the refugee communities. The fieldwork in these countries was
carried out during 1994 and 1995. In addition, this thesis studies Kurdish refugees
from three countries of origin: Turkey, Iraq and Iran. This selection was partly
influenced by some of the Kurds themselves who wanted to emphasise that all Kurds
should be seen as one unity. Thus, rather than looking at only two countries of origin,
three countries of origin are included here.
Some issues which this study has not been able to address have to be mentioned. First
of all, the aim of this thesis is not to study Kurdish society, history or politics. During
my fieldwork it was repeatedly suggested to me that I should concentrate on the Kurds
in Kurdistan rather than on the Kurds in exile, since "it is in Kurdistan where the
problems are." However, given that there are plenty of persons with a far better
knowledge of the "Kurdish question," it is clear to me that I am not the right person to
write about Kurdistan. In fact, there are already a number of books about Kurdish
history, nationalism and politics, as well as numerous reports on the human rights
situation in Kurdistan. On the other hand, an understanding of the refugees' situation
in exile does require familiarity with the reasons for their flight. Therefore, chapter
four contains a brief description of Kurdish history and the political situation in the
three countries of origin. (For those who wish to gain a more thorough knowledge of
these issues this chapter also includes plenty of references to the literature available on
the subject.) Obviously, some of the theories of ethnicity and nationalism, which in
this thesis are discussed in the context of the situation in the countries of exile, might
also be applied to the situation in Kurdistan. However, within the scope of this thesis it
is not possible to discuss theoretical issues relating to Kurdish nationalism and ethnic
relations in the countries of origin.
6Secondly, this is not a study of refugees' psychological adaptation to life in exile.
Rather, the aim is to study the processes of integration and the social organisation of
the refugee communities from a sociological point of view. Obviously, the social and
psychological processes are related to one another. However, a study of adaptation,
identity formation and other psychological processes related to refugee resettlement
would have required a totally different approach and methods to those used in this
research.
Chapter two discusses the concepts and theories used in this thesis. The chapter
concludes with a suggestion for a conceptual framework for understanding how the
social organisation of refugee communities is related to both the country of origin and
the country of settlement. Chapter three discusses general methodological issues, and
the methods and empirical material used in this study. The societies of origin are
described in chapter four. In particular, this chapter briefly describes the main political
developments in Kurdistan which has lead to forced migration and which continue to
influence the refugee communities. Chapter five contains a description of the two
societies of settlement. More specifically, the chapter analyses the different refugee
resettlement policies in Finland and England. The results from the fieldwork carried
out in Finland and England are presented in chapter six and seven. In chapter six the
refugees' experiences in their new country of settlement are described from the
refugees' own point of view, while chapter seven concentrates on describing the social
organisation of the Kurdish refugee communities. These two chapters discuss the
relation to the country of origin on one hand and the country of exile on the other, as
well as the influence these have on the refugees and their communities. Both chapters
will relate the results to the previously presented theoretical and conceptual issues. The
results are summarised and briefly discussed in chapter eight.
Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to explain some terminological issues
pertaining to this thesis. Generally, this thesis uses the terms and definitions used by
the Kurdish informants and interviewees themselves, rather than using any "objective
criteria" or some other externally imposed definitions. This approach is related to the
7well-known theorem presented by the Chicago-sociologist W. I. Thomas: "If men [sic]
define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas 1966, xl).
Hence, this thesis aims to describe the Kurdish refugees' own points of view, since it
can be argued that their definition of the situation is the one which is of greatest
sociological interest.
The term "refugee" is a legal term with a clearly defined meaning within international
law. However, in this thesis the term is used as a sociological and not as a legal term.
The legal definition is often too narrow to apply as a part of a sociological approach
(partly because the implementation of the Refugee Convention is inconsistent and
responds to political shifts in the receiving countries). In this thesis the term refugee
includes all those who feel that they are refugees, which in practice includes persons
with full refugee status, quota refugees, asylum seekers, and persons with some of the
"B-statuses" given to asylum seekers. These more specific descriptions are of course
also used where appropriate.
Some Kurds prefer to use the expressions "North Kurdistan" or "North-West
Kurdistan" rather than Turkey, "South Kurdistan" rather than Iraq and "East
Kurdistan" rather than Iran. For the most part, this thesis reproduces the expressions
used by the informants themselves. However, in the general parts of the text the terms
"Turkey," "Iraq" and "Iran" are preferred, since these are more easily understood by
the reader. For similar reasons the expressions "Kurd from Turkey" and "Kurd from
Iraq" are preferred. However, the use of "Turkish Kurd" and "Iraqi Kurd" is avoided
since these concepts may be considered offensive and contradictory. An exception is
the term "Iranian Kurd," which is generally accepted and widely used by the Kurds
from Iran, and for this reason this term is also employed here.
The term "England" is used in this study to describe the country in which one part of
the fieldwork was carried out. However, the term "United Kingdom" is used when
referring to the state which gives asylum to the refugees. United Kingdom is a
shorter name for The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, while
Great Britain includes England, Scotland and Wales, but not Northern Ireland.
8In conclusion, this thesis is based on a comparative study of the Kurdish refugee
communities in Finland and England. The fieldwork was carried out during 1994 and
1995 among newly arrived Kurdish refugees from Turkey, Iraq and Iran. The aim is to
describe from a sociological point of view the processes which influence the social
organisation and integration of the Kurdish refugee communities in Finland and
England. The thesis aims to develop a conceptual framework which, besides
describing these specific cases, also has a wider significance for refugee studies in
general.
CHAPTER 2
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter explains the central concepts and theories used in the thesis. A broad
perspective is required in order to develop sound theoretical approaches applicable to
refugees. Richmond (1988, 1993, 1994) argues that refugee theory should be seen as a
part of other migration theory. However, it is possible to go further than this and argue
that general theories of ethnic relations are necessary in order to understand the social
processes involved in the integration of refugees into the receiving society.
A sociological point of view is adopted in this thesis in order to study the processes
which influence the social organisation of the Kurdish refugee communities in the
country of settlement. Social organisation is here understood as "any relatively stable
pattern or structure within a society, and the process by which such a structure is
created or maintained. As such the term is a highly general one overlapping with such
terms as social structure, social order, etc." (Jary and Jary 1991, 589). 1 Obviously,
there are a number of psychological and social-psychological processes (identity
formation, prejudice, etc.) which are relevant and closely related to the social relations
described here. However, this thesis is focused upon the wider sociological and
"macro" perspectives, rather than on the psychological processes related to refugee
integration.
A number of concepts and theories which are used to describe the "inclusion" and
"exclusion" of migrants and refugees within the receiving society are discussed in this
chapter. Clearly, there are many ways to categorise people in order to include and
exclude groups in society. Besides ethnicity, gender, age and social class also play
important roles. Since this thesis concerns itself with refugees' specific experiences,
9
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the rest of the chapter concentrates on the discussions about inclusion and exclusion
within the research area of international migration and ethnic relations.
Refugee Theory
According to international law, a refugee is a person who, "owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic]
nationality" (United Nations 1954, 152). From a sociological point of view it is
important to note that such a person belongs to a group of people which has a very
distinctive relationship with both the country it has been forced to flee from and the
country where it is involuntarily settled. As Kunz argues, "It is the reluctance to uproot
oneself, and the absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere, which
characterises all refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee from the voluntary
migrant" (Kunz 1973, 130). This thesis attempts to describe the special relationships
that refugees have with both the country of origin and the country of settlement.
There is an abundance of literature about refugees but only a small number of these are
sociological studies and even fewer consider theoretical questions relating to refugees'
situation in the receiving countries (cf. Escalona and Black 1995; Stein 1981b;
Srinivasan 1995). One weakness with refugee research is that most research "has been
tactical, ad hoc, diffuse and reactive" (Robinson 1993, 6). In addition, the existing
empirical studies have to a great extent been uninformed by general sociological
theory and the experiences of refugees are rarely distinguished from those of other
migrants (Richmond 1988). Similar arguments are presented by Gold (1992) who
finds that studies in the ethnographic sociological tradition are rare, and that policy-
oriented research has dominated the field at the expense of independent, holistic
scholarship. Furthermore, Steen (1992) argues that concepts like "identity" and
"culture," which are both widely debated and held problematic in the social sciences,
are too often used in an uninformed and confusing way in refugee research.
1 1
Many of the few theoretical contributions that exist in the area of forced migration
have developed typologies to distinguish between different migration movements.
Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo (1989) identify refugees as either activists, targets or
victims. Kunz (1973) distinguishes free migrants from refugee settlers, and
furthermore makes a distinction between anticipatory and acute refugee movements.
Richmond (1988, 1993, 1994), however, argues that a distinction between voluntary
and involuntary migration is of doubtful validity since all migration movements in
various degrees and forms include different constraints. Instead he is, inspired by
structuration theory within sociology, suggesting an elaborate typology of several
forms of proactive and reactive migrations.
Hein (1993), in an overview of the discussion about the differences between refugees
and migrants, argues that from a sociological point of view it is only in their relation to
the state, whether in country of origin, during flight, or in the country of asylum, that
refugees are distinguished from ordinary migrants. Quite correctly he concludes that
"refugee status is a relationship to the state that takes a number of forms during the
process of uprooting, migration and adaptation" (Hein 1993, 55).
There are authors who specifically discuss refugees' integration into the society of
settlement. For example Stein (1981a) and Vasquez (1989) describe how refugees over
time pass through different stages in their psychological relation to life in exile. Joly
(1996) emphasises that there still is a need for more research in the area of how
refugees relate to the country of settlement and how the refugee experience will
distinguish them from other migrants. She also argues that refugee adaptation is not
just a matter of time, instead "the refugees' pattern of group formation and social
interaction with the receiving society must be examined in relation to their position
within and vis-à-vis the structure of conflict in the society of origin" (Joly 1995a, 27).
As Joly (1996) points out, Kunz (1981) is one of the few authors who make an attempt
to present a theory that bridges the gap between country of origin and country of
settlement. This theory argues that, depending on the degree of identification with the
homeland, one can distinguish three groups of refugees: "majority-identified," "events-
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alienated" (for example discriminated minorities) and "self-alienated persons." These
three groups also have a different attitude to the flight from the homeland, the first two
groups are "reactive fate-groups" while the last group is a "purpose group." These
groups show different patterns of ideological and national orientation in exile, the
refugees who are reactive fate groups might show four different patterns of integration:
"integrated accommodation," alienated "passive hurt" individuals, persons with a
"hyperactive search for assimilation" and finally persons who in exile feel that they
have a "historic responsibility" to work for their cause and speak up for those silenced
at home. The purpose group of refugees may become "revolutionary activists," as may
over time some of the events-alienated refugees. A final category consists of the self-
fulfilling purpose groups who might leave more or less voluntarily and become
"founders of utopias." The problem with these elaborate classifications is, however,
that they are not very well defined in the very short article by Kunz (1981), thus the
theory is not easily applied to empirical studies.
Another problem, connected to all theories developing different descriptive
categorisations, is that a mere description of different cases is not sufficient if one
wants to understand the social processes behind the categories. The social processes
are better understood by a more qualitative and ethnographic approach.
There are a number of interesting ethnographic studies which have described refugee
communities in exile from a sociological or anthropological point of view. These
studies all investigate refugees within a context taking into account both the country of
origin and the country of settlement. Politically active refugees have been studied by
Bousquet (1991) in her study of Vietnamese refugees in Paris and by Lundberg (1989)
in his study of Latin American refugees in Sweden. The comparative perspective has
been used by Gold (1992) in his study of Vietnamese and Soviet Jewish refugees in
California, and by Steen (1992) in her study of Sri Lankan Tamils in Denmark and
England. Furthermore, Kay (1987) has added an important gender perspective in her
study of Chilean refugees in Scotland. There are also some interesting articles dealing
with refugees from East Europe (Ba:slauskas 1981; Kunz 1971; Luciuk 1986).
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All these studies describe how the refugee communities display a political and social
orientation towards the country of origin. In many cases political events and conflicts
"at home" continue to influence, and often divide, the refugee communities. It can be
argued that this pattern is different from the relationship other migrants have with their
countries of origin. Paradoxically enough, it looks as if refugee communities are
greatly divided, usually politically, at the same time as the communities often contain
large resources for ethnic or political mobilisation because of the refugees' similar
background and life histories. The same political convictions which can divide the
community, can also unite those smaller groups of refugees who share the same
political beliefs and background in the country of origin.
Conceptualising Inclusion
Obviously, refugee studies cannot on their own give enough theoretical guidance for a
study of refugees' social organisation in the country of settlement. One also needs to
look at theoretical traditions in the wider area of internationa1 migration and ethnic
relations. Within these research traditions one can find a number of theories and
concepts describing the inclusion and exclusion of migrants. The processes and
discourses making a difference between "us" and "them" are common in all societies,
but they take very different forms depending on the social circumstances.
Nevertheless, a shared feature is that by defining the "other" we are also defining who
we ourselves are (cf. Miles 1989). This section will discuss some of the concepts and
theories which have been used to conceptualise various forms of inclusion.
A number of different concepts, including adaptation, assimilation, accommodation,
acculturation and integration, are used in the literature to describe the inclusion of
refugees and immigrants into the new society of settlement. Clearly, the term
adaptation is mostly used to describe processes at a personal level. Since this thesis
deals with social processes it concentrates on the later four concepts.
14
Assimilation
Assimilation is a frequently used term. According to the Collins Dictionary of
Sociology assimilation is "the process in which a minority group adopts the values and
patterns of behaviour of a majority group or host culture, ultimately becoming
absorbed by the majority group" (Jary and Jary 1991). However, a definition of
assimilation also should take into account that this is a process which can affect both
sides in the relation, i.e. the majority may also change its values, patterns of behaviour
and culture. This type of process is exemplified in the American debate about the
"melting pot" at the beginning of the century when it was argued that all immigrants in
the United States would assimilate into each other and become "American."
One of the most influential American sociologists advocating an assimilationist theory
was Robert E. Park, one of the leading scholars in the so called Chicago school within
sociology. Park developed a model he called the "race relations cycle." Assimilation is
the final outcome in this cycle. The first phase in this cycle is competition, where the
individuals still are foreigners to each other and the relations are strictly economic. In
the next phase, conflict, people are politically aware of their situation and the conflicts
which arise out of the competition. Accommodation, is the phase where individuals
and the groups agree on the rules which will regulate the relations between the groups,
and people will tolerate and accept each other. The final outcome is assimilation,
where people see each other as individuals and not only as members of different
groups (Park 1950; Park and Burgess 1930). Park based his model on studies in an
urban American setting (cf. Lal 1990) but nevertheless he argued that the race relations
cycle is universal and irreversible.
Hence, assimilation comprises an inclusion of individuals into the society at large. A
society based on assimilation does, however, not include diverse cultures or separate
ethnic groups in the way a multi-cultural society does. It is today obvious that
assimilation between groups seldom is established in the way envisaged in Park's race
relations cycle. In the USA, for example, this is described by Glazer and Moynihan
(1963). They argue that ethnicity remains important in the United States and that
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ethnic groups largely have become political interest groups. Gans (1979), on the other
hand, argues that the so called ethnic revival in the USA is only a "symbolic ethnicity"
and that the processes of assimilation and integration are still at work in the USA.
However, his examples are drawn from the Jewish and white Catholic minorities and
not from the black or Hispanic minorities.
The assimilationist discourse was also dominant in Britain during the early post-war
years. When the post-war migrants started to arrive in Britain it was commonly
assumed that they would assimilate and/or integrate into British society if they stayed
for a longer time. It was thought that the racism that existed was "caused by the
'strangeness' of the immigrants, and that with the acculturation and eventual
assimilation of the immigrants, or their children, the issue of racism would disappear"
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992, 158). The belief in an easy integration into British
society was also common among the immigrants themselves. Most immigrants from
the so called New Commonwealth were English speaking British citizens and there
was no reason why they would not be welcome in Britain.
In Britain, assimilation policies were dominant until the early 1960s. Already in the
late 1950s it began to be apparent that the process of assimilation did not work as
smoothly as was earlier hoped it would. The immigrants were met by increased
hostility from their working-class and middle-class white neighbours. The racism that
immigrants met was apparent and not very well hidden in the early post-war years (e.g.
Rex and Tomlinson 1979).2
Although it is clear today that complete assimilation rarely occurs, it is still a key
concept. Milton Gordon has tried to outline a model of how assimilation is related to
other concepts within this area of research. Gordon (1964, 71; 1978, 169) outlines
seven variables within the assimilation process: structural assimilation, acculturation,
identificational assimilation, amalgamation, absence of prejudice, absence of
discrimination, absence of value and power conflict. In a more recent discussion of
Gordon's model Yinger (1985) argues that the last three of Gordon's seven variables
can be better seen as consequences of assimilation. Yinger also wisely renames the
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terms "structural assimilation" and "identificational assimilation" as respectively
"integration" and "identification." The four variables which can be seen as separate but
interdependent subprocesses of assimilation are therefore: integration (structural
aspect), acculturation (cultural aspect), identification (psychological aspect) and
amalgamation (biological aspect). Yinger's definitions of these four concepts seem to
be logical and useful. The use of the concept of assimilation as a general term
encompassing these other concepts is, however, not a unanimously accepted definition.
Acculturation
The term acculturation is widely used within cultural anthropology, which reflects the
importance which processes of cultural change have in anthropology. Acculturation
can be understood as "a process in which contacts between different cultural groups
lead to the acquisition of new cultural patterns by one, or perhaps both, group(s), with
the adoption of all or parts of the other's culture" (Jary and Jary 1991, 3). As
mentioned above, Gordon (1964, 1978) and later Yinger (1985) also describe
acculturation as the cultural aspect of assimilation.
Within the area of social-psychology another way of using the concept of acculturation
can be found in J. W. Berry's (1988) often quoted acculturation model. Here
acculturation is seen as the process in which "individuals negotiate their way into life
in a plural society" (Berry 1988, 2). Although I will not use this definition of
acculturation, the model still includes a useful distinction between the concepts of
assimilation and integration. Berry sees the difference between assimilation and
integration in the individual's degree of retention of identity. An integrated person
from a minority can keep his/her minority identity but if a person is assimilated he/she
will have the same identity as the majority. I find that this is a more useful and precise
definition of assimilation than the wide interpretation suggested by Yinger.
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Integration
As mentioned earlier, integration should be seen as describing a structural process,
rather than individual assimilation or cultural acculturation. The concept can also
largely replace the concept of accommodation used by Park in his race relations cycle.
Integration as a structural aspect means that a person can keep his or her distinct
identity and belong to an ethnic minority group, rather than assimilate, and at the same
time be a structural part of the wider society. A society in which integration, and not
assimilation, is the dominant pattern of inclusion is often a multi-cultural society,
where people are often regarded as living in different communities.
The concept of community needs clarification before some of the other theoretical
issues can be discussed. A community can be described as "any set of social
relationships operating within certain boundaries, locations or territories" (Jary and
Jary 1991, 97). These social relationships do not necessarily have to operate within
geographical boundaries but can also exist at a more abstract and ideological level.
This concept is often used as a translation of Gemeinschaft (TOnnies 1970). Since
community is a term with positive connotations it has been much used and "it has been
suggested that the concept is one of the most difficult and controversial in modern
society" (Jary and Jary 1991, 97-98.).
If one talks about refugees' process of integration it has to be clear into what
community the integration is supposed to happen. One of the first sociologists who
tried to tackle this issue is Raymond Breton (1964) who argued that immigrant
integration is possible in at least three different directions: within the majority
community, within another ethnic minority group, or within the immigrants' own
ethnic group. According to Breton, the integration can happen in one, two or three
directions at the same time and finally, it is also possible for the immigrant to be
unintegrated. Furthermore, he argues that the ability of the different communities to
integrate immigrants largely depends on the institutional completeness of the
community.
18
Breton's framework is obviously an oversimplification. The process of integration is
not a clear-cut and straight-line process. There are many ways of being integrated into
society and in some situations one may be more integrated than in others. The concept
presupposes a group of people who are being integrated into another social formation.
However, in practice it is often difficult to identify these social groups and formations
as well as their boundaries. Actually, if one takes a post-modernist stance one could
probably argue that nobody is fully integrated into our so called post-modem society.
Since the whole concept of community is imprecise and flexible it is obvious that a
unitary and homogenous "majority community" does not exist. Who defines the
minority, which is usually supposed to change in order to become more integrated, is
another interesting question. The concept of integration often represents the point of
view of the dominant majority and contributes to the creation of a "we" who belong
and "the others" who do not belong (cf. Elcholm 1994; Miles 1993; Schierup 1987).
Given the fact that there are no precise definitions of integration or apparent ways in
which it could be measured it is not surprising that recent books on the subject avoid
defining the concept altogether. None of the contributors in Avenues to Integration
(Delle Donne 1995) or Immigration and Integration in Post-Industrial Societies
(Cannon 1996) offer an exact definition of integration. Occasionally it is not even
clear in these edited books if integration is seen as a structural or psychological
process. Because of the problems with the concept of integration this thesis will not
use the concept as if it represented an absolute measurable phenomenon. Instead, the
concept of integration used here describes tendencies in the structural aspects of the
process by which refugees become part of social groups and institutions in society.
Multi-Culturalism
In Britain, multi-culturalism became an issue from the 1960s onwards and followed
the more assimilationist policies that had been predominant since the war. This change
in policy was largely an answer to the problems of racism, discrimination and lack of
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integration among the newly arrived immigrants (e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992;
Rex and Tomlinson 1979).
The first official recognition of multi-culturalism in Britain was in 1968 when the
Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins defined integration "not as a flattening process of
uniformity, but of cultural diversity, coupled with equality of opportunity in an
atmosphere of mutual tolerance" (Rex 1994, 6). These notions of liberal and cultural
pluralism were the dominant perspectives in the academic "race-relations" discourse
until the end of the 1970s (Denney 1983). Multi-culturalism is often connected to
liberal views of society (cf. Kymlicka 1995).
In Britain, multi-culturalism has been an issue largely discussed within the area of
education. Various multi-culturalist policies have been adopted and incorporated into
the syllabus of the British schools. In practice this has usually meant teaching school
children about the different cultures which the ethnic minorities are originating from
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). The idea is that a greater understanding of other
cultures will lead to less prejudice. Within the multi-culturalist discourse prejudice is
often seen as the cause of discrimination and racism, and therefore it is believed that a
better knowledge of other cultures will solve the problems (Donald and Rattansi 1992).
Multi-culturalism is today a much used, and abused, concept, despite the fact that it is
an ambiguous concept that raises a number of theoretical questions (cf. Vertovec
1996). Firstly, this concept describes a notion of a society marked by cultural
pluralism. This means that the concept implies both inclusion and exclusion at the
same time: people belonging to the same society but at the same time forming different
cultural groups. When we look at present day societies we soon notice that almost all
societies are, to various degrees, multi-cultural. In all contemporary states we find
different ethnic minorities and sub-cultures. Actually, multi-culturalism seems to be
more the rule than the exception.
A second problem connected with the concept of multi-culturalism is that, above all
else, it is a political concept, usually with strong positive connotations. This means that
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the concept is ambiguous and its meaning shifts depending on the situation. For
example, a number of countries have officially declared themselves to be multi-
cultural and to be following multi-cultural policies, e.g. Canada, Sweden and Australia.
A closer look at these countries, however, reveals that their policies are quite different
from each other and that some of the policies clearly are not pluralistic and also are
regarded as repressive by the minorities themselves. This exemplifies the fact that
multi-culturalism is a relative concept and one has to be careful when it is used in a
scientific discussion.
A third problem with the term multi-culturalism concerns the concept of culture itself.
There seems to be disagreement about what this "culture," which furthermore there is
supposed to be multiples of, really is and what its relation to other social phenomena
might be. This dilemma will be discussed in more detail later.
In 1985, John Rex tried to define the multi-cultural value-standpoint. According to him
we first of all have to make a distinction between equality, which is a quite different
value-standpoint, and multi-culturalism. Logically speaking, the multi-cultural society
must mean a society in which people are not equally but differently treated. Equality is
of course a noble goal in itself, but to pretend that it has something to do with multi-
culturalism can only create fuzziness (Rex 1985, 1996). One way of clarifying this
distinction is to look at some of the studies that are made about the "plural society."
Both the classical studies made by Fumivall (1939) and Smith (1965) describe colonial
or post-colonial societies which are far from equal or harmonious and institutionally
divided between different ethnic groups. Rex argues that the ideal multi-cultural
society instead should be a society "which is unitary in the public domain but which
encourages diversity in what are thought of as private or communal matters" (Rex
1985, 4; 1996, 15). By dividing society into these two domains we avoid confusing the
ideal multi-cultural society with the undesirable colonial variants of pluralism.
The institutions of law, politics and economy belong to the public domain of society.
In the multi-cultural society all citizens are equally integrated and have equality in
these institutions. In the private domain, on the other hand, one finds matters relating
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to the family, to morality and to religion. In a multi-cultural society there is a diversity
and cultural pluralism in these matters. There are areas of society, like education,
which intrude into both domains and these are areas where conflicts might occur and
where some kinds of compromises have to be found. However, even in the absence of
different cultures society is by no means unitary. There will always be conflicts in
society, but societies are also able to produce institutions to deal with these conflicts
(Rex 1985, 1996).
The concept of a multi-cultural society understood in this way also relates to the
concept of integration. People might be integrated into society at a structural level, i.e.
the public domain, and at the same time keep their own culture and identity. The
concept of assimilation, on the other hand, would presuppose that people would give
up their separate identities and cultures.
Dilemmas of Multi-Culturalism
In a book about Swedish multi-culturalism, Aleksandra Alund and Carl-Ulrik Schierup
(1991) demonstrate that there are new syncretic cultures developing among the young
generations of immigrant descent. This has implications for the dual division of society
into the public and the private domain as outlined in Rex's (1985) model of a multi-
cultural society. As Rex himself writes, "I now see that the contract between
immigrant groups and a national society involves more than this and that what I said
was something of an oversimplification. None the less the notions of equality and the
recognition of cultural diversity do have some significance, and it is worth developing
them further" (Rex 1996, 56).
Alund and Schierup (1991) and Schierup (1992, 1994) demonstrate that the Swedish
official multi-culturalist policy has indirectly supported a culturalist construction of
new discriminatory boundaries. The welfare bureaucracy in Sweden has undertaken to
construct an organised multi-cultural society, and thereby it has created a society
divided by artificial cultural boundaries. This analysis is also applicable to British
society where the term "race-relations industry" is occasionally used; a term which
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refers to the public sector and organisations dealing with "race-relations." The British
case is extensively discussed by Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992), who describe how
the racialised boundaries have been created in different contexts.
One interesting feature of British society is the multi-culturalist preoccupation with
"communities." People are seen as belonging to specific, usually culturally defined,
communities which are distinct from each other and also have clear boundaries
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). The whole immigration and minority policy in
Britain is often described as a communitarian policy in contrast to the French
citizenship model which encourages assimilation (cf. Lloyd 1993, 1994). The British
communitarian policy for ethnic minorities can be seen as connected to what
Goulbourne calls the "communal option":
Briefly, the communal option presumes that humanity can be legitimately and
properly divided into easily recognisable ethnic or racial categories, and that
members of these categories wish to enjoy security within specified enclaves
which are exclusively their own. These enclaves are further presumed to
constitute the proper boundaries within which individuals should be encouraged
to conduct their daily lives. (Goulbourne 1991, 297)
The British multi-culturalist project has attempted get all communities represented in
the political process. This has mainly been done through "community leaders" who are
seen as representing the communities. The problem is that this preoccupation with
communities has created new divisive lines between people. The "community" is a
label put on a very complex reality. The community centres or their leaders are never
representative or democratically chosen by the people they are seen as representing
(Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Different political goals within ethnic groups have
also been describe by Pnina Werbner (1991), who argues that it is the wider society
which encapsulates and marginalises ethnic groups by insisting on community-wide
policies.
Among refugee communities it becomes even clearer than among other ethnic
minorities that there are no clear and simple united communities. The earlier
mentioned political disagreements between refugees seem to be a typical feature of
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most refugee communities. Thus, multi-cultural policies presuming that easily
recognisable communities do exist are not always the most suitable for refugee
resettlement programmes. The influences of these community policies on the refugee
resettlement in Britain are discussed in chapter five.
Despite all the critique of community policies, one should not forget that multi-
culturalist policies can lead to many important improvements for minorities. This has
been the case for example in Britain. However, at the same time these policies have
also played a part in the racialisation and culturalisation of differences between groups
in British society. An easy answer to the dilemmas of multi-culturalism would be to
abolish the notions of common cultures or ethnic groups and only see people as
individuals. However, this individualism leads to a neglect of structures. It is a fact that
people are divided into different social groups and also themselves feel that they
belong to different social groups. There might be "hidden" discriminatory practices
and ideologies in society which discriminate against people on the ground of their
belonging to different groups. An individualistic approach is not able to take these
kinds of structural disadvantages into account.
Multi-cultural policies are obviously not able to solve all the problems connected with
the tendencies to exclude certain ethnically defined social groups from certain areas of
life. There are a number of exclusionary structures, ideologies and discourses which
have a continuous presence in contemporary societies. The following sections deal
with three phenomena: racism, ethnicity and nationalism.
Exclusion and Racism
Racism and Anti-Racism
In Britain the multi-culturalist discourse was followed from the late 1970s by another
dominant value-standpoint - anti-racism. This standpoint emphasises that an
acceptance of cultural pluralism is not enough when the structures of society still
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create disadvantages for some groups. A lack of knowledge and prejudice are not the
main causes behind racism, as the multi-culturalist discourse often suggests. Instead of
creating an understanding of different cultures and counteracting prejudice, the policy
should be to fight against racist structures in society. Obviously, it is not the
differences in themselves, but the meaning given to these differences which creates the
problems.
By the late 1970s, when the anti-racist standpoint became an issue in Britain, it was
clear for most social scientists that a multi-cultural policy would not be able to end the
disadvantage of the black population in the UK. The discrimination of the black
population could not be explained only by looking at prejudice or cultural conflicts.
Instead, racism and discrimination had to be removed by structural change of society
(Denney 1983). The rise of anti-racist arguments can also be seen in relation to other
political movements in British society. This anti-racist standpoint is often connected to
more or less Marxist views on society, rather than the liberal notion of society which is
more related to multi-culturalism. More militant and separatist attitudes were also
gaining support among the black population (cf. Rex and Tomlinson 1979). Among
the white population anti-racism can be seen in relation to the socially oriented and
radical atmosphere during the 1970s, where the anti-racist movement sometimes was
seen as a part of a wider movement against oppression in society.
Similar anti-racist arguments have been presented in the United States, where for
example Omi and Winant (1994) presents an important critique of ethnicity theory in
the United States. According to them, Glazer and Moynihan's (1963, 1975)
understanding of ethnic groups as interest groups, by which individuals freely can
work for the improvement of their conditions, does not take into account the "racial
formation" in the United States. "Race" has to be seen as a field of social conflict in
the United States which cannot be subordinated to ethnic identity, social inequality or
colonialism (Omi and Winant 1994).
Racism and discrimination are clearly obstacles for both assimilation and integration
because of the boundaries and structures of exclusion they create. Thus any discussion
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about integration or assimilation has to take into account racism and other processes of
exclusion.
The Concept of Racism
A historical perspective is helpful in order to understand the racism of today. In the
19th century Europe found a new way of constructing "the other." This was the heyday
of the so called scientific racism. Until the 19th century it was usually not assumed that
people belonged to different biological races, but during the 19th century the question
of "race" became an important question within science and politics in Europe. The
appearance of the idea of different "races" is related to the development of colonialism,
capitalism and modernity. These social and economic changes created a need for a new
ideology which could give a legitimisation for the exclusion and exploitation of certain
groups (Goldberg 1993; Guillaumin 1980; Malik 1996; Miles 1989). The discourse of
"race" is intrinsically connected to the idea that social groups can be regarded as
natural ones (Guillaumin 1980; Malik 1996).
Although "race" is an old term, the concept of racism started to be used only after the
Second World War. By this time it was commonly agreed that there was not any
scientifically valid biological legitimisation for a division of people into races.
However, a typical feature of racism is that it seems to take different disguises
depending on the social contexts. Racism, and the assumption that social groups can be
regarded as natural, has taken new forms in the contemporary world and is still part of
the social construction of reality in western societies (cf. Goldberg 1993; Malik 1996;
Miles 1989).
The concept of racism has suffered from a good deal of conceptual inflation since its
introduction. Today racism is used to refer to a range of detested practices, procedures
and outcomes as well as a wide range of exclusionary ideologies. Robert Miles (1989)
argues that there is reason to use the concept solely to refer to an ideology. His
delimitation of the concept of racism is followed in this thesis (with an exception for
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the later discussed term "new racism"). However, the widespread use of "race" as a
political or social concept is avoided here.
The term xenophobia is also useful in cases where exclusionary discourses and
practices do not seem to be based on traditional racist ideologies. This term depicts a
fear of everything unknown, manifested in a fear of groups of people which are
experienced to be "foreign," i.e. "the other." Racism should not be confused with
discrimination, which is an act or practice and does not necessarily have anything to do
with an ideology. Furthermore, neither racism nor discrimination should be confused
with prejudice, which describes a categorisation made at an individual level. Prejudice,
discrimination and racism might be, but are not necessarily, interrelated phenomena.
New Racism
One attempt to describe how racist ideology might take new forms and lead to
different outcomes in the contemporary world is encapsulated in the term "new
racism." Broadly speaking, this term refers to contemporary changes in the
exclusionary discourses and practices where the notion of cultural differences has
replaced the idea of biological differences in the process of defining "the other," and
where "races" largely become conceptualised as nations instead of biological groups
(Barker 1981; Malik 1996).
Although Miles (1989, 1993) finds that "new racism" is a vague term, 3 it can be
argued that this concept can be useful in order to depict the changing disguises in
which exclusionary ideologies can appear. In Britain, for example, the processes of
exclusion in contemporary society are no longer simply a question of "race" or colour
of skin, instead exclusionary practices are today taking much more subtle forms
(Cohen 1994). The concept new racism has been advocated by persons working within
the tradition of cultural studies. For example Paul Gilroy (1992) argues that the new
racism in Britain has three features. Firstly, it uses a coded language where racial
meanings are inferred rather than stated. Secondly it identifies race with the terms
"culture" and "identity," and finally:
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The new racism has a third important feature which enables it to slip through the
rationalist approach of those who, with the best will in the world, reduce the
problem of racism to the sum of power and prejudice. This is the closeness it
suggests between the idea of race and the ideas of nation, nationality and
national belonging. We increasingly face a racism which avoids being
recognized as such because it is able to link "race" with nationhood, patriotism
and nationalism, a racism which has taken a necessary distance from crude ideas
of biological inferiority and superiority and now seeks to present an imaginary
definition of the nation as a unified cultural community. It constructs and
defends an image of national culture - homogenous in its whiteness yet
precarious and perpetually vulnerable to attack from enemies within and
without. The analogy of war and invasion is increasingly used to make sense of
events. (Gilroy 1992, 53)
Clearly, the concept of new racism leads us to look at the question of nationalism in
order to understand contemporary processes of exclusion of immigrants and refugees,
thus nationalism is discussed in a later section. Most of the discussion on racism and
"race" in this chapter is based on the British academic discourse, and one can ask to
what extent these concepts and theories have any significance in Finland. Obviously,
the Finnish context is very different, and the public discourse is based on a different
history and uses different concepts. Nevertheless, the general tendency to regard social
groups as natural groups, the new racism with its culturalist discourse and the
exclusionary perception of the nation clearly are also valid descriptions of the Finnish
case.
Rethinking Culture, Difference and Racism
The recent discussion in Britain concerning multi-culturalism and racism has revolved
around the question of how "culture" really should be understood. The notion of multi-
culturalism has been criticised recently because it usually involves a static view of
culture and a preoccupation with tangible culture (the "saris, samosas and steel-bands
syndrome").4 This notion might also lead to an overemphasise on cultural differences.
Research which only pays attention to cultural differences and cultural content may
result in the researched group being defined as "the other." This easily leads to an
erroneous treatment of social problems, whose origins are located in the social
structures, as problems created by cultural differences (Donald and Rattansi 1992).
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This emphasis on cultural differences is clearly evident in the case of refugees. They
are often seen as experiencing huge cultural conflicts between their old culture and the
culture of the new country of settlement. Sometimes this is described as a culture-
shock. This relates to the whole discourse of multi-culturalism which emphasises
cultural differences. Some studies of refugees acknowledge the fact that refugees'
culture can be used as a resource, but often the refugees' lack of acculturation is
regarded as a problem and one that will lead to conflicts with the culture prevailing in
the receiving society. This culturalist discourse often distracts attention from the
structural reasons for the problems that refugees experience. In this way the culturalist
discourse hides the social inequalities and power relations that are the root causes of
exclusion, conflicts and problems. It is possible to argue that culturalist explanations
often have far too big an influence on both researchers and practitioners of refugee
resettlement.
Donald and Rattansi (1992) suggest a critical rereading of the concept of culture to
overcome the problems connected with the notion of multi-culturalism. One of the
leading British theorists in this "rereading of culture" is Paul Gilroy. He argues that we
should understand "the cultural not as an intrinsic property of ethnic particularity but
as a mediating space between agents and structures" (Gilroy 1987, 16). Gilroy (1992)
also has criticised the limited anti-racist project because it involves too narrow a view
of society. A limited anti-racist project is not able to attack these more subtle forms of
exclusion in contemporary societies. Contrary to what a limited anti-racist project
suggests, it is not possible to extract racism from other political antagonisms within
society. Furthermore, Gilroy criticises both the British multi-culturalist and the anti-
racist project because of their preoccupation with ethnic differences. He argues that the
key to understand the problem is to look at how culture itself is understood.
At the end of the day, an absolute commitment to cultural insiderism is as bad as
an absolute commitment to biological insiderism. I think we need to be
theoretically and politically clear that no single culture is hermetically sealed off
from others. There can be no neat and tidy pluralistic separation of racial groups
in this country. ... Culture, even the culture which defines the groups we know
as races, is never fixed, finished or final. It is fluid, it is actively and continually
made and re-made. (Gilroy 1992, 57)
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The problem seems to be that the multi-culturalist and anti-racist policies largely are
based on the same notions of differences that they are trying to attack. "Thus,
establishing a system of identity politics as a form of resistance to Eurocentrism,
orientalism and racism, fails exactly because its basic assumptions have been formed
within the discourse of difference it most wants to attack" (Anthias and Yuval-Davis
1992, 194).
Obviously, both the multi-cultural and the anti-racist standpoints have lead to
improvements for, and the empowerment of, the minorities in the UK. However, these
policies have not been able to change the systems of thought based on mutually
exclusive categories of people divided by cultural differences, which largely lies
behind exclusionary policies. Thus the multi-cultural and anti-racist projects
themselves also have contributed to the racialisation and culturalisation of difference.
There is a need for a proper understanding of culture which takes into account its fluid
and changing character (Gilroy 1987, 1992). It can, however, be argued that this
discussion concerning the nature of culture is not totally new; similar ideas have
previously been presented within anthropology and in some theories about ethnicity.
Ethnicity and Nationalism
Ethnic groups and ethnicity, which is "the character or quality of an ethnic group"
(Glazer and Moynihan 1975, 1), are central concepts in any study of the social
dimensions of international migration. These concepts have been used in many
different ways and for many different purposes within the social sciences. There is a
clear linguistic shift from "race" to "ethnicity" after the Second World War (Bacal
1989). Those social scientist who today use the term "race" are usually making a
distinction between "race" as a categorisation imposed from outside and "ethnicity" as
an identification made by the individuals themselves, although there is considerable
disagreement and confusion surrounding the definition of these concepts (cf. Mason
1986; Ratcliffe 1994; Yinger 1986).
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Early writings on ethnicity often stressed the importance of shared cultural values and
a group awareness of cultural distinctiveness as a basic element in ethnic group
membership (e.g. Narroll 1964). Other authors like Geertz (1963) and Gordon (1978)
have talked about the importance of common descent. According to Rex (1986a), the
latter emphasis can be called a primordial view on ethnicity.
It also has been common to understand an ethnic group as a minority. However in a
widely influential text Glazer and Moynihan use the term to refer "not only to
subgroups, to minorities, but to all the groups of a society characterized by a distinct
sense of difference owing to culture and descent" (Glazer and Moynihan 1975, 4). This
broad definition is clearly more logical and has rightly gained a dominant position
within present day anthropology (Eriksen 1993). Why should only minorities be able
to feel that they belong to a certain group? Hence, everybody has ethnicity and all
persons belong to ethnic groups.
One of the most influential theories about ethnic groups is the theory first presented by
the anthropologist Fredrik Barth (1969). Barth's work is a rejection of Narrolls's
(1964) view of ethnicity as a shared culture, and can at the same time be seen as a
critique of primordial views of ethnicity. According to Rex (1986a), Barth's approach
to ethnicity can be called a situational view. Barth suggests that ethnic groups are
socially constructed. "Ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by
the actors themselves" (Barth 1969, 10). He argues that these processes of constructing
and maintaining the boundaries should be the object of study. The most important
notion is that it is not the cultural content which constitutes the ethnicity of a group
but, instead, the boundaries between different groups. The participants own definition
of the situation becomes important and the struggle for scarce resources is an
important force in the process of ethnicity. Barth's point of view is later elaborated by
Sandra Wallman (1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1986) and Richard Jenkins (1986, 1994).
According to Wallman (1978a, 1978b), the boundaries between ethnic groups are
indicated by markers. Almost everything can be used as a marker by the participants
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who are defining the boundaries, e.g. language, clothes, behaviour, music. Depending
on the situation, a certain marker is important and not another. Characteristics
perceived as "race" are only one of many possible markers defining a boundary
between ethnic groups. With reference to this, Wallman (1978a, 1978b) argues that the
concepts "ethnic groups" and "ethnic relations" can be used instead of the terms "race"
and "race relations."
An important addition to the situational view is delivered by John Rex (1986a).
According to Rex, Barth's theories do not account for conflicts of interest sufficiently
and he does not say anything about the underlying forces of his system. What are the
reasons and the power-relations that determine the outcome? What happens if the self-
identification is not the same as the identification provided by the out-group? (Rex
1986a, 28, 96-98). However, both Barth and Wallman discuss interest conflicts, and
they even argue that it is in these situations that ethnicity becomes active, and it is then
used as a weapon in the struggle for scarce resources. Nevertheless, Rex's critique is
still important because it points to the fact that anthropological studies also need to
look at the more "macro-sociological" economic and political structures of society.
One way of gaining an understanding of ethnicity is to look at the ways in which
ethnicity works and what kinds of social functions it has. Ethnicity is a relation and
ethnic groups always need at least one other group to reflect their ethnicity on, a fact
which is commonly understood in anthropology (Eriksen 1993). Ethnicity also
comprises two different sides. According to Eriksen (1993), ethnicity comprises
aspects of meaning as well as politics. As Daniel Bell (1975, 169) states, "Ethnicity
has become more salient because it can combine an interest with an affective tie."
Abner Cohen writes in Two-Dimensional Man (1974) about how people live in both a
symbolic and a political world. La! (1983) sees ethnicity as having two functions, to
promote group interests and to help people achieve identity.
For a long time ethnicity was seen as a factor which would disappear from the social
arena due to the processes of modernity in society. This kind of primordial attachment
would disappear in the change from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (TOnnies 1970) and
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from "mechanical solidarity" to "organic solidarity" (Durkheim 1938). This has clearly
not happened, instead ethnic phenomena are perhaps more salient today than ever. This
development can only be understood if we look at the twofold structure of ethnicity.
The first factor is that ethnic groups can act as interest groups within society and there
can be economic and political advantages connected to group membership. These are,
of course, functions that social groups in general, and social classes in particular, are
able to provide to their members. However, the second crucial factor is the emotional,
symbolic and meaningful side of ethnicity. Ethnicity can give meaning to our lives and
a sense of belonging in contemporary impersonal, global and alienating societies. This
is the reason why ethnicity is still an important social force today.
Nationalism
According to Gellner (1983, 1), "nationalism is a theory of political legitMNacy , N.14ki\di
requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across politic g ones' 'Today most
authors seem to agree that nationalism is an ideology which emerged during the
eighteenth century in Europe. The basis for this ideology is the notion that there is a
"people" or a "nation," and they have something in common regardless of the
members' position in society, and where there is a people or nation they should also
have a "state" (i.e. political control over a specific territory). In this sense the nation is
an abstract and imagined community (Anderson 1983).
Today most researcher's agree that the emergence of nationalism is connected to the
emergence of the capitalist and modem society. Many researchers propose economic
reasons for the rise of nationalism. For example, Gellner (1983) argues that the nation-
state is a cultural form and political system that is necessary for economic growth.
Benedict Anderson's (1983) historical work concentrates on the psychological appeal
of nationalism. Besides different necessary conditions for nationalism, the most
important thing is the emergence of commercial printing on a widespread scale, which
leads to "national print-languages." This facilitates communication and interaction and
makes the creation of an "imagined community" possible. At the same time a
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normative language is strengthened and administration is facilitated. Nationalism
creates a feeling of a continuing and eternal nation, perceived as a natural
Gemeinschaft, which according to Anderson explains why "people love and die for
nations, as well as hate and kill in their name" (Anderson 1983, dust-jacket).
Anthony Smith has a different focus in his studies of nationalism. He takes issue with
those who look at nationalism as simply a consequence of modernity. According to
Smith (1986), the nations have ethnic origins and ethnicity is an independent element
of nationalism not reducible to other economic or social processes. Consequently,
nationalism has its roots in older history although it is a modern ideology (Smith 1983,
1986).
Smith is commonly regarded as representing a primordialist view, which is largely at
odds with the situational view with its emphasis on the social construction of ethnicity
and nationalism. Smith's approach is, however, more elaborate than this
characterisation would suggest. In actual fact, he accepts that nations are largely social
constructions. Although nations have ethnic origins and are historical communities,
this history is constantly rewritten and manipulated to meet the demands of
nationalism. What matters is not the authenticity of the historical record but the poetic,
didactic and integrative purposes which that record is felt to disclose. Smith even
rejects an overtly primordialist and fixed notion of nations and ethnic groups. Instead
he proposes an intermediate approach, where it is possible to look situationally at
ethnicity, but only within certain limits given by history (Smith 1986). However, this
approach is still in conflict with the notion that nations are imagined (Anderson 1983)
and the suggestion that a nation's traditions can be invented (Hobsbawm and Ranger
1983).
The question is whether Smith's approach is sufficient for a sociological understanding
of nationalism. To regard ethnicity as an independent social force is not a satisfactory
sociological explanation. Certainly, political power relations and social changes have a
profound effect on ethnic feelings and national identities. It is doubtful whether
Smith's approach sufficiently takes into account the relation between nationalism and
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ethnicity on one hand and social structures and forces on the other. A related problem
is that his perspective is difficult to combine with the notion of ethnicity as a relation.
According to Smith (1986), ethnicity cannot be a wholly dependent tool or boundary
marker of other social and economic forces. This point of view is different from many
sociologists' and anthropologists' points of view. Although it might be said that Smith
only has a different emphasis, the fact is that his writings on the subject seldom deal
with social structures (which sociologists usually do) or with boundary processes
(which anthropologists tend to do). Nevertheless, Smith's theories remain important
insofar that he clearly shows that myths and symbols are important aspects of
nationalisms, a fact that many authors tend to forget.
Another important issue is that Smith makes a logical connection between nationalism
and ethnicity. The theories within these two fields have largely developed
independently, but they still have very much in common. Both theories of nationalism
and of ethnicity stress that identities are socially constructed. Surprisingly, "the
remarkable congruence between theories of nationalism and anthropological theory of
ethnicity seems unrecognised (or at least unacknowledged) by Gellner and Anderson"
(Eriksen 1993, 100).
Eriksen (1993) also gives an example of how studies about nationalism could benefit
from anthropology. The question why nationalism is still so salient today has puzzled
many researchers. Within anthropology it has been known for a long time that
ethnicity tends to attain its greatest importance in situations of flux, change, resource
competition and threats against boundaries. Therefore it is not surprising that
movements based on ethnicity and nationalism are strong in societies undergoing
modernisation and social change.
Globalisation, Transnationalism and De-Territorialisation
In the contemporary world the process of globalisation is challenging the traditional
ways in which ethnicity and nationalism have been conceptualised. Globalisation may
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be defined as a "social process in which the constrains of geography on the social
and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware
that they are receding" (Waters 1995, 3). The social relations emerging from these
developments are not easily confined within the borders of nation-states. Thus they
can be regarded as transnational, a term which indicates a relation over and beyond,
rather than between or in, the nation-states. New technological developments and
increased international migration have made various new global, transnational and
even totally de-territorialised social relations possible. This is obviously not leading to
a new uniform world culture (Featherstone 1990), instead the contemporary global
world with its drastic expansion of mobility is a place where "difference is encountered
in the adjoining neighbourhood, the familiar turns up at the ends of the earth" (Clifford
1988, 14). Consequently, the local and the global become increasingly intertwined in a
process of "glocalization" (Robertson 1995).
The contemporary processes of globalisation do not diminish the importance of
ethnicity, on the contrary, it is given a new significance in a global world (Featherstone
1990; Hall 1991; Waters 1995). One major change is that the connection between
ethnicity and locality has become blurred. "Ethnicity, once a genie contained in the
bottle of some sort of locality (however large) has now become a global force, forever
slipping in and through, the cracks between states and borders" (Appadurai 1990, 306).
The processes of globalisation have, among other things, lead to the emergence of de-
territorialised ethnicities. Another development is an increasingly disjunctive
relationship between nation and states, both of which, in a way, have become one
another's projects (Appadurai 1990).
One of the more interesting contributions to the discussion on transnationalism is made
by Basch et al. (1994). Their book is especially valuable in that, unusually among the
literature on globalisation and (post)modernity, it is based on empirical research. In
their studies among migrants from the Caribbean and the Philippines in USA, Basch et
al. describe how the migrants' social, economic, political and cultural networks
involve both country of origin and country of settlement. These processes are
described with the notion of transnationalism:
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We define "transnationalism" as the processes by which immigrants forge and
sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin
and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many
immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political
borders. (Basch et al. 1994, 11)
At this stage it should be added that, although globalisation has mainly been discussed
during recent years, it is obviously not something that suddenly appeared one morning
in the 1980s. Global migration, for example, is older than recorded human history and
transnational social relations also existed before the advent of jet flights and the
internet. Not surprisingly, migration researchers have also before the 1980s sought to
conceptualise migrants' transnational and de-territorialised social relations.
Schierup (1985) as well as Schierup and Alund (1986) point out that there are
anthropologists who have managed to see migration as a dynamic process. The social
processes which constitute and reproduce the total "social field" of migrants' life
experiences can be described with the concept of "migrancy" which connotes the
continuous processual character of migration. Schierup and Alund refer to the
concept's usage by the anthropologist Mayer (1962), who studied the process of
urbanisation among Xhosa migrants in South Africa. Mayer shows that the various
parts of migration - emigration, immigration, integration, remigration, etc. - cannot be
isolated from one another. Furthermore, migration is never absolute and there might be
an oscillation between town and country for a long time (Schierup 1985; Schierup and
Alund 1986).
Thus, migration has never meant a definite end to the old social context in which
migrants have lived. Instead, as Schierup (1985) points out, although migrants live in
one "social field" this consists of a double existential frame of reference in which
migrants continue to live in for a long time:
For the immigrant this double existential frame of reference is not a socio-
psychological aspect alone, but is authentically rooted in social and material
realities. Separation from social networks, groupings, material possessions and
alternatives of labour and education in the countries of origin takes place only
slowly - for some not at all. (Schierup 1985, 153)
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There are of course significant differences in this "double existential frame of
reference" between labour migrants and refugees. Furthermore there is also reason for
avoiding to see this issue as a duality since this suggests that there is necessarily
something contradictory or irrational in the social reality of migrants and refugees: It is
more fruitful to understand this issue as something transnational, i.e. that the social
relations of a person are largely unrelated to his or her actual geographical location.
The studies of social networks made by another anthropologist working in Africa, J.
Clyde Mitchell (e.g. 1989), are also related to Mayer's approach to migration.
Mitchell's approach to social relations influenced many later studies of immigrants in
Britain (Rogers and Vertovec 1995) and the whole tradition of social network studies.
The social network approach emphasises structures. Researchers in this tradition often
develop detailed models of the structure and functions of particular social networks
(Mizruchi 1994). However, this kind of structural sociology is not suitable for this
thesis which studies the processes involved in social relations rather than the structures
(cf. Schatnnan and Strauss 1973). Nevertheless, this study will use the term network,
but in a more general way as used, for example, by Rex and Josephides (1987). These
writers, inspired by Radcliffe-Brown (1952), describe networks as the "relationships
which arise between individuals in the course of meaningful action" (Rex and
Josephides 1987, 14).
In addition to these anthropological studies, there is reason not to forget the classical
work of Thomas and Znaniecld (1958). In their study of Polish migrants they studied
the social organisation of the Polish peasant in Poland and in the United States. Their
study carried out at the beginning of the century can still be regarded as a good model
for the sociological study of a transnational reality (cf. Lie 1995)
The importance of social networks transcending national borders has also been
discussed within more contemporary migration research (Tilly 1990). This approach
has been influential in many empirical studies of chain-migration, among others in
studies of Finnish migration to Sweden (Jaakkola 1984; Nyman-Kurkiala 1991;
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Pohjola 1991). Furthermore, the importance of social networks can also be discerned
in studies emphasising that immigrant and ethnic minority associations, both formal
and informal, can have many important functions for their communities (Carey-Wood
et al. 1995; Jenkins 1988; Joly 1995b, 1996; Rex, Joly and Wilpert 1987; Salinas,
Pritchard and Kibedi 1987).
Since refugees can be distinguished from migrants by the fact that refugees have been
forced to leave their country of origin, it is plausible that the feature of de-
territorialisation would be even more salient among refugees. For example, the Tamil
refugees in Steen's (1992) study have one obvious thing in common:
They do not form a 'people' or a 'community', which means that they cannot be
represented 'as if' one was anthropologizing in a Jaffna village in the North of
Sri Lanka. There is thus no question of writing a monography in the
conventional sense of the term, assuming an easy correspondence between a
people and a place. 'The settling' (or the equivalent) cannot appear at a crucial
point in chapter one. For refugees there is no such fixed setting; this is, indeed,
the whole point about them, regrettably missed in many refugee studies.
Moreover, it is this point which clearly distinguishes migrants from refugees.
Migrants 'decide' to leave and to re-create their life in another place; refugees
are tom away from their homeland and still cling to it. ... In the case of refugees
everything that should normally define them in a socio-cultural context is non-
existent, or rather, still back home (e.g. in Sri Lanka). (Steen 1992, 110)
In the literature on ethnicity, an ethnic group is often regarded as being defined by its
relation to and interaction with other groups (e.g. Barth 1969). An ethnic minority is
thus defined in relation to the ethnic majority in the society. However, it is difficult to
adapt this relational context to the de-territorialised reality in which refugees live.
Gisêle Bousquet (1991) finds that theories of ethnic relations are not easily applied to
refugee communities. She challenges Abner Cohen's (1969) idea that ethnicity is used
to mobilise the members of an ethnic group within contemporary urban political
conflicts, on the ground that the Vietnamese refugees in her study arrived in the host-
country as an already distinct culturally and politically self-identified ethnic group.
Unfortunately, she does not develop her challenge much further than this, nor does she
draw any wider conclusions from her results.
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It can be suggested that the problem has nothing to do with theories of ethnic relations
as such, but with the strict localisation of ethnic relations that these theories usually
assume. In an increasingly globalised world ethnicity might also be defined in relations
which are transnational or even totally de-territorialised. Similar ideas are discussed by
James Clifford (1992) who argues that anthropologists have made a mistake in strictly
localising cultures and social relations.
The changing and processual character of the process of "migrancy," as well as the
continuous transnational social networks, also constitute challenges for the typologies
of refugee and migration movements presented earlier. Is it useful to formulate theories
of migration on strict classifications of migration movements in cases where these are
under constant change? In other words, a person who initially leaves his or her country
as one type of migrant may, depending on the situation and/or the passing of time,
become another type of migrant.
Diasporas
Obviously, refugee research needs a new conceptual framework in which the refugees'
de-territorialised and transnational social relations can be described. In recent years
there has been an increased interest in the notion of diasporas. Lie (1995) argues that
there has been a change of focus in recent publications in the sociology of international
migration. Instead of studying international migration the focus is often on
transnational diasporas. The new diaspora discourse has thus meant that the former
interest in immigration and assimilation has largely given way to an interest in
transnational networks and communities. This discourse has emphasised personal
experiences, and the researchers, who themselves are often from the minority
communities, have tried to describe the minorities' own interests and definitions (Lie
1995).
The concept of diaspora originated as a concept describing the Jewish dispersal from
their original homeland. It has often been used to describe various well-established
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communities which have an experience of "displacement," like the overseas Chinese,
the Armenians in exile, the Palestinian refugees, the Gypsies or the whole African
diaspora (cf. Chaliand and Rageau 1991; Clifford 1994; Cohen 1997; Safran 1991). It
is common to argue that one criterion of a diaspora is a forcible dispersal. Goulbourne
suggests that this word should be used only for a group which "has been forcibly
dispersed and lives in what its members regard as exile, the group keeps its distinctive
identity rather than wholly assimilate or integrate, and it looks forward to the day of
return to the original homeland" (Goulbourne 1992, 4). Likewise, Chaliand describes
diasporas as "born from a forced dispersion, they conscientiously strive to keep a
memory of the past alive and foster the will to transmit a heritage and to survive as a
diaspora" (Chaliand 1989, xiv).
The diasporic phenomena obviously have a long history and are not only connected
to the modern world (Cohen 1997). What, however, is new in the contemporary
world is the steadily increasing impact of globalisation. It is a process which through
the ease of international mobility and the facilitating of transnational social relations
increases the possibilities for the formation of diasporas. The concept of diaspora is
clearly associated with transnationalism, as Khachig TO1Olyan writes, "Diasporas are
the exemplary communities of the transnational moment" (TO1Olyan 1991, 4). Today
the concept of diaspora is used increasingly to describe any community which in one
way or another has a history of migration (Marienstrass 1989). The concept has been
regarded as useful in describing the geographical displacement and/or de-
territorialisation of identities and cultures in the contemporary world. This approach
includes writings on syncretisism, "hybridity" and cultures of resistance among groups
of migrant origin (cf. Brah 1996; Gilroy 1991; Hall 1993; Kaya 1996). Thus, today the
concept of diaspora is used to describe the processes of transnationalism, the
experience of displacement as well as the salience of pre-migration social networks,
cultures and capital, in a wide range of communities (Clifford 1994; Cohen 1997;
Safran 1991; Sheffer 1986).
Thus, it can be argued that today an increasing number of communities have a
diasporic relation to the society in which they live. The transnational social
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organisation these groups display diverges from the traditional way the nation-state
and its citizens are understood. Consequently, these groups represent a challenge to the
exclusivist claims of modern nation-states. It may be that these forms of social
organisation "have pre-dated the nation-state, lived within it and now may, in
significant respects, transcend and succeed it" (Cohen 1995, 16). A slightly different
perspective is, on the other hand, given by Basch et al. (1994) who argue that
international migration, rather than contesting nation-states, leads to nations and even
nation-states themselves becoming de-territorialised as a result of the dispersal of
populations.
The advantage of using the concept of diaspora is described by Clifford when he writes
that "transnational connections break the binary relation of minority communities with
majority societies - a dependency that structures projects of both assimilation and
resistance" (Clifford 1994, 311). This binary relation between a majority and a
minority is what the concept of ethnic minorities presupposes. Therefore the "ethnic
relations" approach cannot give a sufficient understanding of the de-territorialised
social relations of refugees. Seeing refugees as living in a diasporic relation is a way of
throwing some more light on the special relationships that refugees have with both the
society of origin and society of settlement. Thus, the concept of diaspora can also help
to bridge the artificial "before" and "after" distinction commonly applied to migration,
and hereby it can encompass the refugees' own definition of their situation.
The Ethnic Origins of Diasporas
Sheffer (1986, 1995) argues that diasporas play an increasing role in international
politics, an influence which in the USA, for example, has been described by Shain
(1995). These new trans-state organisations have largely been neglected by politicians
and analysts although clearly their number and significance are growing in the
contemporary world. The increase in migration and the new global means of
communication and transport all contribute to this process. Sheffer's profile of modem
diasporas reflects his interest in the political dimension of diasporas:
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[Diasporas] were created as a result of either forced or voluntary migration ...;
they consciously maintain their ethno-national identity; they create communal
organizations, or are on the way to creating them; equally consciously, they
maintain explicit and implicit ties with their homelands; even if only in
rudimentary form, they develop trans-state networks connecting them with their
respective homelands and their brethren in other countries; and they face grave
dilemmas concerning dual and divided loyalties to their homelands and host
countries. (Sheffer 1995, 9)
Sheffer (1995) wants to stress the autonomous individual and collective decisions
taken by migrants after arrival in the country of settlement. He argues that it is not the
migrant's background but their free choice to join existing diasporas, or become new
diasporas in the country of settlement, which is the most accurate explanation for the
emergence of new diasporas. Furthermore he wants to emphasise the ethnic character
of contemporary diasporas. According to Sheffer, the attachment to the homeland can
be attributed to the primordial nature of ethnicity. In the conclusion of his article,
Sheffer (1995) also argues that diasporas are neither "imagined" nor "invented"
communities in the sense described by Anderson (1981). However, this critique of
Anderson is not fully explained.
Sheffer's (1995) emphasis on migrants' free choice seems to be widely exaggerated.
Obviously, it is not in the power of individuals to freely choose their identity and
group membership. Furthermore, Sheffer's own emphasis on the primordial dimension
of ethnicity is, of course, in conflict with the issue of free choice (which he also
acknowledges). Thus, Sheffer's argument is rather confusing since it tries to support
both a primordial view on ethnicity and an instrumental view where migrants are able
to make free choices. However, it would appear that these different points of view are
still connected with each other since Sheffer declares that his analysis subscribes to the
"synthetic" approach to the meaning of ethnicity. In this approach, largely formulated
by Anthony Smith (1981), "the origins of modem ethnicity lie in an inseparable
combination of primordial, instrumental and environmental factors" (Sheffer 1995,
18). Sheffer's argument on the ethnic nature of diasporas finds strong support in
Smith's own writings:
An ethnie need not be in physical possession of 'its' territory; what matters is
that it has a symbolic geographical centre, a sacred habitat, a 'homeland' to
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which it may symbolically return, even when its members are scattered across
the globe and have lost their homeland centuries ago. Ethnie do not cease to be
ethnie when they are dispersed and have lost their homeland; for ethnicity is a
matter of myths, memories, values and symbols, and not of material possessions
or political power. (Smith 1986, 28)
The main problem with Sheffer's approach to diasporas remains the same as with
Smith's more or less primordial view on ethnicity. It is doubtful if these approaches
can sufficiently take into account the structural constrains and power relations within
social relations. In the case of diasporas, it is clear that policies in the host-society also
have a great impact on the diasporas. Exclusionary or inclusionary ideologies,
structures and policies within the host-society all influence ethnic diasporas. Neither
Smith's notion of ethnicity nor Sheffer's notion of diasporas sufficiently takes into
account these structures in society.
Diaspora as an Analytical Tool
The concept diaspora is currently very popular and there are numerous definitions. The
range of phenomena supposedly spanned by the concept is such that it is in danger of
losing its explanatory power. In order to be able to use the concept analytically I prefer
the precise definition of diaspora presented in the first number of the journal Diaspora,
where according to William Safran diasporas are:
Expatriate minority communities whose members share several of the following
characteristics: 1) they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific
original "center" to two or more "peripheral", or foreign, regions; 2) they retain a
collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland - its physical
location, history, and achievements; 3) they believe they are not - and perhaps
cannot be - fully accepted by their host country and therefore feel partly
alienated and insulated from it; 4) they regard their ancestral homeland as their
true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or
should) eventually return - when conditions are appropriate; 5) they believe that
they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their
original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and 6) they continue to relate,
personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their
etlmocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the
existence of such a relationship. (Safran 1991, 83-84)
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This thesis explores to what extent the above mentioned characteristics of a diaspora
can be found in the Kurdish refugee communities. However, Safran's definition has
also been the object of discussion. James Clifford (1994) argues that this normative
definition is too strict, and does not take into account all those instances that can be
called a diaspora. He argues, for example, that there does not necessarily have to be
any centre for the diaspora, nor do all members of the diaspora necessarily want to
return "home." However, for the purpose of this thesis there is no point in using
Clifford's less precise definition since, as I will argue later, Safran's specific criteria
are to a great extent fulfilled by the Kurdish refugee communities. The use of a less
precise definition can only add to the confusion surrounding the concept.
Of wider theoretical importance is Cohen's (1997) discussion of Safran's typology.
Firstly, he points out that although Safran's definition is useful, there is some degree of
repetition concerning the relationship of the diasporic group to its homeland.
Furthermore, he adds that on occasion the goal of a diaspora is not simply a question
of the maintenance or restoration of a homeland, but one of its very creation (the case
of the Kurds and the Sikhs are here mentioned as examples). Secondly he argues that
some issues dealing with the nature of the relationship to the country of exile have to
be added in order to include "trade, labour and imperial diasporas" (Cohen 1997, 24)
as well as the more "postmodern" cultural diasporas. A third addition mentioned by
Cohen (1997) is the question of time. This was first pointed out by Richard
Marienstrass in his discussion of the notion of diaspora, "Certainly, the word diaspora
is used today to describe any community that has emigrated whose numbers make it
visible in the host community. But in order to know whether it is really a diaspora,
time has to pass" (Marienstrass 1989, 125).
Cohen (1997) wants to emphasise the fact that although diasporas are associated with
victims and suffering, they also paradoxically involve possibilities and resources. He
argues that it is important to supersede the victim-tradition of diasporas. In fact, there
are plenty of examples of the creativity and inventiveness of diasporas. The African
diaspora's achievements in the arts and popular music, the Jewish diaspora's successes
in science and the Chinese diaspora's accomplishments in trade are just a few well
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known examples. It can be argued that achievements like these have not happened
despite the diaspora, but rather because life in the diaspora has been the impetus
behind these achievements. Life in a diaspora may both include new possibilities and
propel exiles towards new levels of accomplisment and inventiveness (cf. Cohen 1996,
1997). Some indication of the rationale behind this paradox is found in an article by
Edward Said, himself a Palestinian exile:
Exile, unlike nationalism, is fundamentally a discontinuous state of being. Exiles
are cut off from their roots, their land, their past. They generally do not have
armies or states, although they are often in search of them. Exiles feel, therefore,
an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually by choosing to see
themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people. The crucial
thing is that a state of exile free from this triumphant ideology - designed to
reassemble an exile's broken history into a new whole - is virtually unbearable,
and virtually impossible in today's world. Look at the fate of the Jews, the
Palestinians and the Armenians. (Said 1990, 360)
The exile's search for a new whole history not only takes political forms, it might also
evolve into intellectual activities:
Much of the exile's life is taken up with compensating for disorienting loss by
creating a new world to rule. It is not surprising that so many exiles seem to be
novelists, chess players, political activists, and intellectuals. Each of these
occupations requires a minimal investment in objects and places a great
premium on mobility and skill. The exile's new world, logically enough, is
unnatural and its unreality resembles fiction. (Said 1990, 363)
One example of an author who gets his inspiration from life in exile is Salman Rushdie
whose work largely has been related to the creation of what he himself calls
"imaginary homelands" (Rushdie 1991).
Diaspora and Ethnic Relations
In most definitions diasporas are regarded to be communities. Despite this, the concept
has seldom been used as a well-defined sociological concept. Instead the concept has
mainly been used in order to describe feelings and experiences of displacement.
However, it is important to note that a diaspora can be seen as a social organisation (in
fact, Cohen (1995, 1996) explicitly uses the term social organisation, although he
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never develops this idea further). Hence, to live in a diaspora is not only a question of
having a diasporic consciousness or identity, but it can also have a profound influence
on the social organisation of the community.
Obviously, diaspora theories have a lot to gain from previous studies of migration and
transnational social networks, a connection which seems to be largely overlooked in
much of the literature on diasporas. For example, Safran (1991) identifies a number of
open questions and research agendas in the study of the diaspora phenomena,
including the following:
In the relationship between perceptions of discrimination, actual oppression, and
diaspora sentiments, which are the independent and which the dependent
variables? Is there a reciprocal causality? Is diaspora consciousness a
concomitant feeling of otherness, of alienation, or of a lack of hospitality on the
part of the host society; or on the contrary, is the lack of hospitality a response
by the host society to the exceptionalism that diaspora consciousness signifies?
(Safran 1991, 96)
These are, of course, central questions. However, it is important to remember that these
are not new questions for social scientists. The interest in migrant communities and
minority-majority relations is as old as social science itself. It is obvious from most
studies in this area that the way in which immigrants are integrated is largely
dependent upon the existing social structures and the policies adopted by the receiving
society. Exclusionary policies, racism, discrimination, and xenophobia all have a great
impact on integration. When using the concept diaspora it is important not to forget
this. There is a danger that the concept diaspora, with its preoccupation with "migrant
communities" and their relationship to the country of origin, may disregard the host-
society and the power structures involved in majority-minority relations. If this
happens the introduction of the concept diaspora leads back to culturalistic and other
social and psychological theories in which immigrants are largely seen as choosing to
integrate or not, and exclusionary structures and ideologies, like racism, are not seen to
play any significant role.
Theories and discourses that diasporize or internationalize 'minorities' can
deflect the attention from long-standing, structured inequalities of class and race.
It is as if the problem were multinationalism - issues of translation, education,
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and tolerance - rather than of economic exploitation and racism. While clearly
necessary, making cultural room for Salvadorans, Samoans, Sikhs, Haitians,
Khmers, and so forth, does not, of itself, produce a living wage, decent housing,
or health care. Moreover, at the level of everyday social practice cultural
differences are persistently racialized, classed, and gendered. Diaspora theories
need to account for these concrete, cross-cutting structures. (Clifford 1994, 313)
It is important to remember that there is no reason to see diasporas as a solely positive
development. As Clifford says, "Suffice it to say that diasporic consciousness 'makes
the best of a bad situation.' Experience of loss, marginality, and exile ... are often
reinforced by systematic exploitation and blocked advancement" (Clifford 1994, 312).
Although diasporas are often defined in relation to nation-states, it must be
remembered that a diaspora cannot provide its members with the same services and
opportunities that are provided by a state for its citizens. Thus, it is important not to see
diasporas as a positive and sufficient alternative to egalitarian welfare states
Before concluding this chapter, it has to be added that Kurds in exile have been called
a diaspora by a political scientist, Jochen Blaschke (1991a), when he describes the
Kurds living in Germany. They are also referred to as a diaspora in An Atlas of
International Migration (Segal 1993). The concept is also occasionally used among
the Kurds themselves. Just to give one example: In a recent interview Abdullah
Ocalan, the chairperson of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PICK), comments on the
Kurdish asylum problem and declares that "the Kurds are living in a vast Diaspora like
the Jewish Diaspora of the past" (Laizer 1996b, 47).
Conclusion
The diaspora discourse and the notion of diasporas can provide useful analytical tools
for refugee studies. The notion of diaspora can describe the dispersal as well as feeling
of displacement which is common for all refugees. Furthermore this framework can
take into account the transnationalism and de-territorialisation of social relations
connected to contemporary migration phenomena. This framework conceptualises the
dual orientation towards both the country of origin and country of settlement among
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migrants and refugees, and can thus bridge the artificial distinction between before
migration and after migration which is common in many migration studies. Thus, this
thesis will study the social organisation of the Kurdish refugee communities in Finland
and England within a diasporic conceptual framework. The definition of a diaspora
which is utilised here is the one presented by Safran (1991).
However, it is obvious that the diaspora framework needs some modifications in order
to be used as an analytical sociological concept. It is obvious that when using the
concept of diaspora, one has to take into account previous research and theories of
ethnic relations, international migration and forced migration, which have been
presented in this chapter. Despite the emphasis on transnationalism it has to be
understood that diasporas are influenced by exclusionary and inclusionary structures
and policies in the country of settlement. For example, racist ideologies and various
exclusionary discourses have a profound effect on refugee communities. A diaspora,
although it might create a strong transnational community, cannot replace the
advantages to be gained from an inclusion into an egalitarian welfare state. This thesis
presents an attempt to use the notion of diaspora in such a way that it takes into
account both the inclusionary and exclusionary processes in the society of settlement
as well as the diasporic group's continuous transnational relation to the country of
origin.
CHAPTER 3
METHODS
This thesis is based on an ethnographic study of Kurdish refugee communities which
was carried out between August and December 1994 in Finland and between January
and September 1995 in England. The methods used were traditional field research
methods, and these provide the basis for a description of the communities' social
organisation. However, this thesis seeks to be not only descriptive, but to develop a
conceptual framework for a sociological understanding of the social organisation of
refugee communities in the countries of settlement. In terms of Schatzman and
Strauss's (1973) classification of presentations of field data, this thesis is neither a
descriptive account of the Kurdish refugee communities nor a substantive theoretical
account of refugee integration and diasporas. Instead this research will furnish what
Schatzman and Strauss call an analytic description whereby the conceptual scheme
used (i.e. the concept of diaspora) is developed on the basis of the data that are
obtained (cf. Burgess 1984).
Methodology
The development of a conceptual scheme closely resembles what Glaser and Strauss
(1967) call theory generation. The methodology in this thesis conforms to their
understanding of theory as an ever-developing process. The analysis of the results is
largely based on the generation of what Glaser and Strauss call a substantive grounded
theory, by which they mean a theory which is "developed for a substantive, or
empirical, area of sociological inquiry, such as patient care, race relations, professional
education, delinquency, or research organizations" (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 32). The
substantive theory is defined in opposition to formal theory, by which they mean "that
developed for a formal, or conceptual area, such as stigma, deviant behaviour, formal
organization, socialization, status congruency, authority and power, reward systems or
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social mobility" (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 32). Both these types of theories might be
regarded as theories of the "middle range" (Merton 1949). In this study a substantive
theory is developed for the empirical area of refugees in the country of settlement. As
Glaser and Strauss (1967) point out, the theory generation of a substantive theory can
be accomplished by a comparative analysis between or among groups within the same
substantive area. In this study the comparison is made among Kurdish refugees in two
locations: Finland and England.
Furthermore, substantive theory must be grounded in data: "Substantive theory faithful
to the empirical situation cannot, we believe, be formulated merely by applying a few
ideas from an established formal theory to the substantive area" (Glaser and Strauss
1967, 33). One research tradition which emphasises the empirical perspective is that of
field research methods as described by Schatzman and Strauss (1973) as well as
Burgess (1984). Field research methods are based on methods developed within social
anthropology and by the sociological traditions of community and urban studies, for
example the Chicago school. Within social anthropology Malinowsld (1922) is
regarded as the first user of a field research approach, and within the Chicago school
the classical works by Thomas and Znaniecici (1958) and Park (1950) are of special
methodological importance. The tradition of community studies is largely based on
these two earlier perspectives (Bell and Newby 1971).
One of the main ideas of the Chicago school was that sociology should be an empirical
science where social phenomena should be studied in their own natural settings. The
method of participant observation enabled the researcher to put himself in the place of
the researched and thereby to understand their point of view. It was believed that case-
studies were able to provide a deeper understanding of social reality than was possible
with any other method. This point of view was later elaborated by Glaser and Strauss
(1967), amongst others, who argued that in-depth case-studies are efficient for theory
generation. The informants used should be active participants in the sphere of life under
study (Blumer 1969). The sample of informants also can be a representative sample.
This requires the sample to be checked against different background variables relating
to the total population (Bell and Newby 1971).
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Field research, more than other methods, is based on a process of analytic induction
(Hammersley 1989). This means that the concepts, theories and methods should grow
out of an understanding of the field of study, and therefore they cannot be clearly
defined in advance. The methodology of this thesis is also influenced by the tradition of
symbolic interactionism advocated by Herbert Blumer (1969). Symbolic interactionism
is predominantly an American sociological tradition and seldom referred to in British
or European studies. This tradition is, however, related to the Weberian perspective
advocated by John Rex (e.g. Rex and Tomlinson 1979). In fact, the scientific history of
these two perspectives can be traced to the same roots within German philosophy and
to the work of Georg Simmel, Max Weber and, before them, Immanuel Kant
(Hammersley 1989; Matthews 1977; Rock 1979). Both the Weberian perspective and
symbolic interactionism emphasise that one should understand the social actors' own
points of view and the meaning they give to their actions. Herbert Blumer (1969)
expresses this notion by stressing that one should study the social actors' own
definition of the situation. These definitions are produced in interaction with other
actors, and therefore the researcher should concentrate on situations of social
interaction and the various ways in which meaning is produced in these situations.
Language has thus been an area of great interest for interactionists. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that symbolic interactionism is also applicable to macro-sociological
phenomena (e.g. Blumer and Duster 1980; Lyman 1984).
The interactionist methodology enables the researcher to look at the persons under
study as subjects in their own right, instead of mere dependent variables ruled by the
social structure. This methodology also enables the researcher to study the processes
involved in the field of research. By doing so one can avoid the common problem of
regarding "ethnicity" or "culture" as stable entities unrelated to the social contexts in
which they occur, and at the same time avoid viewing people as passive victims
governed by their cultures and social structures. Process-oriented field research is also
advocated by Schatzman and Strauss:
The researcher may come to see social relations not as structures that "perform" a
limited number of functions, nor as structures which change from time to time,
52
but as processes which from time to time may be dealt with as structures and
which will exhibit a multitude of consequences. (Schatzman and Strauss 1973, 8)
However, in recent years the tradition of symbolic interactionism has been seriously
criticised from a number of different perspectives. Hammersley (1989) has pointed out
the theoretical contradictions, while Denzin (1992) summarises the criticisms
concerning the theory's astructural, apolitical, acultural, ahistorical and overtly rational
common-sense biases. Denzin suggests that a solution would be to merge symbolic
interactionism with contemporary cultural studies. One of the main criticisms is that, in
the major sociological dichotomy between structure and agency, symbolic
interactionism does not sufficiently take into account structural constraints.' It is
obvious in the area of international migration and ethnic relations that structures such
as economic inequalities, racist ideologies and migration policies play a very
significant role. For anybody studying immigrants it is of course especially important
not to forget the influence of exclusionary policies and other discriminatory social
structures. Any other approach easily leads to a "blame the victim" situation where
immigrants are defined as deviants or as problems.
In addition, this work is also related to a sociological tradition represented by the work
of John Rex, who strives to describe how migrants in increasingly multi-cultural
western European countries mobilise in order to defend their interests (e.g. Rex 1996).
This approach suggests that what is important is not only to describe the social
organisation of refugee communities, but also to look at the functions of these social
structures for the community in question. This is of course related to the usually well
understood fact that immigrant and ethnic minority associations, both formal and
informal, can perform many important and positive functions for their communities
(e.g. Carey-Wood et al. 1995; Jenkins 1988; Joly 1995b, 1996; Rex, Joly and Wilpert
1987; Salinas, Pritchard and Kibedi 1987). It has thus been clear from the beginning of
this study that associations have to be included in the research. However, besides
studying formal associations it is also important to look at the more informal
interaction which occur within the group (Rex and Josephides 1987). Furthermore, in
this study the role of associations is viewed within the framework of the diaspora
concept. As explained in the previous chapter, a diaspora can be understood as a social
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organisation and not only as a consciousness, culture or identity, and consequently it is
obvious that what constitutes the diaspora to a large part are the associations and
informal networks within the community.
There are a number of recent sociological and anthropological studies of refugee
communities which have used similar ethnographic methods to those employed in this
research. These studies include research among Vietnamese refugees in Paris
(Bousquet 1991), Soviet Jews and Vietnamese refugees in California (Gold 1992),
Chilean refugees in Scotland (Kay 1987), Latin American refugees in Sweden
(Lundberg 1989) and Sri Lankan Tamils in England and Denmark (Steen 1992). All
five of these studies have been influential in the writing of this thesis.
Ethical Questions
In a study of an oppressed minority like the Kurds ethical questions should be given the
highest priority. During my fieldwork I have declared who I am and what I am doing as
clearly and honestly as possible. Furthermore, confidentiality is of utmost importance
when studying refugees. Since refugees have fled persecution, they or their relatives
might still live in danger. Accordingly, the anonymity of the respondents and
informants has been protected during the research process and in the thesis itself.
Ethical questions are especially important in the study of vulnerable minorities (cf.
GrOnfors 1982). For example, it is important to establish whether this research can in
any way improve the Kurdish refugees' situation or might, on the contrary, only
worsen the situation. Although the final outcome of research can never be anticipated
fully in advance, there are a number of ways in which I have tried to mitigate potential
problems.
First, the research has been planned in co-operation with Kurdish refugees. Prior to
carrying out fieldwork, I had discussions with a number of different Kurdish
associations and individuals concerning their opinions about this research project. The
whole methodology of this research also presupposes that the research process is a
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continuous interaction between the researcher and the researched, with the researcher
trying to understand the latter's own point of view. Through this approach I have been
able to develop the research project so as to consider issues which the refugees
themselves regard important. Also the focus of my research has been influenced by this
interaction, to study Kurds from all the main parts of Kurdistan was a wish expressed
by many Kurds during the initial contacts with the "field."
Secondly, the theoretical perspective of this study leads to an interest in the relational
context in which the Kurdish refugee communities' situation is defined. This means
that there is a great emphasis on the role of the social structure and the majority society
in this process. This relational context guarantees that the refugees are not defined as
"problems." The chapters presenting the results of the field work will also highlight a
number of instances where a change of policy could lead to improvements for the
refugees. However, at the same time this study avoids any "victimisation" of the
minority by emphasising that they are also actors in this process.
Related problems are discussed by Schierup (1987), who argues that studies of the
integration of refugees have often reflected the interests of the receiving states. In this
research an attempt has been made to avoid the problems associated with the concept of
integration through the choice of a research method that aims to understand the
refugees' own point of view. Furthermore, it will be argued that the concept of diaspora
suggests a rethinking of conventional ways of understanding integration. It should also
be noted that I have not been in contact with either the Finnish or British authorities in
order to plan this research. Contacts with the authorities could have worked against my
attempt to understand the refugees' own point of view and to establish a trustful
relationship with the informants. In Britain my role as a researcher independent of the
British authorities was not difficult to establish since I am from Finland. Actually, I
frequently discovered that it was a positive asset to be Finnish and not British. In
Finland, my role as an independent researcher was a little bit harder to achieve, since I
did not hide the fact that I had previously been a social worker. In any case, only a few
of my contacts in Finland were with persons who had known me in a professional
capacity before I carried out the fieldwork.
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Methods and Empirical Material
There are of course a lot of different research traditions which have developed within
the areas of anthropology and sociology that are related to the above mentioned
perspectives. The method used in this research is field research as outlined by Burgess
(1984) and Schatzman and Strauss (1973). Field research covers several different
methods, for example participant observation, unstructured interviews and
documentary methods. The researcher has to be a methodological pragmatist and must
use every possible method which can furnish more knowledge.
Semi-Structured Interviews
Among the different kinds of empirical material collected for this research, the most
important material consists of interviews with a sample of fifty Kurdish refugees from
Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Semi-structured interviews are used because this is a method that
least restrains the respondents while it still retains a good capacity for later analysis.
The aim of the interviews was to give a broad understanding of the refugees' situation
and problems as seen from their own point of view. The interview guidelines, which
were continuously developed during the fieldwork, are enclosed as an appendix.
The method used to find my sample was a combination of snowballing and quota
sampling. The sample was chosen exclusively through contacts with Kurdish
individuals and associations. Since I was introduced to my interviewees by fellow
Kurdish refugees, I generally experienced fewer problems with access than I had
expected. All the persons approached in this way accepted the invitation to take part in
the research. The establishment of a trustful relationship was also helped by the fact
that the interviews did not include sensitive questions relating to the refugees' activities
and background in the country of origin. However, I did experience problems with
access on various public occasions and at more spontaneous meetings in the
community centres when I was not introduced by another Kurd.
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The sample only includes persons who regarded themselves as refugees in the two
countries in question. In this case "refugees" also include persons in the UK with
Exceptional Leave to Remain and persons in Finland with a residence permit given on
humanitarian grounds. The sample includes three persons in Britain who arrived as
refugees but later have received British citizenship. In two other cases, the interviewees
originally arrived as refugees in a third country but later moved to Britain or Finland.
The interviews have only been conducted with adult refugees who left Kurdistan or
their countries of origin as adults.
In qualitative research involving small numbers it is impossible to have samples which
are statistically representative of the whole population. However, I have tried to achieve
a sample which includes representatives from all three countries of origin and both
sexes. Out of a total of fifty interviews, sixteen were conducted with Kurds from
Turkey, twenty-one with Kurds from Iraq and thirteen with Kurds from Iran. Twenty-
four of the interviews were conducted with men and thirteen with women, while
thirteen of the interviews were group interviews with the whole family present, varying
from two to nine persons. Thus, a total of about eighty participants were involved in
these fifty semi-structured interviews. The distribution of all semi-structured interviews
by country of origin, country of exile and sex is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Semi-structured interviews.
Country of exile
Country of origin Finland England Total
Turkey 16
Males 4 7
Females 3
Families 1 1
Iraq 21
Males 4 4
Females 2 3
Families 5 3
Iran 13
Males 3 2
Females 1 4
Families 2 1
Total 22 28 50
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Of the twenty-eight interviews in Britain, twenty-six took place in London and two in
the Birmingham area. In Finland, nine of the interviews were conducted in the capital
area of Helsinki, while thirteen were made in three smaller cities. This relatively well
represents the proportion of Kurds in the capital area in the two countries.
The aim was to achieve a sample with persons who had lived in the country of exile for
between two and ten years. However, the final sample does include one man from
Turkey as well as a family from Iraq who had lived in the country of exile for only
about one year. The purpose of this time frame was to provide a sample of refugees
who were relatively new arrivals but who had still received a decision on their asylum
applications and were no longer asylum seekers. However, since some persons have to
wait for up to four years for a decision, the sample still includes five interviews with
asylum seekers from Turkey.
During the fieldwork I made a particular effort to gain access to the experiences of
Kurdish women. In order to do this the interviews usually had to be organised without
the husband or other men being present. This is because the men often had a tendency
to dominate the conversation. Although I am a man, it usually proved to be possible to
organise interviews with women. It may be that my status as an outsider, who could not
be regarded to follow Kurdish social norms, made it easier to get access to interviews
with Kurdish women than it would have been for a Kurdish man. However, I
experienced problems in finding enough female interviewees in Finland since there in
fact are very few single female refugees in the country. For example, among the few
Kurds from Turkey living in Finland, I was despite my best efforts not able to find a
single female interviewee.
Interviews were conducted both with refugees who were active in associations as well
as with persons who avoided all Kurdish organisations. The sample also represents a
fairly wide spectrum of political orientations, comprising both persons who described
themselves as non-political as well as persons who were active supporters of political
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movements in Kurdistan. These political orientations included support for all the main
Kurdish parties as well as some smaller left-wing parties.
Although the sample is fairly representative according to the known variables relating
to the whole population, it still cannot be seen as statistically representative of the
Kurdish refugee communities in Finland and England. Furthermore, the sample is of
course to an even lesser degree representative of the population in Kurdistan. The
question whether this is a representative sample or not, is on the other hand a secondary
issue since this study does not use any statistical methods in order to make statements
about any wider community. Instead, this thesis is concerned with the major social
processes involved in the refugee communities, and these processes are best studied by
comprehensive case-studies.
The interviews were mostly carried out in the homes of the interviewees, but some
interviews were also conducted in restaurants, in community centres and other public
places. The visits in refugees' homes often took a very long time during which there
were many discussions outside the scope of the actual interviews. Often delicious
Kurdish meals constituted a pleasant part of these visits. Twenty of the semi-structured
interviews were completed with the help of interpreters, since my knowledge of
Kurdish is limited to a few words in Sorani, and I cannot speak any Turkish at all. The
interviews in England were conducted in English. In Finland most of the interviews
were in Finnish, although a few were also conducted in Swedish or English. In this
thesis a translation of an interview statement, made by me or by an interpreter, is
indicated with In" after the quotation.
All of the interviews were tape-recorded except for seven interviews where the
respondents did not wish to be taped. All the semi-structured interviews were later
transcribed to an electronically readable form. These computer files were coded with
the computer program Atlas/ti, which is a flexible program for qualitative text
analysis. 2 Although such transcription demands a lot of work this facilitates the later
analysis of the interviews. Atlas/ti can easily handle large amounts of text and codes,
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and thus the mechanical tasks during the analysis are far easier (cf. Richards and
Richards 1994).
One bias often associated with interview methods is that the information given by those
who are most articulate and speak the language most fluently can easily dominate the
empirical material. In order to avoid this bias, the material collected through interviews
is combined with information gathered from other sources.
Associations
In an attempt to get a clear picture of the Kurdish communities, I tried to contact all
Kurdish organisations in both countries. A Kurdish organisation is here defined as one
which explicitly states that it works for Kurds and/or Kurdish issues. The biggest
organisations were visited frequently during the fieldwork, and all the Kurdish
organisations with their own premises were visited at least once. Some of the smallest
organisations could only be contacted over the phone. Separate interviews were
undertaken with either the chairperson or some of the employees of the different
associations.
The associations' publications in English and Finnish have been studied (e.g. journals,
annual reports and newsletters). These included the following journals in England:
Hawkar, KCC News, Kurdish Observer, Kurdistan Focus, Kurdistan Human Rights
Bulletin, Kurdistan Report and Ronahl In Finland Denge Kurd - Kurdien ;dal,
Dlanpar and Kurdistan Review were studied. However, these journals are concerned
almost solely with the situation in Kurdistan, and they provide very little information
about life in exile.
With the help of this empirical material, information was collected about the Kurdish
associations' official aims, the extent and nature of their activities, their funding and
details of their membership. I was especially interested in the organisations' work with
newly arrived refugees and their opinions about the problems experienced by refugees.
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Participant Observation
In order to further my understanding of the social organisation of the Kurdish refugee
communities, the method of participant observation was used in a variety of social
occasions, including several different Kurdish public gatherings and private meetings at
various locations. For example, besides the more commonplace visits to Kurdish
associations I participated in five different Newroz celebrations, two public
demonstrations, one gathering remembering the massacre in Halabdja, one "15 August
party" celebrating the Kurdish insurrection in Turkey, one seminar celebrating
International Women's Day and several more private happenings. These various events
enabled me to meet and discuss with a great number of Kurds. However, to utilise fully
all the possibilities in the method of participant observation would have required full
knowledge of the Kurdish dialects and Turkish. Therefore, the use of this method has
largely been limited to a confirmation of information collected by other methods.
Additional Sources of Information
In addition to the above mentioned empirical material I also found official statistics to
be useful. Statistics published by the Home Office in the UK and by the Ministry of
Health and Social Affairs in Finland were valuable sources of background information.
There are also a variety of other relevant publications and unpublished material which
are quoted in this thesis.
Conclusion
The methods utilised in this study are ethnographic field research methods. These allow
the researcher to study social phenomena in their own natural settings and to
understand the social actors' own points of view. This approach is particularly suitable
for a study of refugees which inevitably includes many practical and ethical problems.
The empirical material collected through these methods provides the possibility to
6 1
describe the social organisation of the Kurdish refugee communities from the refugees,
own point of view.
Field research methods are also useful for theory generation. As pointed out in chapter
two, research within the area of refugee studies often stands on a relatively weak
theoretical base. Thus, these methods are also helpful in an attempt to make a
contribution to a theoretical discussion about refugees in the country of exile.
CHAPTER 4
POLITICS AND FORCED MIGRATION
IN KURDISTAN
Introduction and History
In order to understand the experiences of refugees in the country of exile, an
understanding of their background and reasons for flight is absolutely necessary. This
chapter thus provides a short general introduction to the Kurdish question, and then
continues with a brief description of recent political developments and forced
migration in each of the three countries of origin.
The area traditionally inhabited by the Kurds, Kurdistan, is today divided between
Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. There are also indigenous Kurdish populations in
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan (Kendal 1993b). As the map in
Figure 1 illustrates, the Kurds constitute a clear majority in large areas of the Middle
East. This chapter will deal mainly with the situation in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. These
three countries account for at least 90 per cent of the Kurdish population, and all the
refugees in this study originate in one of these countries. The Kurds, who are estimated
to number almost thirty million,' are often referred to as the world's biggest nation
without a state. The Kurds are commonly portrayed as persecuted minorities in all the
states dividing Kurdistan. Although this can be said to be generally true, a more
detailed picture is needed in order to understand the Kurdish tragedy.
Kurdish political history and the problems experienced by the Kurdish nationalist
projects can only be understood if one takes into account that Kurdistan lies in an area
where several empires and regional powers meet. On the other hand, the states in the
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Figure 1. Map of Kurdistan with estimated distribution of Kurds across Turkey, Iran
and Iraq. Reprinted, by permission, from David McDowall. 1996. A Modern History of
the Kurds. London: I. B. Tauris. p. xiv.
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region have always had problems controlling the mountainous Kurdish regions and the
numerous Kurdish insurrections. It is only since the advent of modern warfare that the
states in the region, with disastrous consequences, have attempted to gain full control
over Kurdistan. Some of the recent human rights violations in the area will be
discussed later in this chapter.
The entire area of Kurdistan has never formed a state, but the Kurdish emirates under
the Ottoman Empire had a degree of independence and the Mahabad republic declared
independence in 1946. However, these political units only comprised small parts of
what today is commonly regarded as Kurdistan. Instead Kurdish society was for a long
time a tribal society, where tribal allegiances had a considerable influence on the
political and social structure. However, over time the tribal structure has given way to
other loyalties, for example loyalties based on nationalist and socialist discourses
(Bruinessen 1992a). Nationalism arrived relatively late in Kurdistan, which is also a
reason for the difficulties experienced by the Kurdish nationalism. There are a number
of recent authoritative publications outlining the history of Kurdistan and the Kurdish
national struggle (Bulloch and Morris 1993; Chaliand 1993, 1994; Entessar 1992;
Gunter 1990, 1992; Kreyenbroek and Sperl 1992; Laizer 1996a; McDowall 1992,
1996; Olson 1996). Instead of providing too much historical detail I will refer my
readers to these books.
The Kurdish language is an Indo-European language related to Farsi (Persian), but not
related to Arabic or Turkish. The countries in the region today use different alphabets;
the Arabic alphabet in Iraq, Syria and Iran, the Roman alphabet in Turkey and the
Cyrillic alphabet in the CIS. The Kurdish dialects have developed in widely different
directions because of the cultural persecution of the Kurds, the lack of a Kurdish
cultural and political centre and the absence of a common written Kurdish language.
Many of the dialects are today mutually unintelligible. The two most important
dialects are Kurmanji, spoken in northern Kurdistan and Sorani, spoken in southern
Kurdistan (Entessar 1992; Kreyenbroek 1992; Nerweyi 1991). The Kurdish dialects,
despite their huge differences, do not have clear borders between each other; nor do the
differences in dialects have anything to do with the actual political borders in the
65
region (Kreyenbroek 1992). One also has to remember that many Kurds today use the
main language in the state where they are living as their first language. This is
especially true in Turkey where the assimilation policy and prohibition of the Kurdish
language have forced many Kurds to abandon Kurdish. In Iran the Kurdish language is
often used only in private while Farsi is used in public.2
When it comes to religion, most Kurds are Sunni Muslims following the Shafi'i legal
school (this distinguishes them from their Turkish and Arab Sunni neighbours who are
mostly followers of the Hanafi legal school). However, not all Kurds are Sunni
Muslims since there are significant communities of Shia Muslim, Alevi, Yezidi and
Jewish Kurds (Bruinessen 1992a, 1992b). There are also Christian communities in
Kurdistan, but persons belonging to these are not usually regarded as Kurds. Because
of the religious diversity, religion cannot be used as an ethnic marker in the case of
Kurds.
All the above mentioned factors would suggest that it is hard to define who is a "Kurd"
and who is not. However, my own experience is that the Kurds themselves are very
clear of their own identity and ethnic boundaries. Consequently, in this research the
only definition of "Kurd" that is used is one that is based on self-definition. Although
all the Kurds I have met are proud of their Kurdish identity there might also be some
persons of Kurdish ancestry who choose not to identify themselves as Kurds and who
avoid using the Kurdish language. This might happen because of the social stigma that
is sometimes attached to Kurdishness.
Because of their unhappy present political condition, the name of Kurd is usually
associated with the idea of resistance to national suppression and the sufferings
from human rights violations. Our oppressors have described us, unjustly and
successively, as a primitive mountain people refractory to civilization, lawless
nomadic tribes without any national consciousness, highway robbers, eternal
rebels, bloody landlords, red communists, and today as international terrorists.
Contrary to historical facts, we are said to have never been organised into a state
or states of our own. Our past has been so blurred, our present is so full of
struggle that it is often forgotten that we are a people of the Hurrians and the
Medes respectively the Kurds' first and second ancestors. (Kurdistan Parliament
in Exile 1995, 3)
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The leading European authority on Kurdistan, the anthropologist Martin van
Bruinessen (1990, 1992a, 1992b), points out that while the Kurdish people have
ancient historical roots, Kurdish ethnic identity as a clear cut category uniting all
Kurds and separating them from other possible ethnic identities is a rather recent
phenomenon. He stresses that Kurdish identity has largely developed as a reaction to
the cultural and political domination by the Turks, Persians and the Arabs.
What unites them is not any set of objective, economic, political or cultural
criteria, but only the awareness among them that they constitute one people. This
awareness is a result of a series of historical developments, the most important of
which was the rise of Kurdish nationalism. To the extent that the Kurds feel one
and have an awareness of a common destiny, they are a nation. But for each
individual Kurd, the Kurdish nation is not the only entity with which he [sic]
feels he shares a common destiny. Beside those who have been assimilated to a
dominant nation by force, there are also Kurds who have quite willingly chosen
to identify themselves primarily as citizens of their state or as followers of a
particular religion or sect. (Bruinessen 1990, 26)
The Kurdish nationalist project is, like all other nationalisms, eager to construct a
common Kurdish history, identity, culture and language. At the same time the
opponents of Kurdish nationalism, especially the Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish states, are
trying to prove that the Kurds are not a nation. It must be stressed that the aim of this
thesis is not to take part in the heated dispute between the advocates and opponents of
Kurdish nationalism. Furthermore, the theoretical framework of this thesis largely
relies on the assumption that ethnic groups and nations always are social constructions,
and thus there cannot be any "objective" criteria for who constitutes a nation and who
does not. Undoubtedly, however, there is today a strong Kurdish nationalism which
influences many Kurds from all parts of Kurdistan and which regards all the Kurds as
one nation. Consequently, there is only one Kurdish national project, but in practice
there are disagreements among the Kurds about how Kurdish interests best can be
defended.
Because of the political divisions within Kurdistan a wide range of political parties are
found within Kurdistan and in the Kurdish diaspora. In all three countries there are
Kurdish parties and organisations, which are mainly various left-wing and/or
nationalistic movements. 3 Especially in Iran, and at least until recently in Turkey,
67
Kurds have also been active in all-Iranian and all-Turkish parties. The existing Kurdish
parties, despite their appeal to Kurdish nationalism, are largely confined to the present
political borders in the region. Furthermore, they usually regard a political solution
within the existing political borders as the only realistic aim in the present situation.
The Kurdish political parties have often been forced to depend on support from
neighbouring states. Throughout their history the Kurds have also been taken
advantage of in conflicts between states in the region. In fact, many of the Kurdish
rebellions have been opposed and fought by other Kurds. To a large extent the
divisions and conflicts between Kurdish parties can be explained by their different
political alliances to the neighbouring states. The governments of these states have
usually oppressed their own Kurdish minorities, and therefore the Kurdish parties have
often become involved in complex political relations with both international and
domestic repercussions.
Many of my informants have pointed out that the democratic tradition in Kurdistan is
not very well developed. Most organisations in Kurdistan are associated with some of
the political parties. One of the leading Kurdish social scientists in Europe, Omar
Sheilchmous (1995), points out that formal organisations without affiliation to a
political party have been almost non-existent in Kurdistan (with the possible exception
of Iran). According to him the lack of a tradition of free organisations can partly be
understood through the overwhelming influence of the communist parties. These were
the first "modern" organisations in Kurdistan, and usually they were also influenced by
a political culture in which all other organisations, political as well as non-political,
had to be affiliated to the communist party. The Kurdish nationalist parties were
established after the communist parties and often used the latter's organisational
structure as a model, and consequently all social, cultural, sport and other organisations
were affiliated to some of the political parties. According to Sheilchmous (1995) this
tradition still has a profound effect on Kurdish organisations in the diaspora, but one
can discern some degree of change away from this model and towards a more
democratic form of organisation since the beginning of the 1980s.
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The influence of socialism and communism on the Kurdish political scene can only be
understood when taking into account the relative economic underdevelopment of the
Kurdish regions and the social, cultural and political persecution of the Kurdish people
in most of the states.4 Van Bruinessen calls the economic process in the whole of
Kurdistan one "that deserves the name of underdevelopment rather than that of
development" (Bruinessen 1992a, 20). The underdevelopment of the Kurdish regions
in Turkey is described by Kendal (1993a) and Chaliand (1994). Majeed Jafar (1976)
uses the term "under-underdevelopment" for the situation of the Kurdish regions in the
underdeveloped Turkey. The Turkish sociologist Ismail Besikci (1991) describes
Kurdistan as an interstate colony. 5
 Similar economic situations can also be found in
Iraq, where according to Chaliand (1994) the Iraqi government's policy has long been
to economically marginalise the Kurdish regions. The underdevelopment of Iranian
Kurdistan in comparison to other parts of Iran is described by Abdul Rahman
Ghassemlou (1993). He is also the author of one of the most comprehensive studies
published in English about the economic situation of Kurdistan: Kurdistan and the
Kurds (Ghassemlou 1965).6
The underdevelopment of Kurdistan, described in the above mentioned sources,
includes features like high illiteracy, high birth-rates and poor health services in the
Kurdish areas. There are, however, big differences between urban and rural areas
within Kurdistan. For example, illiteracy is especially high among women in the
countryside, while more affluent Kurds in the cities have much better opportunities to
get an education.
Given the economic and political situation in Kurdistan, many Kurds have perceived
their struggle for independence as an anti-colonial or anti-imperialist struggle. In the
literature of the Kurdish parties there are often references to other independence
struggles in the third world. The political solutions in Palestine and South Africa are
mentioned as possible models for a solution to the Kurdish problems, and during a
demonstration I attended in London one of the most popular phrases was "yesterday
Vietnam, today Kurdistan."
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During this century Kurdistan has experienced a high level of internal migration. This
has been fuelled by the high birth rates and changes in the agricultural methods in the
Kurdish countryside. Many Kurds have moved to the big cities both inside and outside
Kurdistan looking for jobs, but often they end up as unemployed living in the poorest
parts of the cities (cf. Chaliand 1994; McDowall 1996). Perhaps even more
consequential than voluntary migration has been the forcible expulsions of the
population. Iraq and lately also Turkey have used systematic and extensive village
destruction programmes in their fight against Kurdish guerrilla.
Turkey / North-West Kurdistan
After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire the Treaty of Sevres, signed in 1920,
sought to guarantee statehood to "Armenia, Kurdistan and Arabia" (Vanly 1993, 145).
However, this agreement was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (1924) after the
turbulent events in Anatolia ended with Mustafa Kemal gaining the power in Turkey.
The Kemalist programme of Turkish national liberation, unity, secularism and
modernisation was largely influenced by European nationalist ideology. This was an
ideology alien in the Middle East (Chaliand 1994) and not very easy to implement in
the multi-ethnic environment of Anatolia. 7 The most serious ethnic conflicts in the
disintegrating Ottoman Empire were between Muslims and the Armenians as well as
the Greeks. These conflicts ended with the Armenian genocide 8 and massive
population exchanges between Greece and Turkey at the beginning of this century.
The Kurds in Anatolia ended up in conflict with the Kemalist ideology after Mustafa
Kemal in 1922 declared that the new state was Turkish. In 1924 the Kurdish language
was banned (Chaliand 1994). Several Kurdish rebellions followed, which were
violently suppressed by the Turkish state, the last major uprising being in Dersim
between 1936 and 1938 (Bruinessen 1994; Chaliand 1994).
Even the existence of a Kurdish minority has been in clear conflict with Turkish
nationalism and the Kemalist ideology on which modern Turkey is founded. During
70
Turkey's entire existence the Turkish government has tried to deny that Kurds exist.
The Kurds have been called "mountain Turks" and Kurdish identity has been
oppressed through legislation forbidding anything "Kurdish" or even any mention of
the fact that Kurds exist. Consequently, there are no official figures of how many
Kurds there are in Turkey. Bruinessen (1992a) estimates that in 1975 the total number
was at least 7.5 million, or at least 19 per cent of the population. In the mid-1990s the
number of Kurds in Turkey was estimated to be around 14 million (Sheilchrnous 1994)
or 12 million (Chaliand 1994).
When the laws forbidding the use of Kurdish were introduced, only 3 to 4 per cent of
the Kurds could speak any Turkish at all (Kendal 1993a). Although there have been
some cosmetic changes in legislation in recent years, the cultural oppression of the
Kurds continues to this day. There has been a clear policy of forced assimilation of the
Kurdish population in Turkey. It is argued that if a Kurd is prepared to accept Turkish
identity, he/she can be accepted as a Turk, and in fact many assimilated Kurds can be
found in important positions in Turkish society. Despite this, there is a clear tendency
to regard any expression of Kurdish identity or culture as a dangerous threat to national
unity. In Turkey "separatism" is a crime that leads to harsh prison sentences.
Those who are detained in Turkey might face torture. In 1993 the UN Committee
against Torture came to the conclusion that the existence of torture in Turkey cannot
be denied, and according to Amnesty International the torture of political and criminal
detainees in police stations was widespread and systematic (Amnesty International
1994a).9
Although the Kurds in Turkey have been denied their ethnic identity and been forced
to assimilate, they have experienced a very strong ethnic revival and nationalistic
movement since the beginning of the 1980s. Since 1984 there has also been an
increase in the activities of Kurdish guerrilla from the Kurdistan Workers Party
(Parfiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK). The PICK was originally a political party with an
explicit Marxist-Leninist ideology. The party and its leader Abdullah "Apo" Ocalan
have been using a clear Marxist rhetoric (e.g. äcalan 1992). However, during the mid-
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1990s the party distanced itself from Marxism-Leninism. In 1985 another organisation
working closely with the PICK was founded, The National Liberation Front of
Kurdistan (Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan, ERNK).
There are, and have been, several other Kurdish parties and organisations in Turkey,
nearly all of which have been declared illegal in Turkey. In London I found that many
Kurds from Turkey also supported other left-wing parties beside the PKK. One worth
mentioning is the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK, formerly named Turkish
Kurdistan Socialist Party), which has advocated a peaceful solution to the Kurdish
question but is nevertheless forbidden in Turkey. However, during the early 1990s the
polarisation of the conflict in Turkey led to a situation where the PKK and its sister
organisation the ERNK became clearly the most important Kurdish political
organisations (cf. Barkey 1993).
Although the PKK is usually thought to be committed to an independent Kurdistan and
opposed to any solution based on autonomy (in contrast to the Kurdish parties in Iraq
and Iran), this is not supported by the literature studied for this research. Actually, in a
recent letter Ocalan writes, "I would like to emphasise that we are not insistent on the
division of Turkey, and that such propaganda does not reflect our approach to the
question" (ERNK 1995, 26). In 1984 the PKK started its armed struggle against the
Turkish government and those whom they regarded as collaborators in the Turkish
imperialists' oppression of the Kurds in North-West Kurdistan. The Turkish republic
has had a rather violent and polarised political history. Also the PKK used
extraordinarily violent methods in the beginning of its campaign (cf. Gunter 1990;
Bruinessen 1988). On the other hand the Turkish government's response to the
Kurdish nationalist movement and the guerrilla war was not only an armed response,
but in practice also an increase in the persecution of all Kurds in eastern Turkey.
The PKK is considered a "terrorist" organisation by the Turkish authorities and
Turkish mass media. The British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, led by Lord
Avebury, who made a mission to Turkish Kurdistan in October 1993 came to the
conclusion that:
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In Britain and elsewhere, the question of Turkish Kurdistan is often presented as
one of a reasonably democratic government seeking to cope with an intractable
problem of terrorism. We believe that the reality is one of military terrorists
aiming to extinguish the identity of a people. (Parliamentary Human Rights
Group 1993, 28)
The discussions I had with Kurdish refugees from Turkey gave me the impression that
a clear majority of the Kurdish population supported the national uprising led by the
PKK and the ERNK. As the above mentioned report observes, "Whether the majority
of the people in the region actually support the PICK itself, they are widely opposed to
the continuation of Turkish rule in its present form" (Parliamentary Human Rights
Group 1993, 6). Kurdish informants have pointed out that the historical importance of
the PICK's struggle is that the party has managed to continue to fight longer than any
other Kurdish movement. The present movement also has a greater level of popular
support than previous uprisings, which largely served the interests of tribal and feudal
leaders. It seems to be clear that the PICK in the mid-1990s had considerable support
among the Kurds in Turkey, but especially among the most marginalised parts of the
Kurdish population.
The situation during recent years in the Kurdish parts of Turkey can only be described
as a civil war between the PICK and the Turkish army. The fights between the PICK
and the Turkish government are even occasionally fought inside Northern Iraq where
the PICK has several bases. In the mid-1990s there were also approximately 20 000
Kurdish refugees from Turkey living in Northern Iraq (McDowall 1996). Bruinessen
(1988) refers to an account in the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet (12 February 1986)
where a "fact-finding mission of the parliamentary opposition ,party, the Social
Democrat-Populist Party, reported that all of eastern Turkey has become a sort of
concentration camp where every citizen is being treated as a suspect and where
oppression, torture and insult by the military are the rule rather than the exception"
(Bruinessen 1988, 46). According to official Turkish sources (Cumhuriyet 9 May 1994
cited by ERNK 1995) 9,595 persons have lost their lives in the conflict, of which
3,028 are civilians (i.e. neither PICK guerrillas nor government soldiers). Kurdish
sources (ERNK 1995) estimated in August 1994 that 34,000 persons have died during
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the civil war, of which 5,000 were civilians. 2,000 villages have been destroyed and
3.5 million people have been forced to move. The human rights situation has clearly
deteriorated during the 1990s. Amnesty International (1993b) places most of the blame
on the Turkish security forces, but also finds PKIC guerrillas guilty of gross violations
of human rights. These accusations are also supported by Human Rights Watch
(1993c). During the 1990s the PICK has at least twice unilaterally declared a cease-fire,
but this has not stopped the hostilities. The Turkish government has also resolutely
refused to negotiate with organisations they regard as "terrorists."
There is a particularly bad situation for the Kurdish villagers who find themselves in
the middle of the conflict. The Turkish authorities have established a system of village
guards to fight the PKK. If villagers do not participate in this system they will face
repression from the army and their villages might be destroyed; and if they do
participate they will find themselves in conflict with the PICK (Amnesty International
1993b; Rugman and Hutchings 1996). According to McDowall (1996), several
Kurdish tribes have migrated to avoid coming under either the government or PKK
pressure. In the mid-1990s there seemed to be a policy to totally depopulate the rural
areas in eastern Turkey, and villages seemed to be systematically burned down by the
Turkish security forces (Rugman and Hutchings 1996).
Whatever the methods of the PKK, the population rapidly discovered that there
was little it did which was not matched by the ruthlessness of the security forces.
A major migration to town began for those caught in the crossfire of the conflict.
(McDowall 1996, 424)
The political situation in Turkey differs from the situation in Iraq and Iran, since the
Turkish government proclaims its commitment to a western style democracy. For
example Gellner (1994) argues that the idea of a secular democracy (although in a
combination with a strong army) is a profoundly important part of Kemalism.
However, it looks as though Turkish democracy does not include the Kurdish question
and the provinces in the east, "Following Ozal's death in April 1993, it has become
clearer than ever that when it comes to the Kurdish question, it is not the civilian led
elected government which determines policy but the army dominated National
Security Council" (Kutschera 1994, 14).
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There also seems to have been an increase in the number of extrajuridical killings and
"disappearances" in eastern Turkey. According to Amnesty International (1993a),
people active in the legal opposition or suspected of having contacts with the PKK
have been killed either directly by, or with the collusion of the Turkish security forces.
Kurdish sources (for example numerous articles in Kurdistan Report) also point out
that many of the atrocities in eastern Turkey are carried out by death squads and
irregular troops, the so called contra-guerrillas.
In the 1990s there seemed to have happened a polarisation of Turkish society on the
Kurdish question. As McDowall observes, "From 1990 onwards ... the majority of the
Turks began to view the Kurdish minority itself as a profound menace" (McDowall
1996, 440). At the same time the government's crackdown on the PICK has also
affected moderate Kurdish and Turkish associations, politicians, artists and
intellectuals (cf. Barkey 1993). Even Kurdish members of Parliament who have
opposed the government's policies have been imprisoned. In the 1990s assimilated
Kurds, who cannot speak Kurdish and have never before strongly identified
themselves as Kurds, are largely forced to choose sides in an increasingly polarised
conflict.
Alevi Kurds
A majority of the Kurds from Turkey living in London are Kurdish Alevis. The Alevis
are a religious sect, not belonging to either the Sunni or the Shia sects of Islam and
they do not follow Islam's traditional religious rituals. There are over three million
Alevis in Turkey, i ° of whom one third are Kurdish. Traditionally Alevis are a socially
stigmatised group, and until this day they have been a marginalised underclass in
Turkish society (McDowall 1992). The Alevi community has experienced a large rural
- urban migration, which has led them to towns where they often live in their own
quarters and are regarded as a threat by the dominant Sunni population (Bruinessen
1992b). The Alevis have also experienced large-scale forced migration, where the
population has been forced to move from areas with high PICK activity (McDowall
75
1992). Being Kurdish and Alevi in many ways means a double marginalisation. The
social situation of the Alevis has traditionally made them incline towards the political
left in Turkey (McDowall 1992). As a couple of my informants told me, this has also
made it easy for them to start to support the PM( during the 1990s, despite the fact that
the PICK originally largely was associated with only the Sunni Kurdish communities.
To understand the sudden influx of Alevi Kurds in Britain in 1989, one has to go back
to 1978 when "tensions between the rightist and leftists in Marash province culminated
in a major massacre of Alevis organised by the fascist Grey Wolves (National Action
Party), in which at least one hundred, and probably several hundred, died" (McDowall
1992, 59). In the local elections in Marash in 1989 Sunni Muslim revivalists and
rightists did particularly well, and among the Alevis in Marash there was a fear that the
events of 1978 would be repeated (McDowall 1992). According to Collinson (1990),
the Turkish authorities' sharp reaction to the May Day demonstrations in 1989 was
also a contributing factor. In May and June 1989 a large number of Turkish citizens
arrived in Britain to seek asylum, and according to my informants in London most of
these were Alevi Kurds. There seem to be several reasons why they chose to flee to
Britain instead of any other country. During my fieldwork most Alevi Kurds described
the migration as a chain migration, where most people had relatives or friends who had
previously arrived in Britain.
Escape from Turkey
Because of the labour migration from Turkey there are established Turkish and
Kurdish communities in many European cities. The present refugee migration is
therefore often a continuation of previous chain migrations (cf. Hjarno 1991). In
addition today, as during earlier migration movements from Turkey, it is not always
easy to distinguish between political and economic reasons for the flight. This is
especially true since the persecution of the Kurds takes both economic and political
forms.
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Although the interviewees were not asked about the reasons for their flight from
Turkey, many persons volunteered to explain this. Most refugees disclosed that the
only thing they had done was publicly to express support for the Kurdish cause, and
that they therefore faced imprisonment or feared for their life in Turkey. The
interesting thing is that none of the persons I met said that they would have been
personally active in the PICK or the ERNK in Turkey. This is in contrast to the Iraqi
and Iranian refugees who often described how they had actively taken part in the
Kurdish resistance movements.
The refugees from Turkey I met often used their connections in Europe, as well as the
resources of their relatives in Turkey, in order to be able to travel to Europe. The
refugees in London usually travelled more or less directly from Turkey to Britain.
Often they planned to go to Britain from the beginning. There are also some persons
who have arrived as students, but who because of the developments in eastern Turkey
and their political activism in Britain have found that they cannot safely return to
Turkey. It is difficult to find any clear pattern of migration among the refugees in
Finland because of the small sample, but it appears that many persons travelled
through the Soviet Union/CIS and ended up in Finland in their attempt to reach
Western Europe.
Iraq / South Kurdistan
After the First World War the British established a new state out of the three ancient
Ottoman vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Largely against their will, the Kurds
therefore found themselves living in a state with a predominantly Arab population
(Vanly 1993). The Kurds are in the mid-1990s estimated to be around 23 per cent of
the population of Iraq, numbering approximately four and a half million (Sheilchmous
1994).
Relations between the Iraqi government and the Kurds have never worked well. The
Kurdish areas have occasionally been granted limited autonomy by the government,
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but usually the (Arab) state's wish for political hegemony has led to conflicts between
the Kurdish minority and the government. Kurdish peshmergas (guerrilla soldiers)
have recurrently been involved in a guerrilla war with the government. The Kurdish
peshmergas have periodically controlled large parts of northern Iraq. During the 1920s
and 1930 the Kurdish uprisings were mostly local conflicts, but from the 1960s the
wars between the Kurds and the government were fought on a larger scale (Chaliand
1994). During the war in 1974 the Kurds were able to get considerable support from
Iran and were able successfully to fight the government troops until Iran suddenly
withdrew its support in 1975. After the defeat in 1975, the Kurdish movement was
split into two parties which have continued their separate fights for autonomy.
The two main Kurdish parties in Iraq are the Kurdish Democratic Party (ICDP) and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These two parties got 45 per cent and 43.6 per
cent of the votes respectively in the Kurdish elections in 1992 (McDowall 1996). The
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq has been divided by different alliances with
foreign countries and by a friction between modern left-wing intellectuals from an
urban background and those supporting a more traditional Kurdish leadership (Sherzad
1992). This friction is also noticeable in the problematic relations between the KDP
and the PUK. The ICDP's leader Masud Barzani is often regarded as a more traditional
leader while the PUK's Jalal Talabani has a background in left-wing intellectual
organisations. There is also a geographical difference: Most KDP supporters are in the
northern Kurtnanji-speaking parts of Iraq, while the PUK is more powerful in the
Sorani-speaking south (cf. Laizer 1996a).
The Kurds in Iraq have always had a clear Kurdish identity and have also enjoyed
greater cultural rights than their Kurdish neighbours in Iran and Turkey. The language
has been accepted as an official language in the Kurdish areas, and this was the case
for example in the agreement on autonomy that was signed in 1970 (McDowall 1992).
Kurdish has also been accepted, at least since 1974, as a language of instruction at
every level of teaching (Chaliand 1994).
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Although the Kurds in Iraq have had cultural rights, the government has repeatedly
been fighting a war against its Kurdish minority. Saddam Hussein's policy towards the
Kurds can be described as a genocide, 11 including forcible deportations, chemical
warfare, mass executions and human rights violations on an enormous scale. During
the late 1980s the Iraqi government's war with the Kurds went into a new phase. After
the war between Iran and Iraq ended in 1988, the Iraqi army was able to concentrate all
its resources on the Kurdish rebellion. Saddam Hussein introduced the Antal campaign
in 1988, a new extensive programme of Arabisation and genocide of the Kurdish
population during which at least 50,000, but probably 100,000 Kurds were killed by
the government (Human Rights Watch 1993a). McDowall (1996) puts his estimate
even higher and writes that 150,000 - 200,000 persons perished in the Antal
operations. In many cases Kurdish villagers were transported to concentration camps
where the men were executed and women and children deported to another part of Iraq
(McDowall 1996).
During the Antal campaign Saddam Hussein repeatedly bombed Kurdish villages and
towns with chemical weapons. According to Kurdish sources cited in Chaliand (1994),
bombardments with chemical weapons against civilians took place repeatedly between
15 April 1987 and 15 May 1988. During this time these bombardments drew
surprisingly little attention from the international community. The most tragic case is
the bombing of the town Halabja on 16 March 1988, where 5,000 people died.
Kurdish sources estimate that 3,500 Kurdish villages out of a total of 5,000 have been
destroyed in Iraq, while American sources estimate the number of destroyed villages at
1,200 (Chaliand 1994). According to other sources the number in 1990 was 4,000
destroyed villages out of an estimated 7,000 (Bruinessen 1992a). About 800,000 Kurds
were deported from the Kurdish areas to camps in other parts of Iraq (Sherzad 1992).
Between 1969 and 1988 at least 130,000 Faili Kurds were deported from Iraq to Iran,
since these were not regarded to be citizens of Iraq (Morad 1992).
The Kurdish rebellion collapsed in 1988, and a large part of the peshmergas and many
civilians fled to Iran and Turkey. Chaliand (1994) estimates that the total number of
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refugees created by the conflict in Iraq was 400,000 persons of whom 370,000 fled to
Iran. McDowall (1996), on the other hand, estimates that the total number of Kurdish
refugees from Iraq living in Iran in 1988 was around 250,000 persons. Most of the
Iraqi refugees I met during my fieldwork are persons who fled into Iran around 1988
and, as will be explained later, were not able to stay there.
In 1990 the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait created a new situation for the Kurds in Iraq.
Despite encouragement from the Allies, the Kurdish parties were reluctant to join the
fight against Saddam Hussein. But in March 1991 a spontaneous uprising in Kurdistan
led to the whole of northern Iraq being controlled by the Kurds. After it became clear
that Saddam Hussein was not, after all, defeated and that the uprising would not get
support from the Allies, it soon became clear that this rebellion would end in a
disaster. Remembering Saddam Hussein's earlier atrocities against the Kurds, the
population fled en masse towards the neighbouring countries (Chaliand 1994;
Bruinessen 1992a). According to UNHCR (1992), there were 1.4 million Kurdish
refugees from Iraq in Iran, and 450,000 refugees by the Turkish border by mid April
1991. For the first time in Kurdish history this humanitarian catastrophe was closely
followed by the Western media. In order to alleviate this massive disaster, a
humanitarian intervention by troops from the USA was soon started. Largely on the
initiative of the British government, a safe haven for the Kurds under the protection of
the United Nations was established in Northern Iraq (Bulloch and Morris 1993).
The Kurdish parties soon organised an election for a National Assembly and
established control over Northern Iraq. Negotiations with Saddam Hussein about
autonomy failed, so the Kurdish National Assembly unilaterally declared autonomy
for the region. Symptomatic of the Kurds' precarious situation is the fact that the
National Assembly did not declare Kurdistan independent. Nor would any of the
neighbouring states support an independent Kurdish state. In a seldom seen mutual
understanding, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran and Syria meet in November 1992
and issued a joint statement declaring their commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity
(Barkey 1993).
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Many Kurdish refugees in Europe managed to visit Northern Iraq after it came under
the protection of the UN. Many of my informants told me that they again started to
hope that it would be possible to move back. The economic situation in the region,
however, was extremely vulnerable. All the wars had destroyed much of the
infrastructure and a large part of the Kurdish villages. Because Northern Iraq is still a
part of Iraq, the UN sanctions against Iraq also affect the Kurdish regions. Since also
Saddam Hussein stopped all trade with the Kurdish areas, the region has become
totally dependent on the trade at the border with Turkey. In this way the Kurds in Iraq
became largely reliant on the goodwill of the Turkish government, a fact that has led to
very bad relations with the PICK.
The complicated problems in Northern Iraq did not help to resolve the old
disagreements between the two main parties, the ICDP and the PUK. Repeated violent
clashes between peshmergas from different parties (the KDP, PUIC, PKK and the
Kurdish Islamic Movement in different constellations) as well as a disagreement over
the tax income from the border trade, finally led to open civil war between the two
main parties during 1994 and 1995 (cf. Laizer 1996a). At the time of writing the
hostilities between the KDP and the PUK continue.
What started as a promising attempt to achieve Kurdish autonomy seems to have
ended in economic despair, social breakdown, human rights violations and civil war
(Amnesty International 1995a; Ofteringer and Becker 1994; Laizer 1996a).
Furthermore, Saddam Hussein is still in power in Baghdad and it is not clear for how
long the United Nations will be ready to provide protection for the Kurds. Of course,
this is not a situation where there can be any return migration from the diaspora. On
the contrary, the situation in Northern Iraq might create new refugees in the area.
Escape from Iraq
The Kurdish refugees from Iraq whom I have met during this study are mostly persons
who were active in the Kurdish resistance movement and who were forced to flee to
Iran in 1988. 1 have not asked the interviewees about their activities before the flight,
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but still most of the Iraqi refugees told me that they had been peshmergas for several
years before they fled out of the country. A few interviewees also arrived in Europe
earlier, in two cases as students.
The Kurds who in 1988 fled from Iraq were accepted as refugees by Iran. Iran has
acceded to the Geneva Refugee Convention and Protocol (United Nations 1995), and
has in fact taken care of a large proportion of the world's refugees. According to
LTNHCR (1993) 4.4 million refugees lived in Iran in December 1991, of whom most
were from Afghanistan. The Kurdish refugees were accommodated in Iran in camps
where "conditions have been physically deprived and restricted, with strictly limited
time allowed outside camp, and inadequate food and health facilities inside"
(McDowall 1992, 111). When the Kurdish refugees from Iraq arrived in 1988 there
were already 50,000 Kurds from Iraq living in Iran who had arrived as refugees in
1975, and also an unknown number of Faili Kurds who had been deported from Iraq
(McDowall 1996).
Many of the refugees from Iraq held political opinions clearly in conflict with the
dominant ideology in the Iranian Islamic Republic. Many Kurdish refugees did not feel
safe in Iran, especially since the conflict between the Iranian Kurds and the Iranian
government remained unsolved. Many Kurdish refugees from Iraq have therefore tried
to continue their flight from Iran. Since the Kurdish refugees from Iraq (for obvious
reasons) do not have any official Iraqi passports or travel documents, these have to be
obtained in Iran. All the persons I interviewed in Britain had been forced to buy very
expensive false travel documents in order to get out of Iran. As Koser (1997) writes,
refugees who travel directly from Iran largely have to rely on intermediaries or "travel
agents." It appears that the only possible destinations by plane from Iran have been
Syria and Russia, from where the refugees have continued their journeys. Few of the
refugees I interviewed had any clear plan of where they wanted to travel. Most people
seemed to have had a very poor knowledge of possible destinations. A woman from
Suleimanya described her knowledge of Europe:
It is incredible when I think of it now, but I had never heard about visas or
anything and was not aware of Europe or did know about the countries and way
82
of life here. I knew of capitalism and that Europe was highly industrialised but
that was it. Although I lived in a town, I was from a poorer part of the town and I
had never met a European and did not know or had met anybody who had been
to Europe.
Some Kurds from Iran and Iraq told me that Sweden has a reputation as a country
where human rights are respected, and consequently many persons try to get to
Sweden. In practice it is often the persons who sell the travel documents and flight
tickets who decide where the refugees will fly. One refugee explained that she had
bought a visa for the United Kingdom, since this was the cheapest one available,
which was probably because the UK was regarded as the country where it would be
most difficult to get asylum. Two other persons told me that they had been on their
way to Sweden, but because of problems with their travel documents during the
change of flight at Heathrow Airport they had to apply for asylum in Britain.
After 1988 many refugees from Iraq have also continued their flight from Iran to
Turkey, where the Turkish authorities have kept Kurdish refugees from Iraq strictly
isolated from the local Kurdish population in elementary camps near the Iraqi border
(Laizer 1991), or in some cases under the protection of UNHCR in towns in the
western part of the country. UNHCR in Turkey has been able to organise resettlement
for some of the refugees in a third country (this will be discussed in more detail in the
section about Iran). The creation of the safe haven in Northern Iraq in 1991 slightly
changed the situation, but because of earlier described circumstances, there are still
refugees coming from Iraq to Turkey. However, according to Amnesty International
(1994b), the policy of the Turkish authorities in 1993 was that there were no longer
any genuine refugees coming from Iraq. Therefore the authorities endorsed a forced
return and even denied the refugees from Iraq the right to leave Turkey for another
country.
Beginning in 1990, Finland has invited a number of Iraqi refugees from UNHCR
camps in Turkey and Pakistan as part of the Finnish annual refugee quota. Most of the
Iraqi refugees in Finland have therefore arrived as quota refugees, although there are
also many who have travelled through the former Soviet Union and arrived in Finland
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as asylum seekers. In my sample in Finland all refugees from Iraq had arrived as quota
refugees. None of the refugees I interviewed had planned to go to Finland, and in fact
many told me that they had never heard about the country before they were given the
opportunity to be resettled there.
Iran / East Kurdistan
The part of Kurdistan that today lies within the borders of Iran consists of areas that in
1514 were incorporated in the Safavid (Persian) empire. The Kurds usually have a
sense of closer affinity with the Persian language and culture than with Turkish or
Arabic. The Iranian state is also a multi-cultural state with several minorities (Azeri,
Arabs, Baluchi, etc.) and it has a far longer history as a state than Turkey and Iraq. The
Kurds comprise between 10 per cent (Bruinessen 1992a; McDowall 1992) and 15 per
cent (Chaliand 1994; Sheikhmous 1994) of the Iranian population, or between 5.5
million and 8 million persons in the mid-1990s. As McDowall (1992) points out, the
sense of affinity with Iran impels today's Kurds towards autonomy rather than
independence from Iran. This sense of an identity as Iranians, although not
identification with the present government, has also been evident in most of my
interviews with Iranian Kurdish refugees.
Despite this, one of the most important events in the history of Kurdish nationalism
took place in this part of Kurdistan. The Mahabad Republic declared itself independent
in 1946. The republic was instigated by, but failed to get support from, the Soviet
Union, and was crushed within a year by the Iranian army. Although the Iranian state
has not denied the Kurds their cultural identity, the persecution and assimilation policy
has been "more cunning" (Vanly 1993, 139). The Kurdish aspirations for greater
autonomy have always been received with hostility from the government and the
Kurdish language is not used as a language of instruction in schools. Especially since
the revolution in 1979, one difference that might be of importance is that the Iranian
Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims, while most other Iranians are Shia Muslims.
84
The Iranian Kurds' relations with the government deteriorated badly after the Iranian
revolution 1979. Many Kurds participated in the revolution in the belief that this
would lead to a better situation for the Kurds. The Kurds acquired de facto autonomy
over the Kurdish parts of the country and started negotiations with the new
government over the future role of the region. It soon became clear that the new
government under Ayatollah Khomeini would not allow autonomy since it would be
contrary to Islamic principles and would divide the Muslims (Koohi-Kamali 1992). In
1979 Khomeini issued a fatwa declaring a holy war "against the atheist people of
Kurdistan" (Chaliand 1994, 78).
There have been two Kurdish political parties of importance in Iran. The most
influential and popular is the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-Iran). In
March 1980 the KDP-Iran received 80 per cent of the votes in Kurdistan in the Iranian
parliamentary elections (Chaliand 1994). The second important party is the more
radical Marxist party, the Revolutionary Organisation of Toilers, known as Komala
(The Organisation). This party was inspired by Maoist ideology (Chaliand 1994) and
was working as the Kurdish section of the Iranian Communist Party, although
demanding autonomy for the Kurdish regions in Iran (Komala 1984).
After the negotiations with the government broke down, Khomeini sent revolutionary
guards to take control of Kurdistan. Despite this, the Kurdish parties and other Iranian
opposition parties were able to control the mountains in Iranian Kurdistan for several
years. Fights between Kurdish peshmergas and the government troops continued until
1983 inside Iran, but since then the Iranian opposition has largely been forced to
operate from inside Iraq (Chaliand 1994). Political disagreements and violent clashes
between the two Kurdish parties during late 1980s also hampered their efforts.
Furthermore, there have also been divisions inside the parties. The relations between
the Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish parties have always been problematic because of the
different alliances the parties have had with the two states. After the outbreak of the
Iran-Iraq war in 1980, relations between the Kurdish parties in the two countries
became even more complicated (Koohi-Kamali 1992).
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McDowall (1992) estimates that at least 27,500 Iranian Kurds had died in the fights
with the government by early 1984, of whom only 2,500 were fighters. According to
my informants Kurdish sources indicate about 55,000 dead Kurds between 1979 and
1992, of whom only 5,000 were peshmergas. Similar figures are mentioned by Laizer
(1996a), who adds that approximately 300 Iranian Kurdish villages have been
destroyed. At the beginning of the 1990s Iranian Kurdistan was under tight military
control and foreigners were not allowed to visit the area.
In recent years the future of the Iranian Kurdish opposition movements has not looked
very bright. Bruinessen suggests that Komala has become "gradually weaker and more
isolated, it turned increasingly radical, and came to see itself as the vanguard of world
revolution. The Party split in the late 1980s, and many of its leaders sought refuge in
European countries" (Bruinessen 1992a, 42). The assassination of Iranian opposition
party leaders in exile has also seriously affected the activities of the parties. It is
commonly assumed that agents working for the Iranian government lie behind these
assassinations. In 1988 the KDP-Iran was split into two branches. According to
Bruinessen, "Both branches of the party still had headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan by the
beginning of 1991 but their position was very delicate, and they seemed not to have
any clear strategies" (Bruinessen 1992a, 42). This disunity continued until the end of
1996, despite talks about reunification. I2 Meanwhile the Iranian government's human
rights abuses against Kurds and other Iranian citizens have continued until recent
years, including political arrests, unfair trials and summary executions (Amnesty
International 1995b).
The Escape from Iran
During my fieldwork I mostly met Kurdish refugees from Iran who have been active in
Iranian Kurdish opposition movements. These refugees had often lived in the Kurdish
mountains in the liberated areas for a long time, up to ten years, active as peshmergas
in some of the Kurdish parties. Many of the interviewees had continued their flight
from the liberated areas in the mountains to Turkey, or in some cases to Iraq. Other
refugees had travelled straight from Iran over the border to Turkey. According to
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Amnesty International (1994b), every year hundreds of Iranian refugees arrive in
Turkey, and the International Organization for Migration estimates that nearly 1.5
million Iranians have entered Turkey since the late 1970s (IOM 1996).
It looks like the earlier mentioned disintegration of the parties and their infrastructure
has forced many refugees to leave the mountains. Some persons have been wounded or
have suffered other physical weaknesses, and are more a burden than an asset for the
Kurdish parties, thus having to seek asylum elsewhere. Several of the Iranian Kurds
who participated in this research said that the disunity and decline of the Iranian
Kurdish movements and opposition parties were major factors behind their decision to
seek asylum in Europe. Many of my interviewees, both from Iran and Iraq, also
indicated that, after several years in the mountains, personal reasons influenced their
decisions. Many persons told me that their children's future was the ultimate reason
why they decided to leave their mountain hide-outs.
Turkey has ratified the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and acceded to the
1967 Protocol, but has kept the geographical limitation of the convention. This means
that Turkey, from a legal point of view, only accepts as a refugee a person who has
fled from his or her country as a result of events occurred in Europe (KiriKi 1996;
United Nations 1995). Consequently, neither refugees from Iran nor Iraq are regarded
as refugees in Turkey and are not allowed to stay in the country. Instead there is an
informal agreement between UNHCR and Turkey that UNHCR can take care of and
determine the refugee status of persons from non-European counties and if necessary
organise their resettlement in a third country. Despite this co-operation there are
frequent reports that the Turkish authorities deport refugees back to the countries they
are coming from, and even persons waiting for resettlement are under the constant
threat of being sent back. There are several reports of refugees who have been forcibly
returned to Iran where they are reported to have been executed or imprisoned
(Amnesty International 1994b). UNHCR is therefore trying to resettle people as fast as
possible. However, this is a complicated process. Even in the fastest cases it seems to
take at least one year, and two years is not uncommon, to determine the status of a
person and find a country for resettlement.I3
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Finland has accepted Iranian refugees within its yearly quota since 1989, and a large
number of the Iranian refugees in Finland are Kurds who have arrived as quota
refugees since 1990. All Iranian Kurds in my sample in Finland had arrived as quota
refugees. As in the case of the refugees from Iraq, none of the persons I interviewed
had originally planned to move to Finland. Some of them told me that they had wished
to move to a country where they had relatives or friends, but since their lives were in
immediate danger they accepted any country UNHCR suggested.
Iranian refugees regard themselves as being under a continued threat from Iranian
agents also in Turkey. In fact, several Iranian opposition politicians have been killed in
Turkey (Amnesty International 1994b). Iranian refugees are housed near Ankara by
UNHCR in certain cities which they are not allowed to leave and where they are
monitored by the local police. This arrangement might be in order to protect the
refugees from assassinations, but it also allows the Turkish authorities to isolate
Iranian Kurds from the local Kurdish population.
Because of the above mentioned factors, many Iranian refugees in Turkey fear for their
lives and wish to leave as soon as possible. Since Iranian refugees, for obvious reasons,
have seldom been in a position to obtain valid travel documents, those who wish to
leave Turkey immediately have to buy expensive documents on the black market. This
was the case for all Iranian refugees whom I met in Britain. Only one person told me
that she had planned to go to the UK from the beginning because she had relatives in
the country. The other interviewees did not have any plans and travelled to the first
place for which they could get valid tickets, since they did not dare to stay in Turkey.
A young woman from Iran told me about her escape:
OW: Did you actually plan to go to Britain from the beginning, or, did you
choose the country?
R: You know first let me say, I did not want to go anywhere honestly and I had
to make decision in just a few days, in about three days, and I did not mind
where I was going, just I wanted to leave Iran, I had a plan going to Germany
because of some friends I had there. Many times I was taken to the Airport in
Istanbul, but I could not, they could not manage, and after a while I decided to
come here and they took me.
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OW: so, it was more like a coincidence that you came here?
R: You know, because when you leave, in that particular situation I did not care
very much where I was going to, I was just going to leave Iran and I was in a
very bad condition of everything, mentally and whatever. When you are forced
to leave you do not mind where you are going to.
Characteristics of the Forced Migration
The conflicts in Kurdistan have grown more serious over the years. During the earlier
local conflicts, refugees were able to flee to another part of Kurdistan and return when
the conflict was resolved. During the more intensive conflicts between the
governments and the Kurds in recent years the refugees have been forced on a massive
scale to flee to the neighbouring countries or to become displaced persons within the
country. However, the complicated political situation in the region and the
simultaneous conflicts between the Kurds and the governments in Turkey, Iraq and
Iran have made it increasingly hard to find refuge in the neighbouring states. At the
same time the size of the conflicts and the devastation in the region has made
repatriation more difficult. The need for asylum outside the region has consequently
increased.
Although the Kurds are oppressed by the governments in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, and
this oppression is a major reason for the flight from these countries, there are also other
reasons for the flight from Kurdistan. The reasons are often a complex combination of
the various political, economic and social problems which I have outlined above. For
example Bruinessen (1992b) points out that the reason for flight is often a combination
of state persecution and various local conflicts, and that furthermore there are also
religious and sectarian conflicts in the region which can create refugees. It is also
important to remember that many persons have not personally been involved in
politics, but are merely victims of violent conflicts or forcible deportations.
Clearly, human suffering cannot be quantified or properly understood by social
science. But since the different patterns of migration among the refugees will have a
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relevance for the later theoretical discussion in this thesis, there is reason to return to
the typologies of refugee migration presented in chapter two. In terms of the typology
suggested by Zolberg et al. (1989), who distinguish between refugees as activists,
targets or victims, it is not very easy to classify the Kurdish refugees. In my own
sample many of the refugees from Iran and Iraq would fall into the category of
activists, since they have personally participated in the conflict as peshmergas.
Travelling with them are of course also family members and children who probably
should be regarded as victims or even targets of the conflict. In the case of refugees
from Turkey it seems as though most persons are victims who are caught in the cross-
fire or are exposed to generalised social violence. However, since the Kurds in eastern
Turkey, as well as in other parts of Kurdistan, are facing persecution largely because
they belong to a certain ethnic group, all Kurds can correctly be regarded as targets in
the sense described by Zolberg et al. (1989).
Almost all Kurdish refugees are what Kunz (1973) would call "acute refugees" who
have escaped from an ongoing conflict. Very few persons can be regarded as
"anticipatory refugees." Since the Kurds are an oppressed minority, they seem to fit
Kunz's (1981) category of being "events-alienated." However, the Kurds are a
majority within Kurdistan, which makes this description somewhat problematic.
Furthermore, many Kurds, especially those active in left-wing parties, also seem to fit
the description of "self-alienated" refugees, since they can be regarded as
"revolutionary activists" with a "purpose." Hence, none of the typologies earlier
described in chapter two seems to be suitable for all Kurdish refugees.
Kurds in Exile
Munir Morad (1992) estimates that in the period 1960-1988 there were all in all 2.5
million displaced persons and refugees originating in the Kurdish area (including
Kurds and other minorities traditionally living in the Kurdish area). Today, the number
is probably far bigger. For example ERNK (1995) estimates that the number of Kurds
forced to move because of the conflict in Turkey alone is 3.5 million. Furthermore, the
changes in Iraq since 1988 have created new groups of refugees and displaced persons.
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Sheikhmous (1994) estimates that the Kurdish diaspora outside the Middle East and
CIS numbers at least 500,000. Of these at least 300,000 can be found in Germany,
where the labour migration from Turkey also included many Kurds. The Turks and
Kurds in Germany have been extensively studied by social scientists, as in the account
of the Kurdish community by Blaschke (1989, 1991a, 1991b) and Senol (1992).
Since the labour migration to Europe was stopped in the early 1970s, most Kurds have
arrived in Europe as refugees. Other countries in Europe with large Kurdish
populations are France, The Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden (Blaschke
1991b; Sheilchmous 1990). A short history of the Kurdish associations and their
cultural and political activities in Europe has been written by Sheildimous (1989). The
book Kurden im Exil (1991) includes an extensive list of Kurdish organisations, artists
and journals in exile. Contemporary Kurdish refugee migration has been studied in
Greece by Black (1995). Collinson (1990) has studied the Alevi Kurdish refugee
migration to Britain, while the fieldwork for Reilly's MA-thesis (1991) was conducted
in the Kurdistan Workers Association in London. There are also some publications
about the Kurdish refugees in Finland (e.g. Make1a.1993; Nyt-voltu and Azim 1996).
The refugees who arrive in Europe are of course not representative of the whole
Kurdish population. It is only certain persons who can and will flee abroad. First,
politically active persons are of course more likely to become refugees than others. In
Kurdistan, as well as in most parts of the world, a politically active person is usually
male, relatively young, well educated, often coming from an urban middle-class
background. Secondly, not all persons have the economic resources to pay for the
travel expenses that a flight to Europe entails. Usually the money is borrowed from
and collected by relatives, but still the opportunity to seek asylum in Europe is not
open to all refugees. However, the refugees resettled by UNHCR are often large
families and other persons who have not had the necessary economic resources.
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Conclusion
This chapter proves that at least one of Safran's characteristics of a diaspora is fulfilled
in the case of the Kurds in exile. Kurdish refugees have experienced a forced dispersal,
since "they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original 'center' to
two or more 'peripheral,' or foreign, regions" (Safran 1991, 83). The conflict in
Kurdistan is a complex one where national and local conflicts are overlapping in a
situation where political ideologies, religious divisions, ethnic conflicts and economic
inequality all play their role. In Iran, Iraq and Turkey the conflicts between the
governments and the Kurds have become worse during the 1980s and early 1990s.
However, there are differences between the political backgrounds in the three countries
of origin. The oppression the Kurds face has taken different forms in the three
countries. There are also considerable differences between the prospects for the
Kurdish political parties and the Kurdish national projects in the three countries. There
is, however, still one Kurdish nationalism which is uniting the Kurds from different
countries.
At the same time as the conflict has become worse in terms of human suffering, it has
become increasingly difficult for refugees to seek refuge within another part of
Kurdistan or the Middle East. Consequently, there is an increased need for asylum
outside the Middle East. The protection, or lack of protection, which two countries in
Europe, Finland and the United Kingdom, has been able to offer to persecuted Kurds
will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5
THE COUNTRIES OF RECEPTION
This study is based on research carried out in Finland and England. This chapter
describes the two societies of reception which have received Kurdish refugees and
asylum seekers and is thus a continuation of the previous chapter which described the
refugees' societies of origin. Both Finland and the United Kingdom have relatively
restrictive asylum policies and also recently arrived Kurdish refugee populations.
However, in most other aspects relating to refugee resettlement the two countries are
unlike each other. A comparison between the two different societies makes it possible
to describe the impact of different social structures on the refugee communities. The
consequences of these differences are discussed in chapters six and seven, while this
chapter concentrates on identifying the differences and similarities in the two receiving
societies. It can be expected that the different social structures in England and Finland
have different consequences for the process of integration and for the social
organisation of the refugee communities. A comparative perspective also gives an
opportunity to highlight some general features in the way refugees are integrated.
Despite all the differences between the two cases, a number of features remain the
same.
Finland
Finland has never experienced any large scale immigration of labour migrants. On the
contrary, until the early 1980s it remained a country of emigration. The number of
refugees arriving in the country has also been very small and most persons have
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arrived during recent years. Although the changes have been slow, Finland has during
recent years changed from a country of emigration to a country of immigration. When
looking at the reception of refugees in Finland, and ethnic relations in general, one has
to remember this historical context.
Finnish history includes comparable situations to the present patterns of immigration.
The country was a part of Sweden until the year 1809 and a part of the Russian empire
until the year 1917. Finland has been a meeting place between east and west, and can
be regarded as a multi-cultural society already from its independence. Since then the
minorities in the country, at least officially, have had a relatively secure position in
Finnish society. The Swedish speaking minority (300 000 persons) has a relatively
secure legal position since Swedish is one of the two official languages of the country.
Also the relations between the majority and the smaller cultural minorities (in order of
estimated size: Gypsies, Samis, Jews and Muslim Tartars) have in an international
comparison often worked relatively well in Finland (cf. Pentikainen and Hiltunen
1995). Ethnic relations in Finland have until recently been a question relating mainly
to these old and well-established minorities.
Migration is certainly not an uncommon phenomenon in the history of Finland. The
total number of persons who emigrated from Finland between 1860 and 1992 is
estimated to be slightly more than 1.1 million (Korlciasaari 1993), which can be
compared to the fact that the population of Finland today is 5 million. During the turn
of' the century the emigration from Finland was mainly directed towards North
America, but later, after the Second World War, it was mainly directed to Sweden. In
addition, there is reason to mention the 422,600 displaced persons, from the areas in
Eastern Finland that were occupied by the Soviet Union, who after the Second World
War had to be resettled in other parts of Finland (Waris 1976).
After the Second World War Finland managed to keep its independence, but the
country found itself in a rather remote and isolated geographical location in a post-war
Europe that was divided between east and west. Despite the special relationship with
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the Soviet Union, the border between the countries was in many ways a closed one.
During the post-war years in Finland economic changes and urbanisation produced a
relatively large unemployed population. At the same time the Swedish economy
experienced a shortage of labour. These circumstances produced a situation with
minimal immigration to Finland accompanied by a large emigration to Sweden. This
combination of factors meant that the formerly relatively pluralistic society during the
post-war years became a country which "has been referred to by many commentators
as the least multi-cultural country in Europe" (Tolvanen 1991, 102). For example, as
late as 1980 the foreign citizens living permanently in Finland numbered only 13,000
persons, which in a European context was probably comparable only to Albania.
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Figure 2. Immigration and emigration in Finland between 1945 and 1995. Sources:
Korkiasaari (1993), Nieminen (1994) and Statistics Finland (1995, 1996).
Until the 1980s, the migration movements described in Figure 2 consisted mainly of
labour migration to Sweden and a return migration from Sweden. The number of Finns
who officially moved to Sweden in the period 1945-1992 is 520,000 persons, but
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about half of them later moved back to Finland. Since 1980 the number of people
moving to Sweden has been low, and more people have moved back to Finland than
emigrated to Sweden (Korkiasaari 1993).
During the 1980s the post-war pattern of migration has changed greatly in Finland.
Immigration is today larger than emigration. The available statistics clearly indicate
that the immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s are no longer only former Finnish
emigrants who are returning to Finland (Korkiasaari 1993). Immigration now largely
comprises of persons from the CIS and the Baltic states, but other nationalities are also
found among the immigrants. Since 1990, persons from the former Soviet Union who
can prove that their ancestors were Finnish are treated as repatriates and can move to
Finland. In practice this repatriation has been applied to the Ingrians, who since the
seventeenth century have lived in the area around St Petersburg. Some of the older
Ingrians speak Finnish, but most of the young people no longer have a knowledge of
the language. No exact numbers are available, but there were probably around 13,000
Ingrians living in Finland in 1995 (Nieminen 1995).
Figure 3 outlines the number of foreign citizens living permanently in Finland.
Although the increase in the number of foreigners looks quite spectacular, one has to
remember that this increase in a comparative European perspective only represents a
return to a more "normal" proportion of foreigners within the country. In fact, the
number of foreigners living in the country remains relatively small. One can identify
three reasons for the increase in the immigration to Finland during the 1980s. First, the
positive economic development in Finland during the 1980s was an enabling effect
(although the country later in the 1990s went into a severe economic recession).
Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union created a situation where some migration
from the east is possible. However, the border remains heavily guarded by Russia and
the migration has perhaps not been as big as expected. The third reason, although quite
marginal, is refugee migration. As Figure 3 shows, only a small part of the foreign
population in Finland are refugees.
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Figure 3. Foreign citizens and refugees living in Finland, 1980-1996. Sources:
Korkiasaari (1993) Nieminen (1994) and statistics published in Monitori and
Pakolasinfo. The number of refugees is an estimation made at the Ministry of Health
and Social Affairs based on the number of refugees arrived in Finland.
Refugees in Finland
The first main influx of refugees into Finland happened after the Russian Revolution in
1917. Finland was mainly a transit country, but there were still 33 500 Russian
refugees living in Finland in the year 1922 (Jaalckola 1989). After this the country did
not experience any larger number of refugees until the 1980s.
By international comparison, Finland is a relatively small country. Therefore it has
been an aim of the Finnish foreign policy to strengthen the role of the United Nations
and to be actively involved in its work. The logical consequence of this is Finnish
participation in the work of the UNHCR. In 1968 Finland acceded to both the Refugee
Convention and the Protocol. During the end of the 1980s Finland was among the ten
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biggest contributors to the budget of the UNHCR. Another aspect of this international
co-operation has been the introduction of an annual quota for refugees.
In comparison with the other Nordic countries the quota has been rather small,
although there has been a significant increase during recent years. The selection of the
refugees has been made on humanitarian grounds and Finland has tried to compensate
for its small quota by accepting refugees whom UNHCR has found it difficult to
resettle elsewhere. The first refugees who arrived within a quota were 300 Chilean
refugees, who arrived from 1973 onwards. Since the late 1970s Vietnamese refugees
have arrived as quota refugees. In recent years the quota has included refugees from
the Middle East and from former Yugoslavia.
The number of asylum seekers, arriving outside of any quota, has been relatively
small. At least in part the small number can be entained by the, as sem from the,
asylum seekers point of view, remote location of the country.' Another issue which
probably has an influence is the restrictive implementation of the Refugee Convention.
It is only around 1 per cent of the asylum seekers who have managed to get full
refugee status and this percentage has during recent years been remarkably constant.
Finland, together with Norway, has recently had the lowest recognition rates in
Europe. On the other hand, the various "B-statutes" in Finland have been granted
relatively frequently. During the last ten years around half of the decisions have been
negative and half of the decisions have granted the asylum seeker a residence permit.
In practice those who have "B-statuses" have the same rights and receive the same
services as those who have full refugee status. For example, a person with one of the
"B-statuses" has the same right to family reunification as those with full refugee status.
However, despite some positive changes in recent years, the Finnish asylum policy can
still not be described as anything other than restrictive. The number of asylum seekers
and the size of the annual quota are presented in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Asylum seekers and the refugee quota in Finland, 1979-1996. Sources:
Statistics published in the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs' journals Monitori
and Pakolasinfo. The annual quota does not correspond fully with the actual number
of quota refugees arrived during the year.
The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs estimated at the end of 1994 that there were
almost 12,000 refugees living in Finland, mainly from Somalia, Vietnam and former
Yugoslavia. The exact number is not known since some refugees have already become
naturalised Finns, and thus are no longer refugees.2 A foreigner, including a refugee,
who has been living permanently in Finland for five years may apply for Finnish
citizenship. In addition, an applicant often has to wait for up to three years before a
decision is given. "Naturalisation is conditional upon the alien being fluent in either
Finnish or Swedish and being considered 'an honourable member of society', i.e. s/he
should not have a criminal record or have incurred large debts" (ECRE 1994, 135).
Finland has had a clear policy to keep the number of refugees as small as possible and
to discourage asylum seekers from spontaneously arriving in Finland. Clear proof of a
strict refugee policy can be seen in the introduction of visa regulations for "refugee
producing" countries. Furthermore, the legal procedure has been changed with the
introduction of the notions of "safe countries" of origin and transit, whereby a negative
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decision in certain cases can be made through a fast procedure. On the other hand there
has been a support for a humanitarian resettlement of refugees in an orderly and
controlled way. The future policies of the country are guided by the fact that Finland
joined the European Union in 1995 and has to harmonise its immigration rules. Since
other European countries today are closing their borders (Joly 1992, 1996) we might
end up in a situation where Finland is closing its borders without ever having had them
open.
Reception policies in Finland
Finnish society is largely based on the model of the Nordic welfare state, with an
extensive public sector and a tradition of actively striving to remove social inequalities
and differences. In the Nordic welfare states the state and civil society are often
regarded as rather intertwined since the state has largely taken over functions from
civil society and the voluntary organisations (Allardt 1994). Although the economic
recession and the severe unemployment situation in recent years might change this
feature, this model still had a fundamental impact on Finnish society during my
fieldwork in 1994.
These features of Finnish society also have an impact on the refugee reception policies
(cf. SOderling 1993). In the same way as other residents in Finland, refugees are
provided with health services, social benefits and, if necessary, housing from the
public sector. In addition there are extensive resettlement programmes for refugees
organised within the public sector. Most refugees take part in orientation courses
consisting of language training and occupational training for about one year. These
extensive programmes are supposed to encourage a positive integration of the refugees
into society. One major aim of the programmes is to find employment for the refugees.
The introductory courses for immigrants include practical experience in various jobs
and extensive guidance about career opportunities. In Finland, as elsewhere,
employment is often seen as a key factor in the integration of refugees (cf. Elcholm
1994; Phillips 1989; Miles 1993). Although the resettlement of refugees is the object
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of special consideration by the authorities, this is all happening within the framework
of the normal structures of social welfare and public support. After the first-year
training programmes, refugees are usually expected to make use of the normal public
services available to all Finnish residents, and thus the reception system is clearly
front-end loaded. In practice, the reception and resettlement of refugees are de-
centralised to the local municipalities since the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
disperse the refugees in small groups in municipalities all over the country.3
Cultural pluralism has not usually been regarded as a political issue in Finland, and
there is a kind of multi-cultural ethos embedded in the official resettlement policies.
However, the Finnish policy of refugee resettlement is, as Matinheikld-Koldco (1994)
points out, contradictory. The government papers about refugee resettlement are based
on liberal pluralist ideas, but the policy recommendations are still universalist. In other
words, the Finnish authorities do not take into account cultural differences or
communities in their practical work although the official policies are supposed to be
multi-cultural. Of course, discrepancies between theory and practice also exist in the
immigration policies of other Nordic countries. In the case of Sweden this is described
by Alund and Schierup (1991).
It can be argued that in practice Finnish resettlement policy is often based on rather
unrealistic expectations of a quick integration or even assimilation of refugees.
Finland, compared to Britain, is a relatively homogenous society with relatively small
income differences and blurred boundaries between social classes. The egalitarian
ideals which have traditionally been a part of Finnish society also support an
assimilationist policy towards refugees. The notion of ethnic minorities living in their
own insular communities within the larger society cannot easily be fitted into the
traditional ideal of an egalitarian society.
Various humanitarian organisations and pressure groups have played a significant role
in the development of Finnish refugee policy, and the whole resettlement of refugees
has been profoundly influenced by humanitarian considerations. Refugees are regarded
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as disadvantaged persons who, like other weak groups such as children, disabled
people and alcoholics, need special support in order to be integrated into the society.
Refugees are often seen as persons who have lost everything in terms of material,
social and cultural capital. Furthermore, refugees are often understood as persons who
must undergo a kind of re-socialisation into Finnish society, and consequently, they
might even be treated in the same way as small children. It is often argued that there is
a risk that the welfare system transforms active adult refugees into passive clients.4
There is also a policy of dispersal according to which refugees are resettled in small
groups all over the country. This practice does not support any creation of cultural
communities among the refugees; nor does it try to take into account the resources
which exist within the refugees' own social networks. Furthermore, Liebldnd (1993)
has argued that the lack of cultural communities is a detrimental factor affecting the
psychological well-being of refugees in Finland. Refugees are usually regarded as
persons who have arrived in Finland to be permanently resettled, since they no longer
have a home country. Accordingly, the Finnish resettlement system has not taken into
account the transnational networks and the diasporic nature of the Kurdish refugees'
experiences (which are discussed in chapter six and seven). Instead the resettlement
system has been dominated by the Finnish authorities' preoccupation with
"integration." Hence, this study argues that the Finnish resettlement policy, in practice,
is relatively assimilationist and less multi-cultural than the resettlement policy in the
United Kingdom.
Public opinion
The question of refugee admission is a highly debated issue in Finland, despite the fact
that the number of refugees is relatively small. The arrival of Somali refugees in 1990
notably drew much attention from the mass media (cf. Aallas 1991), but also the
arrival of other refugee groups has been widely debated. Although there are only a
small number of refugees in Finland, clearly they often face greater hostility in Finland
than they face in countries with more foreigners and refugees. During the end of the
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1980s, when the number of refugees arriving in the country started to grow, the
newspaper reports, especially in the evening papers, were often xenophobic and
usually portrayed refugees as "problems." Furthermore, the readers' letters to the press
often gave the impression that the Finnish people in general were very hostile towards
refugees. In addition, the attitude of some politicians and the authorities' official
policies towards refugees might have further fuelled the xenophobic and exclusionary
discourse. As a consequence, the word refugee today almost has a negative
connotation in the Finnish language. The Finnish xenophobia and inhospitable
attitudes towards foreigners were in the 1980s largely seen as consequence of the
Finns' lack of contacts with foreigners (cf. Jaaldcola 1989; Liebkind 1988).
Finnish attitudes to refugees and immigration have been studied in two surveys
undertaken by Magdalena Jaaldcola (1989, 1995). According to Jaaldcola (1989), only
16 per cent of the respondents in 1987 wanted Finland to receive fewer refugees, and
the overall picture was less xenophobic than was expected. This study was also
comparable to studies performed in Sweden and although the opinions in Finland were
more negative, the differences between the countries were not very big. It can thus be
suggested that the main difference was that the Finnish racist and xenophobic
discourse was more vociferous and louder than the Swedish discourse during the end
of the 1980s.
In 1993 Jaaldcola repeated her earlier study, and it seemed that the Finns had become
less willing to accept immigrants and refugees. This study was again comparable to a
similar study in Sweden, and although there had been a similar change of opinions in
Sweden, the changes in Finland were more dramatic. In 1993 the percentage of
respondents who wanted Finland to receive fewer refugees had risen to 44 per cent
(Jaalckola 1995). Consequently, for the refugees and foreigners in Finland, the situation
had developed from bad to worse. Jaalckola (1995) argues that one major reason for the
change in attitudes was the worsening economic recession in Finland. The
unemployment rate rose to almost 20 per cent in the early 1990s. Immigrants and
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refugees easily become scapegoats for economic problems, and immigration was
widely perceived as a socio-economic threat.
Bearing in mind this change in attitudes, it is easy to understand the increase in
xenophobic and racist attitudes as a consequence of increased immigration. However,
this would be a crude oversimplification of a complex problem. It is obvious that there
is no clear causal relation between the actual number of foreigners living in the country
and the attitudes towards particular groups of immigrants. When discussing the racist
and xenophobic discourse, one has to remember that not all immigrants are defined as
"foreigners" or "problems." Although only a small part of the present immigration to
Finland consists of refugees, the whole discussion about immigration control has been
centred on the question of refugee admission. Refugee issues have been much more
widely debated than issues related to the present immigration from the former Soviet
Union. The number of Ingrian immigrants from Russia and Estonia has been at least as
big as the immigration of refugees, but still the latter migration is perceived as a far
bigger problem. A case in point is the availability of statistics and research. The
refugees in Finland are the object of different controls and considerable interest on the
part of the Finnish authorities. There is very exact and comprehensive information
available on the few refugees living in Finland. When it comes to other immigrants,
the availability of data is not as good, for example in the case of the Ingrian
immigrants it is even difficult to find estimates of their exact number.
In Finland the discourse on asylum policies seems largely to have been based on a
social construction in which refugees have generally been defined, first of all, as
people who do not belong in the country, and secondly, as social problems. In this
discourse there is no room for alternative interpretations which would see the
similarities between the present refugee immigration and other both historical and
contemporary migration movements in Finland. Despite the fact that the refugees are
very few in number, the public discourse on immigration has defined especially
refugees as a "problem." On the other hand, there is of course at the same time also a
humanitarian discourse that advocates a more inclusionary refugee and asylum policy.
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These competing arguments and discourses have been described, for example, by Laari
(1994) and Wahlbeck (1992).
Kurds in Finland
It is impossible to know the exact number of Kurds in Finland since the available data
indicate citizenship or mother tongue, and not ethnic identification. However, by
comparing different sources it is possible to estimate the number of Kurds. A
conservative estimate of the number of Kurds living in Finland by the end of 1994 is
1,250-2,000 persons (see Table 2). Of these persons, 300-550 are from Turkey, 550-
800 from Iraq and 400-650 from Iran.5
Table 2. The estimated number of Kurds and citizens from Turkey, Iraq, and Iran
living in Finland
Country o f origin Estimate of Kurds 1.1.1995 Citizens 1.1.1995 	 Citizens 1.1.1997
Turkey 300-550 1,166 1,473
Iraq 550-800 989 1,773
Iran 400-650 1,114 1,394
Total: 1,250-2,000 3,269 4,640
Sources: Statistics published in Monitori.
The first Kurdish refugees who arrived in Finland were individual Iraqi students who
through various coincidences ended up in Finland in the end of the 1970s. During the
1980s a few Kurds from Iraq also arrived as asylum seekers in Finland. However, most
of the Kurds have arrived in Finland during the 1990s. Most of the Kurds from Iran
and Iraq have arrived as quota refugees through UNHCR since 1990. Consequently, a
majority of the Kurds in Finland have full refugee status in accordance with the UN
convention, but there are also large numbers with other legal statuses. Most of the
quota refugees have lived under the protection of UNHCR in Turkey, but some
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refugees have lived in other refugee camps in the Middle East. The refugees are
selected for resettlement in co-operation between the Finnish authorities and UNHCR.
During the 1990s the number of Kurdish asylum seekers in Finland has increased.
Between 1990 and 1994 there were 233 asylum seekers from Iran and 403 asylum
seekers from Iraq. It can be assumed, however, that only some of these persons were
Kurds. In the same period 377 persons from Turkey applied for asylum, and it can be
assumed that most of these persons were Kurds. Especially during 1991 Kurdish
asylum seekers from Turkey arrived in Finland. However, in contrast to the asylum
seekers from Iran and Iraq, a majority of the asylum seekers from Turkey have had
difficulties in getting any protection from the Finnish state. During the period 1991 to
1994 in total 188 Turkish citizens received a negative decision on their asylum
applications. (the figures are from statistics published in Pakolaisinfo and Monitori).
None of the Kurds in Finland, neither the quota refugees nor the asylum seekers, have
arrived in a pattern of chain migration. The quota refugees have often arrived in groups
whose members did not previously know each other. It seems that those who have
arrived as asylum seekers have usually done so individually without any initial
intention of going to Finland. Most of my interviewees had hardly heard of Finland
before they entered the country.
Since most Kurds from Iran and Iraq have arrived as quota refugees, this gives a
special character to the Kurdish community in Finland. The quota refugees were
selected from persons who were under the protection of UNHCR and who did not have
the possibility to continue their flight on their own to Europe. Therefore the quota
refugees include many persons who had a background as peshmergas or farmers and
did not have enough money to buy a plane ticket in Turkey. The Finnish authorities
furthermore use a humanitarian selection among those who are accepted as refugees by
the UNHCR. This means that the quota refugees include many families and children.
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Those who arrive as asylum seekers are generally a different group of people. In
particular, the asylum seekers from Turkey have been almost solely single young men.
The official statistics support this observation, showing that 83 per cent of the Turkish
citizens living in Finland in 1992 were men (Nieminen 1994).6 In some cases the
wives and families have arrived some years later. It is also interesting that a relatively
large number of male Kurds from Turkey have Finnish girlfriends and wives. This is
perhaps not very surprising since most of the Kurds from Turkey are single young men
and have often spent several years in Finland waiting for an asylum decision. Official
statistics support this observation as well; according to the marriage statistics for the
years 1990-1992 a total of 376 Turkish male citizens married Finnish women, which in
fact is more than any other group of male foreigners (Nieminen 1994).7
Due to the resettlement practice in Finland, the Kurds are dispersed in small groups
around the country. There is a tendency for the Kurds to move later either to the
Helsinki capital area or to some of the regional centres. The Kurds from Turkey tend to
live in the capital area. According to the official population statistics from 31
December 1995 published in Monitori, 58 per cent of the Turkish-speaking population
and 45 per cent of the Kurdish-speaking population lived in the administrative
province Uusimaa. Of the total population only 26 per cent lived in this province,
which includes the capital area and the south coast.
Although the Finnish government is successfully trying to prevent asylum seekers
from reaching Finland, it can be expected that the number of Kurdish refugees will
grow. Kurdish refugees continue to be part of the annual quota. Several hundred
Kurdish refugees from Iran, Iraq and Turkey have also arrived in Finland as family
reunification cases. By the end of 1996 the number of Kurds living in Finland was
probably between 2,000 and 3,000 persons.
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United Kingdom
The well-known political history of Britain, including the country's history as a world
leading colonial and political power, still gives the United Kingdom a world-wide
cultural and political influence. This also has consequences for the migration flows to
and from the country, as well as for British immigration and refugee policies. In fact,
both immigration to Britain and emigration from Britain have been relatively extensive
during the last centuries. Although there has been a large immigration to Britain,
emigration from Britain has actually been bigger than immigration during most of the
years since 1964 when statistics started to be collected through the International
Passenger Survey (OPCS 1994).
The colonial history and the experiences of the British Empire still have a profound
influence on ethnic relations in Britain. The United Kingdom has well established
"ethnic minorities," largely originating from post-war migration movements from the
so-called New Commonwealth. Until the 1990s, refugees have constituted only a very
small part of the migration to Britain. Because of the long history of "ethnic
minorities" and "race relations" in Britain, the whole question of refugee admission in
Britain is connected to the constantly important political issues of immigration and
"race" (Miles and Cleary 1993).
In the 1991 National Census of Population 5.5 per cent of the population indicated that
they belonged to some of the ethnic minority groups in the UK, which is just over
three million out of a total population of fifty-five million. The biggest category was
"South Asian," including Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, and comprising 2.7 per
cent of the UK population. "Black" ethnic groups accounted for a further 1.6 per cent
followed by "Chinese and other ethnic groups" with 1.3 per cent (Owen 1994). In
Britain there is an awareness and a large public discussion of issues related to what
often is called "race relations." Britain has, for example, a comprehensive "race
relations" legislation enforced by the Commission for Racial Equality.
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Refugees in the UK
Britain is often seen as having a tradition of offering hospitality for refugees,
beginning with the French Huguenots in the seventeenth century. Later, a small
number of German revolutionaries, among them Karl Marx, lived as refugees in
London in the mid-nineteenth century. Britain's liberal refugee policy in the Victorian
years largely "rested upon its confidence as the greatest economic, imperial and naval
power" (Panayi 1993, 110). However, the number of persons who fled to Britain did
not become significant before the end of the nineteenth century and the arrival of Jews
from eastern Europe. This also coincides with the first efforts to control the influx of
refugees. Later, in the 1930s, many persons fled from Nazi Germany to Britain (Cohen
1994). The United Kingdom was among the initial signatories to the UN Refugee
Convention in 1951 and also acceded to the Protocol in 1968 (United Nations 1995).
However, until recently the number of asylum applicants has by international
comparison been relatively small.
It is doubtful if there is any reason to talk about a hospitality towards refugees in
Britain since the nineteenth century. For example, Steve Cohen (1988) argues that
refugees in Britain, beginning with the Jews in the 1930s, have generally been
mistreated. Despite the relatively small numbers of asylum seekers the British
government has tried to keep the numbers as low as possible by a number of different
measures. These measures include the introduction of visa restrictions for certain
countries and new laws like the 1987 Immigration Act, which made airlines and
shipping companies liable to a charge of £1,000 for each improperly documented
passenger they bring to the UK. Furthermore, various measures discouraging asylum
seekers from coming to Britain have been introduced, including the removal of social
welfare benefits from certain groups of asylum seekers. A topical problem during
1996 was the new Asylum Bill which sought to cut the welfare benefits for asylum
seekers who had not applied for asylum immediately upon arrival in Britain. Since
many asylum seekers already experience huge practical problems in Britain such
legislation can create a very extreme situation. There have also been changes in the
109
appeals procedure and, as described later, a radical increase in the number of negative
decisions on asylum applications. Finally, there is also an extensive use of the
inhumane practice of detention (cf. Cohen 1994). In Britain immigration authorities
can detain an asylum seeker while his/her case is being considered despite the fact that
the person has not broken any law. The Refugee Council (1994) estimates that
immigration detention in the early 1990s annually affected about 10,000 persons,
although most of these were detained for less than two weeks.
In the light of the changes mentioned above, the British official refugee policy has
clearly lost much of the humanitarian values on which it was originally based. Today
Britain is certainly not a country offering hospitality for refugees, and, according to
Amnesty International (1996), recent developments have largely demolished the right
to asylum in the UK. Most of the recent changes have obviously been introduced in
order to discourage people from applying for asylum in Britain. This is explicitly
stated by the British government in the following news item published in the Financial
Times (8 March 1996):
Bogus asylum seekers are being attracted to the UK in increasing numbers
because of the lure of its welfare system, the High Court was told yesterday.
Many applicants had no proper claim to asylum and were "economic migrants",
two judges heard. New regulations had been introduced "to make the UK less
attractive and therefore reduce the burden on the taxpayers and the social
security fund", said Mr Stephen Richards, appearing for the government. Mr
Richards was defending Mr Peter Lilley, the social security secretary, against
accusations by the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants that the refugee
are unlawfully being deterred from seeking sanctuary in the UK by the
regulations, introduced last month. (`Benefits lure fraudsters' 1996)
Until the 1990s the number of persons applying for asylum has not been very
significant in comparison to other major European countries like Germany or France.
Counted in terms of asylum seekers per inhabitants, the UK received fewer refugees
than most other Western European countries in the 1980s (Cohen and Joly 1989).
There was, however, a remarkable increase in the number of asylum seekers in the late
1980s and early 1990s (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Asylum seekers in the United Kingdom, 1982 - 1995, including dependants.
Sources: Statistics published by the Home Office.
During the early 1980s more than half of the applicants received full refugee status.
However, in recent years the British asylum policy has become increasingly restrictive.
Already during the 1980s the percentage of persons receiving refugee status decreased
radically. This was initially compensated by an increase in the percentage of persons
receiving the British "B-status" called Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR). The ELR
does, however, not entitle a person to the same rights and services as a full refugee
status. For example, persons with an ELR do not have the right to family reunification.
During the 1990s the refugee policy has become even more restrictive, and the
proportion of persons receiving ELR has declined while more and more persons have
received a totally negative decision on their asylum applications. This development is
shown in Figure 6. The reason for the introduction of even more restrictive policies is
undoubtedly the increased numbers of asylum seekers.
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Figure 6. Decisions on asylum applications made in the United Kingdom, 1982-1995,
including dependants. Sources: Statistics published by the Home Office.
It is possible to apply for British citizenship after five years of residence and settlement
in Britain. The person needs to have indefinite leave to remain, and not exceptional
leave to remain, at the date of application. 8 In addition naturalisation requires sufficient
knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic, a good character and the intention to
live in the UK (JCWI 1995).
Reception and resettlement policies in the UK
In the UK the state has not taken over functions from civil society and the voluntary
organisations to the same extent as in the Nordic countries. In British society the "local
community" has to a larger extent been understood as an independent entity separate
from the state. The British social welfare system has traditionally been taken care of to
a large extent by voluntary organisations. The British system of refugee resettlement is
of course connected to these more fundamental perceptions of the role and relations of
the state and the civil society. Furthermore, one has to remember that British society is
traditionally a class society. Immigrants are of course integrated into specific places in
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this hierarchy. As Rex argues in his early writings on this subject (Rex and Tomlinson
1979), the immigrants largely have been integrated into the underclass of British
society, and are disadvantaged in comparison with working-class whites (cf. Rex
1986b).
At least since the 1980s, the multi-culturalist discourse, which is discussed in chapter
two, has been more dominant than assimilationist policies within social policy in
Britain. Candappa and Joly describes British social policy practices in the eighties:
Cultural identity and difference became fully acknowledged as was the
importance of consulting with communities. Following from this a more recent
trend arose towards what is sometimes called 'self help', which is assisting
communities and their associations to provide services to ethnic communities
and to develop economic projects. (Candappa and Joly 1994, 17)
Because of the communitarian policies towards ethnic minorities in the UK, there is a
tendency to regard the Kurdish refugees as one of many "ethnic minorities" in a multi-
cultural society. However, the specific experiences of the Kurdish refugee
communities in Britain are of course very different from the history of the British
ethnic minorities, whose long history of settlement in Britain often has to be seen
within a colonial context. Therefore, it can be argued that the British authorities'
policies towards refugees are not always sensitive to refugees' specific social situation
and problems.
On the other hand, in Britain the refugee reception is in practice largely organised
within the voluntary sector and not by the British authorities. The National Health
System and the Department of Social Security are of course providing their specific
services, but in the case of more general advice and services there are a wide variety of
non-governmental service providers. Although funding for refugee reception is to a
large extent organised from public sources, the practical work is largely carried out by
various charities and voluntary organisations. In a recent publication, the British
refugee resettlement policy is described in the following way:
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Central government responsibility for oversight of arrangements for the
settlement of refugees rests with the Voluntary Service Unit (VSU), located in
the Home Office. VSU's general policy is to provide the help and support
needed by refugees through voluntary organisations and community groups,
through local authorities, or through special programmes within existing
statutory agencies. Compared to national statutory provision, such arrangements
are intended to allow greater flexibility and sensitivity to local needs and
consumers' voices. (Carey-Wood eta!. 1995, 1)
In practice the British authorities have largely handed over the responsibility for the
reception of refugees to organisations in the voluntary sector and to the "local
community." The refugees can thus "choose" between a number of "competing"
service providers, although in practice particular groups come under the care of
particular bodies. Needless to say, there are many organisations whose activities are
overlapping each other and there is often a lack of professionalism among the
organisations within the voluntary sector (cf. Majka 1991).
In the cases of the Chilean, Vietnamese and Bosnian quota refugees there have been
various official resettlement programmes, and it seems as if the British authorities have
taken a more active role in these cases. However, in these programmes the British
government has also funded different NGOs to take care of the practical work. The
Kurdish refugees are not part of any special resettlement programme or given any
special consideration by the authorities. In practice Kurdish refugees largely have to
help themselves upon arrival in the UK. There is, however, a wide range of charities
and community centres where they can seek support. These organisations are often
directly funded by the authorities.
The first voluntary organisation which refugees encounter is often the Refugee
Arrivals Project (RAP). After arrival at Heathrow most refugees are handed over from
the Immigration Service to the RAP. In practice it is often the RAP which decides
where people will live in London. Refugees are in the first instance expected to stay
with relatives or friends after arrival in London. However, if a refugee does not know
anybody, the RAP will send him/her to one of the local authorities in London. In
practice refugees are often resettled in boroughs where the RAP case worker knows
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that other persons who speak the same language live. However, housing is very scarce
in London, and the local councils can only provide housing to those with special
needs. Single refugees must largely fend for themselves and usually face acute housing
problems.
The RAP is funded by the Home Office to provide the necessary service to refugees
immediately after arrival in Britain, and is expected to be able to move people in to the
community within a day or two of their arrival. Obviously, this task is almost
impossible. The organisation writes in its Annual Report 1993 that "the task we face
has become more complex and demanding and the project is stretched to breaking
point by the additional pressures on us all" (RAP 1994, 7). Clearly, in this situation
many refugees need help and advice from other sources. Perhaps the most important
provider of practical help, after refugees have stayed in Britain for a few days, is the
Refugee Council. The Refugee Council is a large organisation mainly funded by the
Home Office, it has a wide variety of services, programmes and activities aimed at
giving practical help to refugees and at promoting refugees' rights both in Britain and
abroad.
In addition to the Refugee Council there are many other smaller organisations which
give valuable support to refugees. In the case of Kurdish refugees the various Kurdish
community centres and organisations in London are of special importance. These will
be examined more closely in chapter seven. There are also a number of British
voluntary organisations doing very important work for refugees. For example, many of
my interviewees were grateful for the help they had received from the Medical
Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture.
There is public funding available from a variety of sources for voluntary organisations
working with refugees. The Home Office "section 11" funding, which is mainly used
for supporting education in areas with a high proportion of ethnic minorities, recently
became available for projects involving refugees. The competition for the Single
Regeneration Budget is also open to refugee organisations. During my fieldwork,
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funding from the London Borough Grants Unit was given to the Kurdish Cultural
Centre, Kurdistan Workers Association and the Kurdish Information Centre (in
Islington). There is usually also funding from local councils if the organisation serves a
specific local community. There are also other public programmes and private trusts
which support voluntary organisations working with refugees. Nevertheless, a lack of
funding remains a serious problem for many voluntary organisations.
Kurds in Britain
Since the 1970s the UK has been a significant host for Kurdish students, and later
refugees, from Iraq. The Kurds from Iraq were the first large group of Kurds in the
UK, probably because of the historical ties between Iraq and the UK. Since many
Kurds from Iraq have arrived as university students, they are today often well
educated, and especially among the men one finds many persons with doctorates.
Consequently, some Kurds from Iraq at present have well-established positions in
British society. The Kurds from Iraq living in Britain are in this respect clearly
different from the quota refugees in Finland.
In Britain the Kurds from Iraq have recently been outnumbered by Kurdish refugees
from Turkey, who since 1989 have arrived in significant numbers and moved into the
Turkish community in North London. A total of 4,650 Turkish citizens applied for
asylum in the UK in 1989 (Home Office 1990), of whom a large number arrived
during May and June. As a result of this major influx, visa requirements were imposed
on 23 June 1989 for all Turkish citizens wanting to enter the UK. Home Secretary
Douglas Hurd explained the decision in the following way: "These developments have
placed strain on immigration control, creating long delays and inconvenience for the
main body of passengers." According to him, many of the asylum seekers were
"young men who have admitted to making their claim because of employment
difficulties in Turkey" (Crisp 1989, 18).
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Collinson (1990) has studied the legal and political framework of the arrival of the
Kurdish asylum seekers, and she argues that there are doubts concerning the legality of
some of the measures the authorities introduced to handle the influx. British
Immigration Officers stationed themselves at Istanbul airport, and it is highly likely
that this measure was introduced in order to prevent potential asylum seekers from
boarding flights to Britain. There were also cases where asylum seekers seemed to
have been prevented from applying for asylum upon arrival in Britain. Furthermore,
many Kurdish asylum seekers were detained in British prisons pending the outcome of
their applications for asylum (Collinson 1990).9
The sudden influx of a large number of Kurdish asylum seekers during the spring of
1989 cried a dramatic situation in North London. The authorities did not have the
necessary facilities or the ability to take care of this large group of people. Local
authorities, voluntary organisations and churches in North London had to do whatever
they could to help the newly arrived Kurdish refugees. The areas in London, the
boroughs of Haringey and Hackney, where the asylum seekers arrived are largely
deprived inner-city areas, and among other problems it was difficult to find proper
accommodation for all asylum seekers (cf. Crisp 1989; Reilly 1991).
The Turkish community in North London was established by Turkish Cypriots who
migrated to Britain from the 1950s onwards. There has also been a labour migration
from Turkey, but by comparison with other European countries this has not been
significant. Among the small number of Kurds from Turkey who arrived as labour
migrants in the UK, many persons now regard themselves as refugees. The Kurdish
refugees from Turkey today constitute a large part of the Kurdish/Turkish community
in North London. The Kurdish refugee migration from Turkey seems largely to have
happened as a chain migration. As explained in chapter four, many of the Kurds who
have moved to North London during recent years are Alevis from the areas of Marash
and Sivas in Turkey. The Kurds from Turkey often come from a rural background and
many of them are poorly educated.
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The Iranian Kurds in Britain have, together with a large number of other Iranians,
mostly arrived as refugees since the revolution in Iran in 1979. It is difficult to estimate
the number of Iranian Kurds in the UK. It is possible that many of the Kurds from Iran
identify themselves primarily as Iranians and that they are not therefore part of the
Kurdish community. My rough estimation is that there were between 20,000 and
30,000 Kurds living in the UK in 1995. The number is constantly growing and about
two thirds of the Kurds are recently arrived refugees from Turkey. At least 90 per cent
of the Kurds in the UK live in London.
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Figure 7. Asylum applications from Turkey, Iran and Iraq made in the United
Kingdom, 1985-1995, excluding dependants. Sources: Statistics published by the
Home Office.
In Figure 7 the numbers of asylum seekers (excluding dependants) from Turkey, Iraq
and Iran are presented. The number of asylum seekers from Iran reached a peak
immediately after the revolution in 1979 but the number of refugees has only slowly
declined since then. On the other hand, the number of refugees from Turkey has
increased dramatically since the 1980s. In the late 1980s asylum seekers from all three
countries had the same statistical chance to get full refugee status. This has
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dramatically changed in recent years. A surprising development is that, although
during the 1990s the human rights situation in Turkey has not improved, it is refugees
from Turkey who in the mid-1990s statistically had the least chance of getting refugee
status or even ELR. This development can be observed by comparing Figure 8 and
Figure 9.
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Figure 8.. Decisions on asylum applications from Turkey, Iran and Iraq in the UK
1985 - 1990, excluding dependants. Source: Statistics published by the Home Office.
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Figure 9. Decisions on asylum applications from Turkey, Iran and Iraq in the UK
1995, excluding dependants. Source: Statistics published by the Home Office.
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Conclusion
International comparative studies are always connected with problems concerning the
comparability of the phenomena under study. Different historical developments,
different conceptual definitions, different political systems and different social
structures often mean that the validity of observed similarities or differences between
countries can be disputed (Lloyd 1993, 1994; Weiner1996).
In the case of Finland and England, however, there are some indisputable differences.
For example, the historical contexts in which ethnic relations have developed in
Finland and in Britain could hardly be more different. Britain has a history as a major
political power, being the centre of a major world empire. One feature of an empire is
that it has outlying territories. This inevitably leads to contacts, as well as migration,
between people in the periphery and in the centre. Initially, it was of course the centre
which was the dominating force in these contacts. These contacts have also led to
different models of multi-culturalism being adopted as part of everyday life.
In present-day Britain, where migration to and from other parts of the Commonwealth
has been common for a long time, multi-culturalism is an intrinsic feature of life in
cosmopolitan cities like London. In addition, British society has traditionaliy been a
class society and a society where local communities are regarded as fundamental units
of society. In these social structures of plurality and diversity it is easy to implement
various cornmunitarian and multi-cultural policies. Also the refugee reception policies
largely revolve around the refugees' own communities. The arrival of refugees in
Britain is also commonly misunderstood as a continuation of previous immigration to
the country.
Finland, on the other hand, is a relatively recently independent state with a small
population and a remote geographical location. Finnish society is characterised by the
model of the "Nordic welfare state" with its extensive public sector and blurred
borders between civil society and the state. This type of society actively strives to
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integrate and equalise all its members. As argued in chapter two, the model of a multi-
cultural society is, however, largely based on the acceptances of differences. Thus,
although Finnish policies are often officially described as multi-cultural, the policies
are in practice relatively assimilationist by comparison with British policies. This
approach seldom takes into account the diasporic nature of the refugees' social
relations in the country of settlement.
In addition, Finland has during the post-war period experienced very low levels of
immigration. The sudden increase in immigration, which furthermore has largely
occurred during an economic recession, has led to a xenophobic reaction among parts
of the general public. This reaction has been fuelled by racism and biased mass-media
reports, and has largely become focused on the refugees in the country. Thus, although
the official reception policies are supporting an inclusion of the refugees into society at
large, there are parts of the population who actively strive to exclude the refugees.
Consequently, when one talks about solving problems connected with ethnic relations
and multi-culturalism, it would be easy to regard Finland as lagging behind other
countries. As Lloyd (1993) points out, Britain is often wrongly seen as being ahead of
other European countries in this respect. This kind of comparison of countries is not
possible. Strictly speaking, countries are different and cannot be understood as being
"ahead" of each other. Lloyd (1993) argues that different European countries have
developed differently and that one cannot use an evolutionary perspective where
countries are seen as going through a set procedure of developments. Furthermore, one
has to remember that because of the differences, any theories and policies which are
adopted in one country are not necessarily transferable to the other country.
Thus, any sweeping normative comparisons are avoided in this chapter and it is only
established that the two countries are different. The refugee resettlement policies are
heavily dependent on general social policies and are connected to more fundamental
conceptions of the state, local communities and the civil society. The UK adopts a
traditional communitarian and multi-cultural approach, while Finland in practice has a
more assimilationist resettlement policy. It can also be argued that although they
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approach the issue from different perspectives, neither country has fully understood the
specific nature of refugee migration. Chapter six and seven describes the consequences
which these different approaches have for the Kurdish refugees and how the different
policies have influenced the social organisation of the Kurdish communities.
CHAPTER 6
THE REFUGEE EXPERIENCE
This chapter describes the Kurdish refugees' experiences in their new countries of
settlement. These experiences were discussed during the interviews in Finland and
England, and are here presented from the refugees' own point of view. Obviously, the
Kurdish refugees have encountered a whole range of problems, and this chapter cannot
deal with all of them. The aim of the chapter is to indicate and discuss the main
problems refugees experienced, and thereby to present the framework in which the
social relations of the Kurdish refugees were constructed in the two countries of
reception. The research findings in this chapter form a basis for the discussion in
chapter seven about the social organisation of the refugee vmnrnul\ities.
Arrival
Refugees who arrive in a new country experience a variety of problems. For those who
arrive as asylum seekers, the arrival can be a very traumatic experience. A widow from
Iraq described her arrival at Heathrow Airport:
It was horrible, really horrible -- I cried so much and did not know what to do
and I did not speak the language. I tried to explain that here I am with my two
children and we do not know what to do. It was all really horrible, but the people
at the airport were very friendly and helped me and told me not to cry.
The first obstacle refugees face is often the asylum application. Many interviewees told
me that when they first arrived as asylum seekers they did not properly understand
what the status of a refugee was. As explained in chapter four, few of the refugees
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from Iran and Iraq had been able to plan their flight in advance. Most had only a very
superficial knowledge of the country they were travelling to, and only a few had even a
basic knowledge of English. Since many persons had been forced to obtain falsified
travel documents in order to travel to Europe, there was the additional fear of how the
authorities would react to this.
Many Kurds have great expectations of democracy in Europe when they arrive and
they think that the European countries will welcome them warmly. They are not
prepared for the bureaucratic procedures and all the other difficulties refugees
encounter in Europe. Two young men from Turkey described their arrivals:
When I came to Finland it was between twelve and one o'clock in the night. I
was really tired and I had a beard, I was totally exhausted. I did not know what I
was doing here and what a refugee was. ... Then I just thought that I am a Kurd
and I have problems in my own country, and there are human rights in Finland
and a democracy, and so on. I thought that perhaps there is a possibility that I
can stay in Finland. But then, when I myself saw what the real situation was like,
it was completely different from what I had expected [t].
I planned all the time to go to England, tried to get here all the time. Because I
trusted this country's democracy much more than any other European country,
but after staying two years without decision and with the problem with family
reunion, I understood what kind of democracy it was. I did not expect that these
things would happen.
The real attitude towards refugees in Europe often comes as a total surprise for the
refugees. A woman from Iraq who had been active in the Kurdish resistant movement
told me the following about her expectations before arrival:
We really valued ourselves and our political struggle very highly when we
arrived and thought that we would be warmly welcomed. We were surprised that
this was not the case and that people did not care who we were. In Kurdistan, the
United Nations and its refugee status is well known and people speak about it, so
we thought that refugees were welcomed in Europe and that our fight for human
rights would be highly appreciated.
Because of the situation in their countries of origin, many Kurds are very suspicious of
authorities and afraid of the police. This leads to problems when asylum seekers are
interviewed by the authorities in order to determine their legal status. Many refugees
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are afraid of telling the truth since they believe that what they tell will ultimately end
up with the authorities in their homeland. The refugees are afraid of what might
happen to them if they have to return, and if they do not return, they have to be afraid
of what might happen to their relatives. This understandable reluctance to tell the
authorities the real reasons for their flight can seriously damage the refugees' chances
of getting asylum. These problems were emphasised by many informants. For
example, an Iranian man who subsequently got full refugee status said:
You know, it is difficult to describe the feelings that you have when you arrive.
On the one hand, you are scared of what will happen. Maybe they will deport
me. People from Kurdistan and from the third world in general have a different
view of the police and the state. They are not seen as somebody who can help
you in any way. You have to be scared of them, you see them as an enemy and
not as somebody doing something for you.
In Britain many refugees do not apply for asylum at the border, and instead prefer to
seek help first of all from people they trust. This is one reason why many applications
for asylum are made when the applicant is already in the country and not at the border.
Another reason for in-country applications is that many persons who have arrived as
students in Britain might find that it is impossible to return home because of political
changes in their country of origin during their stay in Britain. The pattern of in-country
applications was common among those who came from Turkey and Iran. According to
statistics from the Home Office (1994), a clear majority of the applications from
Turkish and Iranian citizens between 1990 and 1993 were made in-country, while
among Iraqi citizens around half of the applications were made in this way. In the
Finnish case there are no comparable statistics, but it is likely that most persons had
already applied for asylum at the border.
Unfortunately the refugees' fear of the authorities in the country of reception did not
seem to be totally without reason. During this research I heard several stories of how
the authorities often showed a surprising lack of confidentiality which might even have
endangered the safety of the refugees themselves and their relatives back home.
Furthermore, the interpreters used by the authorities were not always persons whom
the refugees felt confident with.'
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Among the refugees from Turkey there is a common belief that there is co-operation
between Turkish and European governments and police forces, a co-operation which is
nurtured through contacts in NATO, the European Union and other international
organisations. Once an application for asylum is made in Western Europe, it is
assumed that sooner or later this will be known by the authorities in Turkey. Refugees
from both Turkey and Iran told me about problems and threats experienced by their
relatives back home after the refugees had left the country.
Anxieties and Psychological Problems
The psychological problems encountered by refugees in their new country of
settlement have previously been well documented (e.g. Eitinger and Schwarz 1981;
Liebkind 1993; Zwingmann and Pfister-Ammende 1973). Similar psychological
problems are also experienced by Kurdish refugees. These problems can be connected
to the Kurds' experiences in their countries of origin and/or can be connected to the
process of waiting for a decision on their asylum applications.
Several respondents described traumatic memories from Kurdistan. It can be assumed
that most of the Kurdish refugees have close relatives or friends who have been
executed or killed in combat, have disappeared or have been imprisoned. Many
Kurdish refugees have themselves experienced imprisonment and torture. These kinds
of experiences often leave the refugees with serious mental health problems. The
refugees were understandably not very eager to discuss these experiences, and since I
did not usually ask about them directly, the traumatic memories were only mentioned
incidentally in the interviews.
Because of the political and economic situation in Kurdistan many refugees in exile
are inevitably worried about their relatives living in Kurdistan. Sometimes the
whereabouts of the relatives is not known, or there is no possibility of getting in touch
with them. A man from Turkey, who lived alone in London, told me about his tragedy:
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I have not been in contact with my family since 1992. I am too scared of what
will happen to them if I call. I have not been able to be in contact with my home
village, and I do not know if it even exists any more. I am very worried for my
family [t].
Waiting for a decision in the country of exile often becomes an additional problem.
The quota refugees in Finland avoid this problem since they have had their refugee
status defined by UNHCR before arrival, and thus they know that they can stay in the
country and will get help from the authorities. The asylum seekers, on the other hand,
have to live in uncertainty for a long time until they get a decision on their
applications. Among the refugees in this study, up to three years was not an
uncommon time to wait for a decision, both in Finland and in the UK. This long
uncertainty aggravated all the practical and psychological problems experienced by
refugees. An Iranian refugee who arrived in Britain in 1991 described the problems
that most asylum seekers have experienced:
The immigration officers asked a lot of questions. Why did you come here, why
did you not go to another place? And so on. I was actually scared all the time
until I got my full refugee status. It is not a good feeling to be scared all the time.
There was this uncertainty. It was a difficult time, and I was scared what will
happen for the first two years here. Now it is different.
As long as the asylum seekers do not have a final decision, the uncertainty of their
future makes it difficult for them to make any plans or to start a new life in the country
of settlement. A young man from Turkey, who after almost four years in Finland had
still not got any decision on his asylum application, described the help he had received
from the authorities:
Personally I can say that Finland was like a prison to me; it really went badly for
me here. ... Several times I have decided that I will leave this country, because
of the authorities. Some of them, they do not know what they are doing. And
when you complain about the situation, the person just tells you that they do not
know, everything is a mess. ... When I look back I hate that three and a half
years, almost four years has gone by and what have I seen? My youth has passed
by, I have not studied, I did not get a decision, I did not get, I did not understand
anything. All this time it has been so hard. Many times I went to the doctor, but
that did not help either. It has been difficult, so difficult [t].
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Obviously asylum seekers are living under much psychological stress which is directly
related to their flight and refugee experiences. On the other hand, it is also obvious that
the reception policies have a great impact on the kinds of difficulties that occur. A
woman, who waited over two years for her decision, and who furthermore had the
additional problem that she arrived in Britain without her child, described her
experiences:
It was very difficult, particularly the last few months. It was just unbearable, to
wait for the child, and nothing is happening in terms of whether they will accept
you or not. What happens if they do not accept it. There is a risk of being
deported, you know, and you cannot have your child unless there is a decision
made, and I was hearing news like the grandparents are really ill and they cannot
look after her any longer, ... It was growing very difficult and there was so much
pressure in terms from home, saying we cannot look after the child any more;
and there was not anything that I could do in this end, just to try to pressurise,
and then you cannot do that because you do not know the system, you do not
know the language to even make a phone call to the Home Office to say what is
happening with my case. So, it is always up to others to help you, if they could,
and sometimes getting help costs money, which we did not have, you know,
even getting interpreter costs.
In the above quotation the interviewee mentions several practical problems that
refugees face in Britain while they are waiting for their decision, which might
aggravate the psychological stress they experience. Stress and uncertainty are
difficulties that all refugees, regardless of their country of settlement or country of
origin, have to face to some extent. However, as described in chapter five, the
reception and resettlement of refugees are organised in different ways in England and
Finland. Because of this, there are many practical problems that are specific to the
country of reception. These different experiences will be discussed later in more detail.
Those who are probably in the worst situation in Britain are those who are imprisoned
in the detention centres for asylum seekers. As mentioned in chapter five, detention is
used relatively frequently in Britain. Among the refugees in this research there were,
however, only two persons who had been kept in detention for around two weeks. In
Finland there is an organised system whereby asylum seekers are accommodated in
official reception centres while they wait for the outcome of their applications.
Although these open institutions cannot be compared to British detention centres, they
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are still depressing places. The long stays in these centres are often a traumatic
experience. One asylum seeker who for a long time had stayed in a number of different
reception centres told me the following:
It was really crowded and there were all kinds of psychological pressure and
everything. Sometimes I thought that no other persons than refugees could stand
this, because this life - in this life - because really it was difficult, it was not--
You can say that there were cultural problems, language problems, people were
different, and then-- It is a miracle that people, or refugees, can stand such a life,
live all the time in a camp. In [one centre] it was really difficult, and all the time
many refugees were fighting [t].
Some of the reception centres in Finland were established hastily and experienced a
number of problems. Some centres found it difficult to get suitable staff while others
were situated in isolated locations, or otherwise had totally unsuitable facilities. All of
the six interviewees who had arrived as asylum seekers in Finland told me about
negative experiences during their stay at different reception centres.
Because of all their various problems and anxieties, the asylum seekers can easily get
off to a very bad start to their stay in the country of resettlement. Furthermore, the very
long processing times for asylum applications in both Finland and England aggravate
all the problems that the refugees experience. In Finland there is the additional
problem that since the asylum seekers and refugees are so few, refugees often find
themselves isolated from their compatriots.
Safety and Gratitude
The experiences of the asylum seekers who are waiting for a decision are completely
different from the initial experiences of the quota refugees in Finland. When the latter
arrive in the country they are usually welcomed by the authorities at the airport and
they can normally move into their new homes at once. The reception is usually well
organised and the resettlement is prepared before their arrival. Of course, the quota
refugees also experience difficulties, but their smooth arrival in their new country of
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settlement has a positive impact on their experiences. An emotional attachment to the
place where they first arrived and to Finland was described by many of the quota
refugees. Although the following young man from Iran had moved to Helsinki, he still
showed a great affection for the town where he arrived and where he lived for one and
a half years:
In Smalltown [fictitious name], there I have known people, and it is the people
and nature, Smalltown was the first place in Finland that I saw. I do like
Smalltown more than Helsinki, it feels like it really was my home town, this
kind of notion I got of the town [t].
Despite all the problems refugees experience upon arrival, there is reason to emphasise
the sense of relief and security refugees feel after they have been allowed to stay in the
country. There is also a huge gratitude felt towards the country that has accepted them
as refugees. Not surprisingly, this is especially evident among those who arrive as
quota refugees. The interviewees were asked to mention things that they regarded as
positive in the country of asylum compared to their situation in Kurdistan. All refugees
mentioned things like security, the fact that they no longer experienced war, and the
democratic institutions which meant that they no ionger had to fear for their Nves. A
large family from Iraq summarised the differences between Finland and Kurdistan as
follows:
Father: One important difference is that there [in Kurdistan] you did not know
what could happen in the next one hour for example, insecurity. Mother did not
know when the children went out in the morning if they would return home and
what would happen to them.
Son: Our life there was not a normal life for a normal person, we did not know
what our future was.
OW: Is your life here in Finland more secure?
Whole family: Yes!
Daughter: Your stomach was full [in Kurdistan], but life was insecure.
• •
Father: I was always afraid and upset for my children while we lived in
Kurdistan, I was afraid for my own sake as well, but most afraid for my children.
In economic terms life was OK in Kurdistan, we had our own house and owned
land. If it had not been for the regime, it would have been good for us, but they
destroyed everything [t].
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For those refugees from Iraq or Iran who have spent several years as displaced persons
within Kurdistan, the ultimate reason for their flight has often been the safety of their
children. A woman from Iraq had lived in refugee camps within Kurdistan for several
years until her large family fled to Turkey, from where UNHCR resettled them in
Finland:
OW. In what way do you think that your life has changed since you moved to
Finland?
R: It is a little bit easier now, not war and problems here in Finland. In Iraq we
have many problems and much war. I think we had a lot of problems, really a lot
of problems. Here now my children can live and my children can attend school.
This is why I came here, so that my children could live and my children could
attend school, this is why I came here. In Iraq there is war, but I was not hungry
and did not come here because I was hungry. Sometimes Finnish people
perhaps, not all but some, are angry or say that many refugees get much money
and buy many things. But I also had a house in Iraq and I had a car, I had many
things. It was only because I wanted to live that I came here. And I did not come
here on my own, Finnish people came and talked to us and after that we came
here.
6W: So, it was largely for the sake of the children that you made the decision to
come here?
R: Yes, my husband wants to go back to Iraq. It was only for the sake of the
children that we came here, so the children could live and attend school.
OW: So if you did not have children you would perhaps never have moved?
R: In that case I would not mind going back [t].
Education and Language Skills
Refugees arriving in Europe in general tend to come from the affluent parts of the
population in their countries of origin. Since refugees are often well educated, they can
become an asset for the receiving society. 2 In Britain this has been revealed for
example by Carey-Wood et al. (1995). Among Kurdish refugees this argument is
particularly true for men from Iraq living in England. Many male Kurds from Iraq
arrived in Britain as students and are today very well educated. There are also highly
educated Kurds from Turkey and Iran, but an interest in studying and a very high level
of formal education, including numerous persons with doctorates, seems to be
especially evident among male Kurds from Iraq living in Britain. There is also a
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difference between different cohorts of refugees from Kurdistan. The more recent
refugees from Iraq and Turkey often come from a more humble background and often
have a poorer school education than earlier refugees from Iraq.
Regardless of their level of formal education, Kurds generally have extensive language
skills, with the possible exception of Kurds from Turkey who seem to master fewer
languages. It is not uncommon for a man from southern Kurdistan to speak four or five
languages, usually some combination of Kurdish, Arabic, Turkish, Azerbaijani and
Farsi. Unfortunately none of the languages used in Kurdistan is very useful in Europe,
and only those who have attended secondary school or university have any knowledge
of English. However, the extensive language skills many Kurdish refugees possess
might make it easier for them to learn additional languages.
Kurds from Turkey living in London seemed to have particularly weak linguistic
skills. This observation is supported by the Kurdish Workers Association in London
which estimated that only 7 per cent of the newly arrived Kurds in North London had a
fair or good knowledge of English while 92 per cent knew very little or no English at
all (Refugee Council 1993). In Britain refugees from Iran and Iraq generally seemed to
have a better knowledge of English than the Kurds from Turkey. The level of
education and language skills are also clearly connected to gender. Kurdish women
have usually received less formal education and might not speak as many languages as
Kurdish men. It is common in all parts of Kurdistan for women to be illiterate, and
among recent refugees from Kurdistan there are many women who have never
attended school.
A clear majority of the informants felt that in the beginning language was their biggest
problem (Of those who did not mention language, several persons both in Finland and
Britain emphasised problems with the asylum application; one asylum seeker in
Britain mentioned that he had not been able to find a doctor for his son; and in Finland
one family complained about the isolated location of their flat). The knowledge of the
country's language was regarded by the refugees as a resource that could solve many
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of their other problems. A woman from Iran living in London gave a typical answer to
the question about her first major problems:
Unfamiliarity with the society - everything was strange at that time - and
language. Language was the biggest problem, because when you know the
language, getting contact is easier, and you can discover anything by yourself.
You know, you know how to contact. Language really suffered a long time ... I
am not such a person sitting asking others to do everything for me. I can cope
with my self anywhere, but if you do not have language, how can you help
yourself?
My results indicate that the refugees, somewhat surprisingly, experienced worse
language problems in England than they did in Finland. However, there were also very
big individual differences within the communities. The language tuition given to
refugees in Finland has been successful, and most Kurdish refugees can already speak
some Finnish after one year in the country (or the language is Swedish, if they live in a
Swedish-speaking area of Finland). Therefore the Kurds in Finland generally seemed
to have a better knowledge of the majority language than the Kurds in England. Also
the availability of interpretation services during contacts with authorities seemed to be
relatively well organised in Finland.
The Kurds in London, especially in the Turkish community, often had very little
knowledge of English. In Britain the language tuition given to refugees often seemed
to be inadequate, sporadic and sometimes inefficient, largely because of a lack of
funding (cf. WUS 1991; Ali 1990). Furthermore, there was often no interpretation
service available during contacts with the authorities. For example, the refugees
usually had to organise interpretation themselves during visits to the Department of
Social Security (DSS).
Practical Problems
The flight from Kurdistan is usually financed through contributions and loans from
relatives. Even those who are resettled by UNHCR have usually been forced to borrow
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money from relatives. Kurdish refugees, with few exceptions, are thus penniless when
they arrive in the country of asylum, and therefore refugees usually have to rely on
social benefits. Although the situations in the two countries not are totally comparable,
one can say that the social benefits are generally more generous in Finland, while
refugees in Britain often face huge problems making ends meet. An additional burden
is that refugees are supposed to pay back the money they have borrowed from their
relatives when they have established themselves in Europe. Furthermore, they often
feel that they have an obligation to send contributions to needy relatives in Kurdistan.
The Kurds who manage to seek asylum in Europe have often previously belonged to
the more affluent parts of the Kurdish population, although there have been some
changes in the demographic characteristics of the refugees in recent years. Thus there
is clearly a downward economic mobility for many refugees, which is discussed in
more detail later in the section dealing with refugees' employment situation. One thing
which has improved is the range of public services available in European countries, but
in other respects refugees tend to face far bigger economic problems in exile than they
did in Kurdistan. An older man in London told me about his property in Turkey:
In Kurdistan I owned a lot of land, I was rich and lived comfortably. This was a
good thing in Turkey. All the rest was bad because Kurds do not have any rights
in Turkey. You can never imagine how big my land was. I had so much land that
you could not see the end of it. But there was no safety, so we had to flee [t].
The downward economic mobility of many refugees questions the popular
misconception of refugees as economic migrants. Many refugees would in fact have
had a more secure economic future in the country of origin. A man who had been a
peshmerga in Iraq speculated about what kind of future he would have had in that
country:
If I had not been political in my country, I would not have come here, because I
did not come to Britain because I am hungry, or for a job or hunger. Because in
my country we have more jobs, and my country is not poor. Yes, it has many
companies and many things. If I had finished my [studies] and worked in a
petrol company I would have had a very good job, yes, and good money, but the
political took me and I ran away.
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Closely connected to the economic problems are a number of other practical problems
experienced by refugees. The differences in the reception and resettlement policies
become very evident when looking at the practical problems experienced by the
refugees. The refugees had widely different experiences in the two countries.
Finland
In Finland refugees generally found that the social benefits and other support they
received from the authorities were sufficient. Nor was housing perceived as a big
problem. The local municipalities were usually able to provide all refugees with flats.
Housing in Finland is generally of a good standard, but on the other hand the flats
which the refugees rent are often smaller than the homes the families have been used to
in Kurdistan. Some refugees also felt that their flats were poorly situated. Most
respondents were very pleased with the social services they received from the Finnish
authorities, but there were of course still other problems and conflicts which occurred
in relations with the authorities. In the words of a man from Iran:
Oh yes, [the authorities have helped me] during the first months after we came to
the country, and in a very positive way, except for some things that we did not
understand. It was because of culture, and living here— How to behave. Because
we did not know very much about the system here and you had to quickly
transfer one life into this life. It was very hard. We almost got a lcincl c — mental
problem, not totally mad but that is perhaps what it is anyway, and tired and
angry all the time because everything is new [O.
In any event, none of the interviewees in Finland felt that they had been discriminated
against by the authorities in the area of social services and benefits. A refugee from
Turkey, who had also helped other Kurdish refugees with their practical problems, told
me about the variety of difficulties asylum seekers experienced, but still found that
things had worked well in one respect:
In the social sector the Kurds have received everything they need in Finland.
Kurds and Finns have been treated in the same way, and you cannot say that one
has got a better service than the other. The rights of the Kurds have been the
same as those of Finnish people [t].
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However, the public support offered to refugees is not always only a positive thing. It
includes a power relationship which supports a "clientelisation" of the refugees so that
refugees are regarded as more helpless than they actually are. The outcome can be a
kind of declaration of incapacity of the refugees. According to a man from Iran, there
is a hidden racism which can even be part of actions that have the best intentions:
For example, there are people who want to help you more, but that is not good
either. They think that you are disabled, you do not have this or that. Usually we
are disabled since we do not know the language, but we can learn the language.
But some people want to help you so much like you do not know anything and
cannot learn anything, which is bad [t].
The supportive and active resettlement policies in Finland are supposed to give a good
basis for a positive integration of the refugees into Finnish society. The refugees have
generally been pleased with these policies and the resettlement programmes have
undoubtedly led to positive results. However, as is shown in other parts of this thesis,
positive integration has not taken place. The shortcomings in the integration of
refugees should despite this not be blamed solely on the resettlement policies. Rather,
the major reasons for the shortcomings in the resettlement of refugees are to be found
in the more general structures in Finnish society. These structural issue are discussed
in more detail in later parts of this thesis.
England
Since, in Britain, there is no structured official resettlement programmes for Kurdish
refugees, their life situation is initially very chaotic. These issues were discussed with a
woman from Iran:
OW: ... Do you think that you got the help you needed? Or I mean, if you could
now decide yourself, how refugees in this country should be taken care of —
R: I would change everything. It is very strong bureaucracy system here. If you
speak English, maybe it is better, maybe you can face it much better, but if you
do not speak English it is horrible. I had horrible days, unforgettable, but with
the situation we had - I was ill, and then no English, no house, no money, no
work - everything was complicated when we arrived.
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The housing situation in London can not be described as anything other than
horrendous. The local councils and charities do not have enough accommodation for
all homeless refugees, and the prices on the private market are very high. The houses
and flats that are available are generally of a low standard and are usually smaller than
those the families have been used to in Kurdistan. Furthermore, the refugee
associations only have very limited resources to alleviate these problems (cf. HACT
1994).
Many refugees are forced to live with relatives for a long time until they manage to
find a place of their own. Some single persons live at hostels provided by charities, for
example by the Refugee Council, until they manage to rent a place from a private
landlord. One of the refugees interviewed had even been forced to live in an occupied
house for about one year. To find enough money for the rent is a serious problem for
many refugees, since the housing benefit does not cover the prices they have to pay for
privately rented flats. However, families with children generally manage to get a roof
over their heads through the local council or some housing association.
One issue which aggravates the practical problems in Britain is that there is no system
by which the refugees automatically get the benefits to which they are entitled. The
refugees have to apply for the benefits themselves. If you are totally unfamiliar with
the language and how society works, this is not very easy. A man from Iraq who had
lived in Britain for nine years reflected on this problem:
My experience of the UK is that you have to fight your way in, find your way by
yourself. If you do not find it by yourself, you will not be granted any help. For
example housing benefits, people get neglected if they do not find their way on
their own, you have to do it yourself.
It is difficult to make any normative comparisons of the different resettlement policies
in England and Finland. However, there were some informants with experience of both
the British system and the system in some of the Nordic countries (which tend to have
fairly similar policies). The sample includes one refugee who had two sisters in
Sweden with whom he had close contacts. This is how he compared the Swedish and
British policies:
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OW: Now, when you look back at this time when you arrived and the problems
you had, how would you organise the reception of refugees, if you could decide
exactly how things should be done?
R: I think that the system that they have in Sweden, as you probably know,
seems to be better. The Swedish system is more relaxation, while here you have
to be worried when you arrive. But on the other hand the English system helps
you more to manage yourself, to be able to do things on your own. So there are
advantages and disadvantages in both systems. But some people need more help,
for example when people come from a small village in Kurdistan, they have
problems. So for those people the Swedish system is better. But I do not want to
put the systems side by side and say that this is better than that. Some people do,
but I do not want to compare. But still, some people do need help and this is why
I think that perhaps the Swedish system is better.
The Swedish resettlement system is similar to the Finnish system. Obviously, as is
indicated in the above quotation, one advantage with the resettlement policies in these
Nordic countries is the equal treatment they also guarantee to refugees with less skills
and resources to find their way on their own. It appears that the British resettlement
policies do not fully recognise the refugees' specific problems and experiences. In the
words of a man from Iraq:
When looking back at my own experiences, generally speaking, I think that the
authorities to a bigger extent have to take into account that they are dealing with
political refugees and not usual migrants. Refugees have a lot of problems on
arrival that have to do with their connections back home, and they are in a very
difficult situation upon arrival in the UK. There should be some provision to
help refugees psychologically, now there is nothing. Genuine political refugees
may have experienced a very difficult time before arrival. Treating them as
ordinary migrants and giving them no relaxation time is a big mistake. I think
that refugees might need something like a couple of months relaxation time.
The British authorities have not fully recognised the specific nature of the refugee
migration, and they seem to deal with it in the same way - as they dealt with earlier
immigration to the country. As pointed out in chapter five, the British government's
view has been that many asylum seekers are illegal immigrants who arrive in Britain in
order to use British welfare benefits. On the contrary, however, my research findings
indicate that at the moment refugees and other legal immigrants face huge problems
even in getting the limited public services to which they are legally entitled. On the
other hand, the strong local communities in Britain can provide refugees with many
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advantages. The Kurdish associations and ethnic networks are able to play a far bigger
positive role in Britain than they do in Finland. The functions and importance of the
Kurdish associations and informal networks are discussed in more detail in the next
chapter.
To summarise, the Kurdish refugees in Finland experience relatively few practical
problems connected to housing, income support, education, interpretation services and
other aspects of the social services. This is in contrast to the Kurds in England, who
often experience a number of practical problems in their contacts with the authorities.
Obviously, the resettlement policies in the country of settlement have a decisive
influence on the practical problems refugees experience.
The Experience of Displacement
In addition to the practical problems which refugees experience upon arrival, there are
other problems which in practice cannot be solved and which the tefnees have to live
with. In particular, there is a sense of displacement, alienation and uprootedness which
is common for all refugees. To be a refugee means that you have been forced to flee
from your home and that you are living in a country to which you never wanted to
move. The feelings refugees have are not easily understood by people who have not
experienced exile themselves. The best way to describe these feelings is through
quotations from my interviews. For example, a woman from Turkey recalled her
experiences upon arrival in Britain:
Because you do not know even what it means to even be a refugee, you know,
what does it mean? You feel, you come, it is kind of a shock. You feel like you
will never go back again to your country, the feeling is so bad, because it makes
you more vulnerable, if you like, in terms of, you know, going back home and
seeing family and all that, so that is quite serious. And they [advice workers at
the community centre] did explain what it does mean to be a refugee under
international law and what happens, and in practical terms also what happens
and all that for the person. The first time you become a refugee, the first thing
that shocked me was that I cannot go back to my country, unless of course all the
political things will be solved. I can travel anywhere in the world once I have a
passport except for Turkey or Kurdistan, it even says so in your travel document,
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and it is just so-- I think it is the same for everybody, but it is just so bad, that
you cannot go back.
It is also clear that nothing in the new country of settlement can compensate for the
social relations one has lost. In the words of a young woman from Iraq who had lived
in Finland for two years:
I feel safe here and it is a convenient place here, and I live in peace and
tranquillity here, but still I am all the time longing for my relatives in Kurdistan
[t].
To be a refugee not only means that you have been forced to leave your home, but
since you never wanted to move to the country of exile, there is an additional feeling of
alienation in the place where you are living. This sense of alienation was clearly
evident in most interviews. A woman from Turkey stated:
I do not definitely consider this country as my country, and I do not really feel
like home, but I do not sort of allow myself to be a guest either. I try to be
involved as much as I can, within the community and with the people that I -- I
feel that I have to be involved with British people, with the public, but I also
know the fact that this is not my country. I am a refugee. The word refugee is
itself-- something. And I still have the ultimate goal of going back.
For political refugees the sense of loss is also closely connected to the political
struggle in Kurdistan. This has previously taken up a large part of their lives, and in
exile it is no longer possible to be active in the same way. Thus many refugees feel that
they have lost the meaning and sense of purpose in life. A woman from Iran described
the differences between her life in the Kurdish mountains and her life in London:
A lot of things [have changed in my life since I left Kurdistan]. I used to have a
very hard life, always bombardments, fighting, these things. But I was very
active, I was in other ways very happy, I had many many friends. I do not know,
I was happy, I was really happy, I thought that I was doing in that community,
something like useful. But when I came here, things changed a lot, I did not do
anything, I did not have any work, I just had to stay at home. This studying
helped me a little bit. I lost all my activities, there was nothing to do in this
country, I could not get involved in their society, it was so difficult to be
accepted by them, language difference, culture difference, and so on. It is not the
same, everything has changed.
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It can also be argued that refugees do not relate to the country of settlement in the same
way as labour migrants. Many refugees wanted to stress the specific refugee
experience. A young man who had lived in Finland for almost three years explained:
The biggest problem here is how to mentally or ideologically relate to this. If my
country would be free, if my people would be a free people, I would not have to
be worried, about anything. Instead I would be very satisfied with wherever I am
and whatever I do, I would not notice that at all. But because Iran is very
different, and I have been fighting for freedom, and I still feel like I am part of
that, so I still feel I have an obligation to myself, I should go back there again.
You would not expect this to be the case because for example the things I am
doing today are different from what I did before, but still it is the case. I am very
-- every day I live with it, because for example in the night when I sleep, perhaps
five, six times I see dreams about it, about my own people, my own life and
other things [t].
Another Iranian man who had lived in Finland for more than three years tried to
explain more clearly the difference between himself and labour migrants:
Really I am speaking about political refugees, not about migrants or others, it is
only because of politics that he/she 3 has left his or her country. Because he/she
cannot live in that country and he/she does not want to die. ... He/she is waiting
for something, for example if a president leaves a country as a refugee, he/she
does not want to become for example a Finn, he/she wants to go back to his or
her country some day, to his or her own land. And also we are the same, the only
difference is that I was only part of the youth section [of my party], but at this
time I did not think that I would stay in Finland or in the UK or in whatever
country, I did not think anything else than that I would like to continue my fight
against that government, if necessary from here. ... When I am involved in
politics I want a political party and I could for example do my own radio
programmes and journals and so on. And then I want that the country [of
reception] accepts me and helps me in my fight. Because if I am here I want to
live, and I have a right to live, and the political life is part of my life. I should
have the possibility to live for politics, ... I am a political person, I am not
labour, there is so often this misunderstanding. Somebody should tell the people
why we are here [t].
However, the alienation refugees feel is not only related to the political struggle in
which they have been involved in. Ultimately this alienation is also related to the fact
that although they have moved to a new place, they will still carry with them their old
identity and culture for the rest of their life. A man from Iraq pointed out that he
thought that he could never become truly assimilated.
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OW: What do you think about Finnish people, do you think that they want you
to become as Finnish as possible, or do you think that they want you to preserve
your own culture?
R: It depends actually from person to person. What I would say is that some
Finnish people would not accept that I in any way would become a member.
Some others, they have something to do with these cultural issues and
foreigner's affairs, in many instances they unfortunately are trying to force you
to become Finnish, and that I have rejected and rejected continuously, because I
cannot become Finnish when somebody wants me to. I will never become
Finnish because I have lived twenty-four years in another country, and I have
grown up in another culture and now I have arrived here and it is true that I can
learn a lot of things and behave like a Finnish person, but I am not thinking like
one. Because I know a lot of things that Finnish people do not know because I
have knowledge of, in addition to the Finnish culture, also my own, which the
Finnish people do not have any knowledge of [t].
The refugees' relation to their societies of origin is not only a matter of looking back at
their earlier lives; it is an ongoing and continuous relation. The refugees continue to be
influenced by contemporary developments in Kurdistan. Especially the political
developments play a large role for the refugees. A woman from Turkey said:
I think all Kurdish refugees have the problems in Kurdistan still inside them
although they are away from there. They still think about Kurdistan and have it
with them here, they have relatives still living there and hear news from
Kurdistan. When they hear that villages have been destroyed it affects them
directly although they are living here.
All refugees continue to relate to, and identify themselves with, Kurdistan. After
several years in exile refugees continue to feel alienated from the receiving society.
This section has thus shown that refugees feel partly alienated and insulated from the
their country of reception. Furthermore, refugees continue to relate to their country of
origin in several different ways. However, the connection with Kurdistan has not only
a psychological aspect; there are also quite tangible flows of information, ideas, capital
and people between the countries of origin and the countries of settlement. These
transnational networks are described in more detail in chapter seven.
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The Wish to Return
Related to refugees' sense of displacement and alienation is a feeling that their stay in
the countries of reception is only temporary. The refugees look forward to the day
when they can return and everything will become normal again. 4 All respondents, with
only two exceptions, stated that they wanted to move back to Kurdistan as soon as
possible. (The two respondents who did not want to return were a woman from Iran
and a woman from Iraq who had lived respectively for six and ten years in Britain, and
who were both afraid that they would have problems in moving back and adjusting
themselves to traditional gender roles in Kurdistan.) A man from Turkey living in
London and a man from Iraq living in Finland expressed typical opinions about their
wish to return:
It is not just me. All of the Kurdish people, all over the world, not just in
England or Britain or Europe, all over the world, they all want to go back to their
country [t].
I would like to return to Kurdistan, I think that I am the first family that will
move back when Kurdistan becomes free. If there would be a democratic leader,
and peace and safety, after that I would go back. That is why I am now here,
because there is no security. I think that some day I will go back, it is impossible
for me to imagine that I would stay here. If that happens it is not my fault but
because of life. Now we live in Finland but we do not know what will happen in
the future [t].
The circumstances that most respondents mentioned as necessary for a return included
the change of government in the country of origin, the introduction of democracy and
human rights and some kind of autonomy for Kurdistan. Despite their wish to return to
Kurdistan all interviewees told me that they found it very hard to plan anything for the
future. The political future of Kurdistan was regarded as very unclear and some
refugees pointed out that they did not know if it would ever be possible for them to
return. Many of the refugees from Iran and Iraq thought that, although they would like
to return, this was very unlikely to happen within the near future. However, the
refugees from Turkey were more likely to regard their stay as temporary and were
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more optimistic about the possibility of a political change. The following quotation is
typical of the optimism and hope that many refugees from Turkey expressed in 1995:
I do not really hope [to stay in Britain]. Only while we are waiting for a free
Kurdistan. But for me personally I do not think that we are going to stay in
England for the rest of our life. My personal feeling is that in a couple of years,
two or three years, a kind of solution will be found between the Kurds and the
Turks, so that actually we can return and be in our country, in a free
environment.
Contrasting with this is the alienation from politics that could be found among
refugees from Iraq. A man living in Finland reflected on the problems in Iraq:
One does not know, Kurdistan lies between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. You do
not know what can happen. I do not believe in Kurdish politics any more, but
perhaps the USA or the United Nations can do something. There are local
problems as well between the two parties which have to be solved. I remember
1974, when the USA did not support the Kurdish revolution. One does not
know, but I do not believe in the future and cannot see how changes could
happen. Perhaps you can ask some of the Kurdish politicians who live in London
what they say about it, they know better than I do. ... But I will stay here until
the situation gets better [t].
In the case of the Iranian refugees, the hopes for a political solution were at least as
pessimistic. A man from Iran considered it unlikely that he would be able to return
within the near future:
You know, it depends. If things change in the way that there will be a new
dictator, in that case I will be forced out again and I would not like to. But if Iran
will be a free country, and Iran lets me study, get a job and live as a human
being. But if I now go there and I see a new dictator I have to react again, and
my life will be in danger, and I will end up in jail and it will be difficult, I will
not get a job, I will not have the right to express my opinion, all these kinds of
things. But if I get what is normal for a human being, the things I can do here in
the Nordic counties. But that will not happen very fast, because in Iran there is
not a very well organised opposition at the moment [t].
One has to remember that for some refugees a return is unlikely even if the political
situation in Kurdistan suddenly changes. Many refugees have lost everything they had
in Kurdistan. Their villages have been destroyed, their land has been confiscated, and
their relatives and friends might have been killed or have disappeared. This was the
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case for refugees from all of the three countries concerned. An older couple from Iraq
living in Finland described their situation:
Husband: We cannot move back as long as there is no democratic rule there and
human rights are not respected. Personally I could stay here because I have
nothing left in Kurdistan and it is not so different here.
Wife: Yes, I agree with my husband [t].
In Finland it is relatively common for young Kurdish men to have relationships with,
and marry, Finnish women. This of course has a decisive influence on the future plans
of the Kurdish men, especially if the couple has children. As several young men told
me, children and marriage would probably mean that they must give up their plans to
return.
To sum up, almost all refugees wish to return to Kurdistan when conditions are
appropriate, but when this will be is not yet clear. However, the Kurds from Turkey
were generally more optimistic about the chance of returning and were more inclined
to see their stay as temporary. The Kurds from Iran and Iraq, however, did not think
that a return would be possible within the near future. Obviously, the political
developments in the country of origin have a profound influence on the refugees' plans
for the future.
Future Plans in the Country of Settlement
Although most refugees would like to return to Kurdistan, it is a fact that they must
continue to live in exile for a long time, perhaps for ever. As a man from Iraq who had
lived in Britain for five years said, "Many people say that they are going back, but very
few have actually done this. Many people speak about it but nobody goes back." Thus,
all refugees need to make some plans for their future in the country of settlement in
case a return migration remains impossible. A woman from Iraq living in Britain and a
man from Iran living in Finland described their plans for the future should they not be
able to return :
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I would like to go back. But now it is impossible to go back, and if I have to stay
here I will do my best and follow British laws and be thankful and live as a Kurd
in Britain.
In the first place I hope that we would have our own country, but if it is not
possible to return to Kurdistan we would like to participate in Finnish society
and also become citizens.
The refugees want to return, but they also want to establish a life in their new country
of settlement. How these conflicting plans for the future can be reconciled is a
common dilemma. A young man from Turkey who had lived in Britain for four years
described his thoughts:
OW: What is bad [in Britain compared to Kurdistan] then?
R: Bad is, in any case, you know you feel yourself, something-- that in any case
probably you will go back to your country, or you do not think of establishing a
life here, a family you know, and in any case it is not your country.
OW: So it is still some kind of-- some kind of alienation?
R: Yes, yes, it is yes. But I think for much more, for many people they are
establishing a community here, or Kurdish or Turkish, you know, a closed
community, and they do not feel-- to be living in a foreign country. How can I
say -- statistically if you ask a lot of people they can say, here I want to go back
actually, but, in fact, actually, the reality is different actually. But I can say that
in any case as an example, you want your one leg to be in your country and your
other leg to be in this country, if you see what I mean. It is very difficult.
Clearly, many refugees wish to take advantage of their lives in exile in order to further
political and personal goals that are related to their countries of origin. Lundberg
(1989), in his study of Latin American refugees, argues that it is possible to understand
the refugees' life in exile as a career during which the refugees are trying to prepare
themselves for their ultimate goal which is a return to the country of origin. For
example, many refugees spend their time studying and gaining knowledge which they
can utilise after they have returned. A young man from Iran hoped to become a teacher
in Kurdistan:
At least now I will study, and when my studies are concluded I would like to
study even more. To get knowledge, although you never can get enough
knowledge, but to get relatively good knowledge. And if some day it happens
that I will return, in that case I can work as a teacher for my people. The people
who are there surely need it more than the people who are here. And this is my
whole future, but I do not know if I live so long or not [t].
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Almost all refugees considered it possible that in the future they would apply for
citizenship in the country of settlement. Dual citizenship is possible in both England
and Finland (however, if refugees are given full refugee status they are not allowed to
keep their original passports, and will instead be given the Refugee Convention travel
document). Three of the interviewees in Britain already had British citizenship. Those
who did not want to apply for citizenship thought that they would soon return home,
and that they would thus not need a new citizenship. Many refugees indicated that
there were largely practical reasons behind their wish for a new citizenship. It was felt
that Finnish or British citizenship would make their life easier, and in particular, it was
mentioned that travelling abroad would be facilitated. Although travelling with the
Refugee Convention travel document is possible, some interviewees found it
embarrassing to use this document while others were afraid of more serious difficulties
during trips abroad. As other studies also have shown (e.g. Ekholm 1994; Icduygu
1996), an application for citizenship is largely a practical question and does not
necessarily indicate a person's attachment to the country of settlement or his or her
wish to return to the country of origin. In the words of a man from Iran:
I might get a Finnish citizenship in order to facilitate travel and avoid problems
in the future, but I will not psychologically become Finnish. But does it make
any difference? If I want to work here and do my best here, if I can do something
positive, what difference does it make if I am Finnish or not, if I do my work in a
responsible way? ... On the other hand I am not the same person as I was before,
but I cannot become part of the Finnish people because I am still mentally in Iran
and you have all your memories there, you have your life there, your family and
parents live there, all kinds of things, so -- When you think of it, one cannot
change the people you belong to, I belong to this people. Nobody can decide
what they want to be, it is not possible to change it, which is the reason why.
You can work here, but mentally and in your thoughts you are the same [t].
Many refugees hoped that citizenship would make it easier to find a job and would
reduce the discrimination they experienced in the labour market. However, some
refugees were afraid that a new citizenship would not lead to any difference in the
majority populations' opinions. A man from Iraq was pessimistic about his chances of
being accepted as a member of Finnish society:
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I would like to be [a Finnish citizen]. It would make things easier for me, at least
officially in this country. But as I told you, not even that would help me mentally
in any way, psychologically as long as I am regarded an outsider in this country.
On the other hand it is clear that the Kurds, as a persecuted minority, do not
necessarily have a strong emotional bond to their original citizenship. This was
stressed by some refugees from Iraq who said that since they were Kurds, they did not
have any attachment to the Iraqi state, and that they therefore wanted to get rid of their
citizenship as soon as possible. A few persons also mentioned that their application for
citizenship would be made because of gratitude towards the country that had given
them asylum. An Iranian man who had arrived in Finland as a quota refugee felt that
he owed a debt of gratitude to Finland:
I feel that I owe Finland and the Finnish people, Finnish society a lot. Because
Finland has given me asylum and security and given me an opportunity to study,
and I think I have to pay back a little bit of this debt. That is why I will
participate in Finnish society, although in that sense that I can be a Kurd, a Kurd
in Finland, or no problem to be a Finnish Kurd. And I think that I can somehow
unite these things [t].
All refugees stressed that they wanted to combine the good parts from the Kurdish
culture with the good parts of the culture of the receiving society. Obviously, all
persons have multiple identities and in multi-cultural societies it is possible for
immigrants to combine different cultures and identities (cf. Rex. 1994, 1996).
However, as some of the quotations in this chapter indicate, some refugees also felt
that the process of integration into the receiving society was connected with various
psychological problems.
Although the ultimate goal of the refugees is to return, there is at the same time a clear
wish to be integrated into the society of reception. These contradictory future plans are
not in conflict with each other since at present a return to Kurdistan is not possible, and
nor is it very plausible in the near future. The wish to integrate is seen for example in
the fact that all refugees express a desire to participate in their new society of
settlement. This issue will also be discussed later in the section about refugees'
employment situation. Obviously, integration is a goal among the Kurdish refugees.
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However, assimilation is not a goal and not even regarded as a possible outcome of
their lives in exile, and this fact clearly relates to the question of refugees' ethnic
identification.
Ethnic Identification
This study has not made any attempt to examine the issues of the Kurdish refugees'
identity in any detail. However, some questions about the refugees' identification were
included in the interviews. For example, all interviewees were asked how they would
describe themselves to a person they had not met before, and, depending on the
countries of origin and settlement, they were given the following alternatives:
British/Finnish, Iranian/Turkish/Iraqi or Kurdish. This question about identification
was also asked in order to identify the interview sample, which only included persons
who defined themselves as Kurds.
Not surprisingly, none of the interviewees wanted to call themselves British or
Finnish. All refugees said that they would present themselves as Kurdish. However,
there were still some differences related to their country of origin. The Kurds from Iraq
were most likely to only present themselves as Kurdish, rather than use any other
description of themselves. In fact some of them even found my question very strange,
if not offensive, and asked me how I could question their Kurdish identity. Many
Kurds from Turkey added that they could also use the labels Kurd from Turkey and
Turkish Kurd. Most of the Kurds from Iran, however, found that the terms Iranian
Kurdish and even Iranian were accurate. This probably reflects the fact that "Iranian"
signifies citizenship in a more ethnically neutral way than for example "Turkish."
Especially those Iranians who had been active in leftist parties seemed to avoid
emphasising a separate Kurdish identification. The Kurds from Iraq and Turkey, on the
other hand, generally wanted to stress their Kurdish identification. A man from Iraq
told me that he had always defended his right to a separate Kurdish identity:
No, this has not changed, I have always, always said that I am a Kurd. Wherever
I have gone and whoever I have spoken to, I always tell them that I am Kurdish.
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And this is the reason why I am a refugee today. Because I have fought for my
right to be Kurdish, which is why I am a refugee. That is why there are Kurdish
refugees, because we are not allowed to be Kurdish and live in Kurdistan [t].
Most interviewees said that their identification had not changed during the time they
had spent in their new countries of settlement. In those cases where the identification
had changed, the refugees felt that they had started to feel more Kurdish since they
moved to Europe. The news from Kurdistan had greatly affected a man from Iraq who
had lived in Britain for nine years:
I have actually changed the way I am looking at this. I am today more aware of
my identity, because of the things that you hear that have happened in Kurdistan,
since the oppression against the Kurds started ten years ago, before that I was not
aware in the same way. So, I have been influenced by the oppression, and there
has been a gradual change -- I have had both relatives and friends who have been
killed and to hear about this has influenced me.
In Turkey the Kurds have largely been denied the right to exist as a separate ethnic
group. Therefore it is not surprising that the refugees in exile might feel more
"Kurdish." An activist in a Kurdish organisation told me:
Let me tell you, the Kurds in Turkey have been so discriminated that they have
not even known who they are. They were so discriminated that they had
forgotten that they were Kurdish. Until the PKK came we did not understand
this. That is why we have to educate ourselves and learn of our history and tell
other people who we are [t].
One interesting aspect of Kurdish refugee identity has to do with the widespread
practice of ethnic monitoring in Britain. The whole idea of ethnic monitoring was
questioned by many of the interviewees. A woman from Iran described her dilemma:
Oh yes, it is horrible, I do not know, do you ask me do I fill it in? I have to do it -
- I have to do it, but I think it is very racism. I do not know why they do that, and
sometimes I cannot feel myself in any column, because there is no column for
me, and I write only "Other" ... I do not know why they ask these. I rejected to
fill it in last year, and then I spoke with the management of the college, and he
told me they do this to make a balance between the students, but I did not accept
that.
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The terms used in ethnic monitoring (the most common categories are "White,"
"Black," "Asian" and "Other") have a rather specific meaning in Britain. A few
persons told me that they used to state that they were Asians, since Kurdistan lies in
Asia, until somebody told them that in Britain Asian usually refers to persons
originating from the Indian subcontinent. Most had to opt for the "Other" category and
explain on the forms that they were Kurdish. None of the interviewees chose the
category "White."
"Black," although a controversial and debated term, is often used in Britain as a broad
political term referring to all persons experiencing racism, and is widely considered as
a relevant category around which resistance to racism can be organised. Of the twenty-
eight interviewees in Britain, only two declared that they as well as being Kurdish,
they could also describe themselves as "Black." Both persons had lived in Britain for a
relatively long time and had been involved in community work with ethnic minorities,
and both considered the term "Black" to include all ethnic minorities in Britain. This
would suggest that the Kurdish communities, over time, might start to feel part of, and
be integrated into, the wider category of "Black" or "ethnic minorities" in Britain.
However, this is a development that is far removed from the present situation, where
the Kurdish refugees tend to identify themselves as Kurds rather than anything else.
Actually, many interviewees had problems in understanding the question when asked
if they felt that they were an "ethnic minority" in Britain. Because of the continuing
relationship which most refugees have to their countries of origin, they wanted to think
of themselves within this framework and not within the framework of British ethnic
relations. A refugee from Turkey who had lived for seven years in Britain clearly
understood the meaning of the term "ethnic minority," but still found it
incomprehensible to think of the refugee community in these terms:
OW: Do you consider yourself to belong to an ethnic minority then, because
people in Britain sometimes talk about ethnic minorities?
R: No, I get really angry when they say Kurdish minority. I do not. Kurdish
people, Kurdish nation I would say.
OW: But I mean in England, an ethnic minority in England?
R: In England?
OW: Yes, in England.
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R: Hmm-- Maybe we are a minority, but I do not know ethnic minority, I do not
like the word minority.
OW: OK, it has to do with--
R: It is sort of like discrimination, in a way, one way of --
OW: Yes. So you do not like the word minority because it has to do with that
you do not feel like you are a minority in Turkey. OK.
R: How they can call twenty million people a minority is just amazing. There are
nations which are smaller than that, what is for example the population of
Holland or Luxembourg?
Consequently, the Kurdish refugees predominantly choose to define themselves as
Kurds rather than using any other ethnic or national label. The strong identification as
Kurds therefore makes a fast assimilation impossible, since assimilation into the
society of exile would mean that the refugees would give up their previous identity. On
the other hand, a social and structural integration is of course still possible and is also
regarded as a goal by the refugees.
Ethnicity is always defined in terms of a relation between social groups. The Kurdish
refugees' ethnicity is primarily defined within the context of social relations in the
countries of origin. Because of this orientation towards Kurdistan, it is difficult to
regard the Kurdish refugees as an ethnic minority within the framework of the
countries of exile. This supports the argument in chapter two that theories of ethnic
relations are not easily applied to refugee situations (cf. Bousquet 1991).
Gender Issues and Family Values
Although many of the problems refugees experience are the same for both men and
women, female refugees are in some respects especially disadvantaged. This section
briefly describes refugees' gender-specific problems. In order to understand these
problems, this section also very briefly discusses some issues pertaining to gender
roles and family values among Kurdish refugees.
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All interviewees pointed out that the social relations in Kurdistan and in the two
societies of resettlement work in completely different ways. A woman from Iraq
described the differences between Britain and Kurdistan:
Yes, in Kurdistan there is-- people around you. When you live in Kurdistan all
the neighbours, all your family, friends, you do not feel that you are on your own
in Kurdistan. If you have any problem all the friends and families and all the
neighbours are like your family, they come to help you, and they visit you-- it is
not like here [in England] really.
These differences between the social relations in Kurdistan and in the countries of
origin were in various ways pointed out by all interviewees. When asked to give
examples of positive and negative things in the country of settlement in comparison
with the situation in Kurdistan, most people chose to speak about family values. A
woman from Iran explained:
Iranian people are close together, they are very good to each other. If you have
some problems you can go to any of your neighbours or friends and they will
help you. In England nobody helps you and you cannot get help or talk to your
neighbour, you just say hello and that is all. In Iran things are better. ... Iranian
families are very close together and we look after each other. In England parents
are not responsible for their children, they are not close together and do not take
care of each other. Brothers do not help their sisters and men do not help their
wives. In Iran we do not know this, this is what I think. You have to be careful
with your children, you have to give them advice. You have to give them advice
not to take drugs and not to drink. I am responsible for my children. In this
country it is different, people are not responsible for each other.
Many of the interviewees, both men and women, had serious doubts about the way the
family works in Europe. Divorce and the general breakdown of families in Europe
were mentioned by many persons as negative aspects of life in exile. The commitment
to the institution of marriage and the family in general seems to be a fundamental part
of the Kurdish culture (cf. Songur 1992), and this was expressed in various ways in
most interviews.
Without exaggerating the importance of cultural differences it has to be acknowledged
that it is possible to argue that there are cultural differences between contemporary
northern European societies (including Finland and England) and the traditional
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Kurdish society. However, what should be remembered is that these differences do not
by themselves lead to problems or conflicts, which are instead determined by other
factors. However, it can be argued that because of the cultural differences, the refugees
might feel more disoriented and might experience more misunderstandings than they
would otherwise do. This in turn might aggravate all the problems refugees experience.
As Sheilchmous argues, "For somebody coming from a social background like
Kurdistan (which is mainly agrarian), with its intensive social contacts in the
framework of the extended family, neighbours and friends, the experience [of exile]
becomes even more dramatic" (Sheilchmous 1990, 103).
An issue closely related to Kurdish family values is that of gender roles. In traditional
Kurdish society there is a clear division of labour between men and women, with both
having specific roles determined by gender, age and marital status (cf. Songur 1992).
Men are traditionally dominant in the public sphere of life, while women are confined
to the private sphere of life. It is sometimes argued that traditionally Kurdish women
have more freedom than women living in other traditional cultures in the Middle East.
Proofs of this is seen in the fact that Kurdish women traditionally do not wear veils and
are often allowed to speak with unacquainted men. However, whether or not it is true
that the Kurdish women, relatively speaking, are more emancipated, it is a fact that
traditional Kurdish society and public life largely are dominated by men (cf. Laizer
1996a). Some of the interviewees, both male and female, even regarded traditional
Kurdish society as a very sexist society in which women are discriminated against. On
the other hand, many women also strongly defended traditional gender roles and
family values and argued that the freedom of women in Europe is illusory. Some
persons even argued that individual freedom in Europe amounted to nothing else than
loneliness and irresponsibility.
This section is not able to give a full picture of gender roles in Kurdistan. The
important issue for the purpose of this thesis is that although diverse opinions were
expressed about gender roles, all interviewees experienced that there were significant
differences between the gender roles in Kurdistan and those in the societies of
settlement. A man from Iran summarised his view of the differences:
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There are really, really big differences [in the gender roles in Kurdish society
compared to Finnish society]. For example, I mentioned before about illiteracy,
and then when there is no freedom. And then when the official law of the
country [Iran] only gives rights to men, so the women do not really have any
rights at all. Although usually in the Kurdish areas the Kurds do not follow those
rules so strictly, the women there are perhaps more free than in other places, and
in the economy they might perhaps to some extent have a share. But in decision-
making they do not have a very strong place, they can give advice but they can
not decide [t].
Often the two concepts of honour and shame are used to describe two fundamental
virtues in Kurdish culture (cf. Songur 1992). In particular, the life of Kurdish women
is traditionally ruled by the importance of honour and shame. Sheri Laizer describes
the importance of these traditional customs among the Kurds in Turkey:
The motivating factor for most Kurds continues to be their sense of honour. A
family's honour is all-important and is usually seen as residing in the purity and
fidelity of its women.... A woman's infidelity to her husband - even when the
marriage is an arranged and possibly loveless union - brings disgrace to both
families. (Laizer 1991, 44)
Some of the female interviewees explained that still in exile the concept of the family's
honour has a profound influence on the relations between the sexes in the Kurdish
communities. A woman from Turkey argued that young female refugees in particular
experience many problems in England:
Kurdish women's situation is quite difficult here, since they live in a totally
different culture. Especially young women, ... because here the Kurdish
community puts a big pressure on women, especially on girls, because they
believe English culture is a culture where you can have free sex, and they do not
want their children to be like them, especially their daughters. And there are still
arranged marriages here, they either get women from Kurdistan, for their boys,
or they send their daughters back to Kurdistan for marriage.
OW: So, this is done to protect the women--
R: Yes, to protect from the other side.
OW: --from the terrible English culture?
R: Yes, to protect their family.
Of all the problems refugees experience, some are obviously gender-specific. Kurdish
women often have a poorer education and less language skills than men. Actually,
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many of the female informants emphasised that the possibility of studying was one of
the positive things about living in Europe. Since Kurdish women have traditionally
been confined to the private sphere of life, female refugees often have limited personal
contacts with the society of settlement. In the European countries services and
resources are mainly available within the public sphere of life, and therefore they are
often not as accessible for Kurdish women as they are for men. Consequently, some
Kurdish women in Europe have to rely on their men, who have to take care of the
whole family's contacts with the authorities and other public institutions. A woman
from Turkey gave a description of the problems facing refugee women in London:
Men are more open to the changes, if you like, to the outside world, because of
the society back in Kurdistan. Whereas women are more used to a more closed
environment, you know, and when you come to a country like this and there is a
culture shock, it is more striking for women than it is for men, I would say.
Women need a lot of encouragement and confidence because throughout history
because of the treatment of women, women lost self-confidence and they do not
see a role for themselves in the society, they do not see any position and they
feel like they cannot really do much in that sense. So problems for women here,
either you get more closed, you know, between four walls at home. For example
you look around you and you do not see many women around you trying to learn
the language, but you see more men going to colleges, young or middle-age men
trying to learn the language. But women mostly choose to stay at home, and do
not get out much. Because they feel like they cannot cope with the changes. It is
more difficult for them to understand the society, they just let men do it.
Among the first refugees from Iraq, many women had a good educational and
professional background, but among the recent arrivals from Iraq and Turkey the
women's disadvantaged position has become even clearer. Furthermore, the women
from Turkey living in London are in a special situation since they are living in their
own close community. Although this has its own advantages, it also means that
women tend to become isolated from British society. In addition, some of them work
in factories as well as taking care of their families. Consequently, they have very
limited chances to take part in language courses or to learn English through personal
contacts.
Women's issues are not always taken into account sufficiently in the refugee
community. Some female interviewees felt that Kurdish associations are not really
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able to help women enough with their specific problems. The impression given during
various discussions was that the emancipation of women was seen by many persons as
only a subordinate part of the larger Kurdish national project of liberating Kurdistan
from oppression by the states in the region.
To summarise, Kurdish refugee women are in many ways disadvantaged compared
with Kurdish men. Since the public sphere of life in Kurdistan is largely reserved for
men, women are not used to taking part in public life in a way that is customary in
European societies. Women are often also deprived of their traditional support
networks in the extended families that exist in Kurdistan. Kurdish women often have a
lack of formal education and work experience as well as a high frequency of illiteracy.
Kurdish female refugees also have to take care of their traditional duties as housewives
and mothers, and are thus often prevented from taking part in educational courses and
language training. All these factors contribute to the specific problems that female
refugees face in their new countries of settlement. This exemplifies the fact that it is
important to take into account a gender perspective in discussing refugees' problems.
As Kay (1987) argues, this gender perspective is often forgotten in refugee studies,
which tend to concentrate on the public domain and not the private domain of life.
Employment
This section describes the integration of the Kurdish refugees in terms of the refugees'
integration into the labour market. The Kurdish refugees' diasporic consciousness and
their continuous relations with the country of origin should not divert attention from
the fact that refugees do want to integrate into their new countries of settlement.
Although refugees do not want to, and feel that they cannot, totally assimilate, there is
a clear wish among them to play an active social and economic role in their new
societies. As argued earlier in this chapter, regardless of their plans for the future or
their feelings of alienation, all the interviewees expressed a clear wish to become
integrated and participate in their new society of settlement. To find employment was
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obviously regarded as one of the most important ways to participate in society. A
woman from Iran told me:
I am not working, I am a student, studying English. I would like to work but I
cannot find work. I would like to do something with my own hands, not just get
help from others all the time. I feel really bad every time I go to the DSS, I think
that it now is enough, I have been here five years now and I should be able to do
something on my own and not just rely on others.
Clearly, all refugees would like to find a job or some other meaningful employment in
the country of reception. As a man from Iraq said, "To sit like this, doing nothing, in
Kurdistan it would be regarded as a disease." To have a job is clearly not only an
economic issue. This also would solve many of the psychological and social problems
which the refugees experience. A family from Iran said that their wish was to return to
Kurdistan, but if they had to stay in Finland, they did have plans for the future:
We are trying to be useful persons in any possible way. Our first goal is to
establish our own business so we could stand on our own feet, in this way we
also would get rid of the psychological pressure and we will secure our future [t].
The concept of integration is often measured through the migrant's position in the
labour market (cf. Ekholm 1994; Miles 1993; Phillips 1989). As the quotations above
illustrate, the Kurdish refugees in both countries want to become integrated into the
receiving society in this sense of the term. Many refugees are not part of the
economically active population since, for example, they are students or housewives;
but among those who are a part of the labour market one can find a clear difference
between the way they are integrated in the two countries.
Finland
During the fieldwork in Finland the employment situation was extremely bad. Ekholm
(1994) has used official statistics to calculate the exact unemployment rate for
refugees. The rate was 61.4 per cent of the economically active refugees in 1992, when
the national average was 13.1 per cent. Since the national average unemployment rate
grew to 18.4 per cent in 1994 (Statistics Finland 1995), one can assume that
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unemployment among refugees was even worse in the autumn of 1994 when this
research was carried out.
A few Kurds arrived in Finland before the economic recession, and some of them
managed to get jobs. However, among the main group who arrived in the 1990s, the
employment situation remained very bad. A few Kurdish refugees have been
employed as interpreters and Kurdish language teachers, while others are self-
employed in fast food outlets and shops selling oriental foodstuffs. The "start money"
for unemployed persons who establish businesses (a scheme administered by the
Employment Offices) has been of great help to many Kurds. Nonetheless, those who
have managed to become self-employed are exceptions, and during the fieldwork it
became clear that most Kurdish refugees are unemployed.
As described in chapter five, the Finnish refugee resettlement programme is clearly
oriented towards integrating refugees into the labour market. The programmes include
practice in different jobs and extensive guidance about career opportunities. The aim is
also to avoid the kind of integration that tends to occur in England, where refugees end
up doing the most menial and poorly paid jobs (cf. Steen 1992). In Finland there is a
minimum wage and also labour legislation which to some extent prevents the refugees
from being discriminated against in the labour market. 5 However, it has to be stressed
that Finnish resettlement policies have not been adjusted for the present employment
situation. During the current economic recession most refugees have not been able to
find any kind of employment. Instead, the integration of refugees has been into the vast
army of alienated and marginalised unemployed. Clearly, the relatively high
unemployment among refugees can only be seen as a failure of the Finnish
resettlement programmes. It also appears that the refugees are not given a fair chance
to compete for the few available jobs. A young man from Iran, who spoke rather good
Finnish, told me:
Once it happened, in the Employment Office, there was this thought that the
worker there had found a job for me as a cleaner. I said that I wanted to have a
job, even if it was a job as a cleaner. But then he showed me that it said in the
advert that the employer had written that you had to speak Finnish.
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This was, however, the only occasion when I heard about somebody even having a
remote chance of getting a job through the Employment Offices. Instead, the
unemployment situation in Finland has created a situation in which the refugees are so
marginalised that they cannot even experience the luxury of being discriminated
against in the labour market.
England
The employment situation for refugees in Britain is not good. In 1995 the national rate
of unemployment in Britain was around 8 per cent. However, among refugees the
percentage is probably considerably higher. Carey-Wood et al. (1995) recorded an
unemployment rate of 57 per cent among refugees in their sample in 1992. However,
as they point out, there are of course other ways of making economic contributions
besides having a "job." Their research showed, for example, that 36.5 per cent of their
respondents had done some kind of voluntary work.
Britain has a comprehensive race relations legislation which among other things aims
at preventing discrimination in the labour market. Although the efficiency of this
legislation can be debated, it can be argued that the British legislation, compared with
the situation in Finland, has been relatively efficient in preventing open racism and
discrimination in the labour market. Despite this, there is still a clear ethnic
segmentation in the labour market. London is a multi-cultural city including many
communities established by persons originating in the Middle East. These
communities can provide some of the Kurdish refugees with an opportunity to get
jobs. Since Britain does not have any minimum wage, these jobs are often very poorly
paid. In this study this is particularly clear in the case of the Turkish/Kurdish
community in North London. The Kurdish refugees here have an opportunity to be
employed in some of the "sweatshops" in the area. Refugees are often forced to work
in the poorly paid black market because the DSS money is not enough to live on and
sufficiently well paid "legal" jobs are not available.
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The estimates of the unemployment of the Kurds in London show great variations. The
1993/1994 Annual Report of the Kurdistan Workers Association (KWA) estimates
that 95 per cent of the Kurds in North London were unemployed, while many of those
in employment were "exploited by the factory 'sweat shops' that run in the area, and
perform menial, unrewarding work" (KWA 1994, 7). A report from Hackney Council
(1993) estimates that unemployment in the "Turkish community" in Hackney was 35-
40 per cent, while 20-30 per cent of the Turkish/Kurdish community were self-
employed. The report furthermore states that "Hackney entertains the greatest amount
of 'black' economy and the Turkish/Kurdish community appear to rely heavily on this
opportunity" (Hackney Council 1993, 10). There were estimated to be around 800
clothing manufacturing units in Hackney alone. The report criticises the fact that there
are not enough facilities to integrate most members of the community into the national
economy, and advocates better incentives and guidance for those active in the garment
factories. Other significant economic activities in the Borough's Turkish/Kurdish
community were cafes (around 400 establishments), restaurants and different shops
(Hackney Council 1993).
In this research, five respondents have had temporary jobs in Turkish/Kurdish textile
"sweatshops" in North London. These jobs were sometimes part of a black economy
where no taxes were paid. The wages in these "sweatshops" are low and are paid
according to results. Needless to say, these jobs provide no social security and give no
protection against illness, accidents or unreliable employers. A refugee from Turkey
described the working conditions:
Usually you work like twelve hours a day. And you do not have any kind of
security. If you are ill that is it, they sack you. They do not care about you at all,
and there is a big market here. Most of the Kurdish people, Kurdish refugees,
work without a National Insurance Number. I worked in a factory for one month
ago but it was unbearable for me and I left it. It is again twelve hours, or it is not
twelve hours, you start and you do not know when you are going to finish it.
They do not let you, allow you to go out unless the job finishes, and sometimes
you work like seven days a week like twenty hours.
There are so many people, they are on Income Support and Housing Benefit, and
they cannot afford to cut it, so they have to find illegal jobs, and since there are
so many people looking for jobs, they do not care, if they sack you the next day,
or even the same day, they can find somebody else.
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These jobs usually mean that the Kurdish refugees are integrated into the labour
market at the lowest possible level, occasionally working in low wage jobs and
occasionally being unemployed. Even the highly skilled refugees are experiencing a
dramatic downward economic mobility (cf. Carey-Wood et al. 1995; Rasheed 1992;
Hackney Council 1993). There is, however, some chance that over time the refugees
might improve their situation in the labour market. Carey-Wood et al. regard duration
of stay in the UK as one of the factors affecting refugees' career status in Britain. A
large number of the Kurdish refugees are actually students who might improve their
status on the labour market in the future. In fact many well-educated men from Iraq
can already be found in very good positions in Britain, but these persons are of course
only a small minority of the Kurds in Britain.
To sum up, there are differences and similarities between the employment situations of
Kurds in Finland and in England. In both countries the refugees find themselves
integrated at the lowest possible level of the labour market. In Finland the Kurds are
mostly unemployed, while in Britain they might take poorly paid jobs in different
"sweatshops." The resettlement programmes in Finland have clearly failed in their goal
to achieve a positive integration for refugees, while the lack of resettlement
programmes in Britain almost automatically excludes refugees from the better jobs.
However, in Britain the Kurds can use their own informal networks to create and find
jobs. For example, in North London there is a separate Turkish/Kurdish ethnic labour
market in which the Kurdish refugees can find employment.
All refugees want to get jobs and achieve integration into the labour market. They
might not always have the necessary skills for the labour market, but still many of
them are highly educated. Taking this into account, the relatively high unemployment
rate among refugees suggests that they face serious discrimination. As has repeatedly
been proved in Britain, ethnic minorities are disadvantaged and face discrimination in
the labour market, and there is no reason why refugees should not face the same, or
even worse, discrimination. In fact, in both countries the refugees experienced many
different kinds of discrimination and racism.
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Racism and Discrimination
Finland
The findings of this study are rather depressing concerning the extent of racism and
xenophobia in Finland. A majority of the interviewees had several experiences of
various kinds of xenophobia or racism, and the situation cannot be described as
anything else than alarming. What was especially appalling was that most of the single
men had experienced racially motivated and vicious, violent attacks. Two young male
persons had even been attacked by youth gangs in the middle of the day. The female
and older male refugees had mostly experienced vocal expressions of xenophobia and
racism. Most interviewees had been insulted by drunken Finns.
Even if only some of the refugees have experienced actual racist attacks or
discrimination, all of them have been affected by the racist and xenophobic attitudes
which many Finns display. This of course has a profound effect on the refugees'
relations with Finnish people. An older man from Iraq described how his family's
contacts with Finns were influenced by these experiences:
Yes, all the time when you walk on the street you think that perhaps that person
hates me. Because it happens some times, which is why you have it with you all
the time. We respect Finland and what they have done for us, but we do not
know who is against us here. In Kurdistan we knew who was the enemy [t].
The fear of racist attacks has also led to the fact that some refugees are living a more
isolated life than they would otherwise wish to do. Most refugees avoid restaurants,
pubs and other places where it is p3ssible that problems might occur. 6 A man from
Iraq told me that he usually had no problem apart from encounters with drunken
persons:
On Saturdays and Sundays we do not usually go out very much because they
[drunken persons] insult us in the street. For example, we cannot go to any bar,
disco or hotel if we want to drink something, because they bother us. That is
why we avoid places like that [t].
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Similar experiences of racism in Finland have also been documented by other authors
studying refugees (e.g. Alitolppa-Niitamo 1994; Ekholm 1994), but unfortunately no
official statistics of racist attacks are available. However, as I also will discuss later,
one still has to remember that not all Finns are hostile towards refugees, and that it is
only a minority who create problems. In any event, the extent of racism and
xenophobia in Finland came as a surprise to the refugees, especially to the quota
refugees who in a way have been invited to Finland.
Surprisingly, many interviewees still did not regard racism and xenophobia as a major
problem in their lives. Many of the interviewees said that they did not think that the
incidents of racism and discrimination which they had experienced were very
significant. Taking into account the extent of open racism in Finland, this is rather
extraordinary. One reason might be that, compared to the experiences of
discrimination and civil war in Kurdistan, these racist attacks were regarded as only
minor incidents. Furthermore, the refugees have not experienced any discrimination
from the Finnish authorities, only from certain individuals. The refugees' opinions can
also be partly explained by the fact that refugees might see their stay in Finland as only
temporary, since they still hope to move back to Kurdistan within a few years. Another
possible reason, why the interviewees did not want to make a big issue out of these
incidents, might be that they wanted to give me as good picture as possible about their
experiences in Finland. Complaining about racism would seem to be ungrateful after
they had received asylum in the country.
Personally, I find that the extent of open racism and racist attacks in 'Finland cannot be
described as anything else than alarming. However, in some cases the hidden
xenophobia and discrimination is experienced as an even worse problem. A man from
Iran did not regard the overt racist attacks as racism, and argued that the real racism in
Finland was a hidden cultural racism towards people from the third world:
Really I cannot say that someone who attacks me is racist. The person is hostile
towards foreigners, which is not racism. A person who makes a difference
between cultures, this is real racism according to me, because that person wants
to say that something is better, and he/she wants to put people in different
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classes. ... It might happen [that Finns have disagreements with each other] but
that is person against person. I have this idea, if a foreigner comes against you
and he/she is from a different culture. You will blame everything on this
person's culture. It is because of your culture that you did this and that. This
would not happen between Finns, nobody will tell you that you have a different
culture and are a foreigner. This term "foreigner," it means that the person is
different from the rest. But if you have problems with another Finn, will
anybody tell you that it is because of your culture? Nobody will tell you this,
they will say that it is because of your personality. But if somebody blames your
culture, says that it is bad or good. ... This is in my opinion racism [t].
The above quotation is clearly related to the notion of new racism which is discussed
in chapter two. Furthermore, this Iranian man argued that the differential treatment
which refugees experience arises because refugees are seen to come from inferior and
poor countries and cultures. A man from Iraq described his experiences of racism in
Finland:
R: Towards me personally nothing serious has happened, but the most serious
thing for me is the mentality of the Finnish people, I can give you a lot of
examples.
Ow: Yes. That is fine.
R: For example, when you see my face now, I do not look like an African.
People believe that I am from Spain or Italy or so on. They have treated me so
good, and after that when they notice I am a refugee and from Kurdistan, this is
not shown very clearly but I am sensitive about this, and I immediately notice
that people treat me differently. This mentality is a problem. Even if he would
notice that I am not an Italian or Spanish, he would not start calling me names,
but I notice anyway that his voice changes in some way and I know that
something has happened inside him.
Finnish xenophobia can take a variety of forms. For example, one refugee living in
Helsinki had repeatedly noticed that people avoided to sit next to him on the bus. In
addition to the fact that people felt excluded because they were identified as foreigners
from the third world, some felt that it was an additional disadvantage to be identified
as a refugee. The stigmatisation connected to refugee status seemed to be common in
Finland. A man from Iraq told me:
It is a big misunderstanding here in Finland, but I am not saying that all Finnish
people say this or think this way. I do not want to generalise, because I am
always talking in a relative way about these things. The big misunderstanding is
that about refugees, people think that you have to be poor, you have to be
without any knowledge, you have to be this and that. But people do not realise
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that a real refugee is something different from a person who is here because of
starvation.
The quotations above suggest that there are hidden racist ideas at play which are not as
obvious as open racism and racist attacks, but which are still serious problems.
However, at the same time very few of the refugees in Finland experienced actual
discrimination. In particular, the authorities were regarded as giving a fair and equal
treatment to everybody. A man from Iraq who had experienced a lot of racism among
the general public was still able to tell me that:
The authorities' behaviour is good, I think. At least they do not show their-- If
they have something against you, they do not show it to us. And all things go
without any problems, and on the other hand even sometimes they help us more
than they help Finnish people.
England
London is a large multi-cultural city and its human diversity seems to mean that
Kurdish refugees feel more easily at home. A woman who lived in the borough of
Kensington and Chelsea in London described her experiences:
OW: Have you experienced any racism in Britain?
R: Not myself, no. But, you know, it is different because the area I have live in,
have you seen it? It is not many English people live in this area. It is all African
and Asian people live here, and I really never have seen any [racism]. And I do
not feel I live in England, you know. When I go outside [London], it is more like
England. But here it is so different, mixed up all peoples and cultures. But I like
it, I like it very much, it is more like home.
In a large multi-cultural city with many persons regarded as "foreigners," there is also
less risk of being personally singled out for racist attacks or insult. Among the
interviewees, one male refugee had once experienced a racist attack and some of the
female refugees had experienced insulting comments from British persons. Although
racist attacks and racism are still a serious problem in London, the extent of this fades
in comparison with the situation in Finland. During the fieldwork I also had the
opportunity to meet a refugee who had stayed in Denmark for some time. He argued
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that although people in Britain talked about racism all the time, he actually felt that the
situation was worse in the Nordic countries. These issues were also discussed with a
Kurd who had moved from Finland to England, and who was largely able to confirm
my interpretation of the differences between the two countries:
You know, in Finland I felt like a stranger, I do not feel in the same way here. I
am of course a stranger also here, but I do not feel in the same way. You know
this street where we live, there are many foreign people here, my next door
neighbour is Chinese. In Finland we were the only foreigners, I felt that people
thought I was a stranger and looked at me, although everybody was very nice.
But actually I liked Finland better than England. Everybody was very nice to me
in Finland and I will never forget that and always be grateful for what people did
for me, the problem was only that I felt as a stranger there and felt that I cannot
live there. I do not feel in the same way here. In Finland I did not know what I
was doing there and felt as if I was going mad, I feel much better here in London
although there are a lot of problems here. But I feel much more comfortable here
and do not want to move back.
Obviously, the refugees in Britain do not experience as much open racism as in
Finland. However, it can be argued that racism in Britain is more hidden and
structural. The immigrants in Britain are integrated into the society at the lowest
possible socio-economic level. Furthermore, there is often a lack of services for the
refugees and they face a lot of obstacles in their contacts with British authorities. As
research has shown (cf. Wrench and Solomos, 1993), the existence of racial
discrimination in Britain cannot be denied. However, the discriminatory and racist
structures in British society are, however, not always very obvious since they not
necessarily manifest themselves in the personal relations of refugees' daily lives in the
multi-cultural inner city boroughs of London. The situation in Britain is in this respect
almost the opposite to the Finnish situation. In Finland there is an obvious and crude
racism and xenophobia which the refugees experience in their daily lives, but on the
other hand relatively few of the refugees had experiences of systematic discrimination
and none felt that they had been discriminated against by the authorities.
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Conclusion
This chapter has described the Kurdish refugees' own experiences upon arrival in
Finland and Britain. The psychological problems, experiences of displacement and
many practical problems seem to be the same for all Kurdish refugee groups,
regardless of their country of origin and country of settlement. Furthermore, Kurdish
refugees in general have similar experiences to those of other refugee groups, and this
study thus largely confirms results from previous studies discussing refugee
resettlement. However, this thesis seeks discuss these issues within a slightly different
conceptual framework.
This chapter has shown that three more of Safran's characteristics of a diaspora are
evident among the Kurdish refugees. First, there is a feeling of alienation among the
refugees. Clearly, "they believe they are not - and perhaps cannot be - fully accepted
by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it" (Safran
1991, 83). This feeling of alienation has to do both with the refugees' feeling of
displacement and their experiences of racism and discrimination. Secondly, there is a
wish to return among the refugees, since "they regard their ancestral homeland as their
true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should)
eventually return - when conditions are appropriate" (Safran 1991, 83-84). Clearly, at
the moment a return is impossible, and, depending on country of origin as well as
political convictions, there were different assumptions of when and how the conditions
would be appropriate for a return. Thirdly, the refugees can be seen to have a
continuous relation with their homeland. This entails that "they continue to relate,
personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their
ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence
of such a relationship" (Safran 1991, 84). This is indicated by the feeling of
displacement among the refugees. The next chapter will return to this last characteristic
and look more closely at the transnational social networks in the Kurdish refugee
communities.
168
It is obvious that the Kurdish refugees have a diasporic consciousness. This indicates
that the diaspora concept might be a useful concept for describing the specific refugee
experience. The diasporic relations in the refugee communities mean that theories of
ethnic relations are difficult to apply to the community. The Kurds do not regard
themselves as a minority within the context of the country of exile; instead their
ethnicity is defined within social relations in the country of origin. Consequently, any
fast assimilation of the refugees is obviously out of the question. Despite this diasporic
consciousness and the impossibility of a fast assimilation, the refugees strive to
become integrated into their new society of settlement. All refugees wish to find
employment, learn the language and culture and in all possible ways settle down and
have well-functioning social relations with the majority. The refugees actively strive to
combine their Kurdish culture with the culture of their society of settlement.
This dual orientation towards both the country of origin and the country of
resettlement is not as contradictory and paradoxical as it seems. In the refugees' own
experiences their country of origin and their country of exile, as well as the time before
and the time after migration, constitute a continuous and coherent lived experience.
The separation between before and after migration, as well as the separation between
the country of origin and country of exile, is largely forced on the refugees'
experiences by the outside observer. The concept of diaspora can help the researcher to
rethink these issues and to understand the transnational reality in which the refugees
are forced to live. The concept can bridge the often artificial duality in which the
refugee experience is conceptualised.
All the Kurdish refugees shared the experiences discussed above, but there were also
other significant differences between the various groups of refugees. First of all, there
is a gender perspective which has to be taken into account. Among the Kurdish
refugees, men and women often have the use of very different means and resources to
handle their problems. There are also significant differences between the experiences
of the refugees in Finland and in England. The refugees in England experienced more
practical problems and language difficulties while the refugees in Finland seemed to
suffer more from isolation and various mental problems. The employment situation
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and type of integration into the labour market were not the same in the two countries.
The experiences of racism and discrimination were also diametrically different, in
Finland the authorities and resettlement programmes supported equality but the
refugees still confronted an obvious everyday racism, while in the multi-cultural
British society racism and discrimination seemed to be more structural and subtle.
These differences between the two countries indicate that the resettlement policies and
social structures in the country of settlement have a big impact on how the refugees
will be integrated and what kind of problems they will experience. Thus, although the
refugees have a diasporic consciousness and remain oriented towards their countries of
origin, this should not divert attention from the important role played by the social
structures in the countries of settlement. The integration into the wider society seems
to be largely dependent on the exclusionary and inclusionary policies of the country of
settlement and not on the degree of diasporic feelings amongst the refugees. These
issues are also discussed in chapter seven.
Clearly, there are both advantages and disadvantages in the way the reception and
resettlement of refugees is organised in the two countries. The Finnish resettlement
policies provide a good base for positive integration, although this is not the actual
outcome because of unemployment and racism, amongst other factors. The British
resettlement systems do not provide equal and similar services for all refugees in the
same way as the more egalitarian public support systems in Finland. On the other hand
the well-established Kurdish communities in London also provide a good base for a
positive integration through the support networks and resources within a strong
community and voluntary associations. Unfortunately, however, integration into
British society has largely been into the lowest socio-economic positions. In a perfect
world one would of course be able to combine the positive aspects from both
countries: Public support in combination with strong ethnic communities in both an
egalitarian and a truly multi-cultural society.
CHAPTER 7
THE KURDISH REFUGEE COMMUNITY
This chapter describes the social organisation of the Kurdish refugee communities and
thus follows on directly from the previous chapter, which described the refugees'
personal experiences. To begin with, the focus is on what can be called the "social
integration" of the Kurdish refugees. In the previous chapter a structural dimension of
integration is discussed from the point of view of the refugees' integration on the
labour market. Here the analysis of integration is developed further through the study
of the refugees' interpersonal relations. Later parts of this present chapter describe
how the refugee communities have adapted to the different social situations in the
two countries of reception. The Kurdish associations in both countries are presented
and the positive roles of associations and informal networks are examined. Finally,
attention is given to the diasporic political activities of the refugee communities.
In chapter two it was pointed out that the concept of integration, although frequently
used, is problematic. Raymond Breton (1964) points out that the integration of
immigrants is possible in at least three different directions: within the majority
community, within another ethnic minority group, or within the immigrants' own
ethnic group. As made clear in chapter two, this framework is clearly an
oversimplification of a complex process. Nevertheless, Breton's classification can
serve as a useful way to structure the research findings presented in the first parts of
this chapter. Thus, the following sections describe the interpersonal relations of the
Kurdish refugees with the ethnic majority, with other ethnic groups, and finally with
fellow Kurds. This description will introduce a critical discussion of the concept of
integration and suggest a rethinking of the process of refugee resettlement.
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Integration into the Society of Reception
Finland and England are of course not unitary and homogenous societies. If one wants
to study immigrants' social integration into these complex societies, it is not clear
which parts of these societies that the immigrants are supposed to integrate into and
how this process can be studied. Thus, instead of describing integration in absolute
terms, this section describes the refugees' experiences of personal relations with the
majority from the refugees' own point of view. It is argued that the relations with the
majority populations are quite different in the two countries.
Finland
The small number of refugees and migrants in Finland, in combination with the
official resettlement policy based on refugee dispersal, often creates situations where
the refugees have little opportunities to socialise with persons other than Finns. There
is also a considerable interest on the part of many Finns in the few migrants in their
country. Furthermore, the refugee resettlement in Finland often engages many persons
in the local community where the refugees live. To be the object of curiosity and
charitable concern is of course not part of normal social relations, but these contacts
might later develop into more conventional relations and lasting friendships.
During the semi-structured interviews the refugees were asked about their social
contacts with the majority population. All interviewees had some - and in many cases
they had several - Finnish friends. On the other hand, most of the interviewees still had
a larger number of Kurdish friends. One way of finding Finnish friends was through
the system of being introduced to Finnish "friend families" by the Finnish Red Cross.
All the quota refugees I met had been provided with "friend families" upon arrival in
Finland. This system has been functioning relatively well,' and several interviewees
still have regular contacts with these families or persons. Clearly these relations have
been important for many refugees, and I was often told how helpful these families had
been. A man from Iraq spoke about his family's Finnish friends:
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Yes, we have a Finnish friend family. They have really helped us a lot. So we
have some Finnish friends, although much more Kurdish friends. My wife only
has two Finnish friends, but our children have many friends [t].
In Finland it is relatively common for young male Kurdish refugees to have Finnish
girlfriends, and some Kurdish men are married to Finnish women. The only exceptions
are Kurdish men from Iraq who in the mid-1990s were able to travel back to Iraq in
order to get married. However, that a Kurdish woman would many a Finnish man was
unheard of. One can only speculate about the reasons for this. On the one hand, there
are more single men than women among the Kurdish refugees in Finland, especially
among the Kurds from Turkey. On the other hand, cultural factors in both the Finnish
and the Kurdish cultures may be of significance.
The level of social contacts between Finns and Kurds seems to be rather surprising in
the light of the discussions of Finnish xenophobia and racism in the previous chapter.
The xenophobia and racism the refugees met might be seen as a detrimental factor in
terms of the social integration of refugees into Finnish society. However, it is
important not to generalise; not all Finns are xenophobic. Several interviewees
explained that it is only a minority who are a problem. This was emphasised by a man
from Iraq who had lived in Finland for several years:
I think that it is obvious that there are different attitudes and behaviour in
Finland. Those who behave in a different way, they do not hide their feeling for
themselves, but I have not had any experience [of racist attacks]. I have not
confronted any such situation.
The relationship between the Kurds and the majority in Finland was thus a rather
ambivalent one. On one hand, there were friendships between Finns and Kurds; but on
the other hand, racism and xenophobia were often serious impediments to personal
relationships. It is possible that since immigration in Finland is a new experience, there
have been two distinct approaches among some Finns; while some persons are openly
hostile towards "foreigners," others are very interested in meeting and befriending
them.
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Since most of the Kurdish refugees do have Finnish friends, it can be argued that the
Finnish resettlement programme has been fairly successful in this respect. However, in
other respects the policy seems to have been a failure. For example, the extent of open
racism in Finland remains a serious hindrance to more spontaneous relationships.
Furthermore, the high unemployment rate among the refugees has also diminished the
possibilities for social contacts with Finns.2
Although there are social contacts with Finns, these relations cannot replace the very
close social relations which characterise Kurdish society. The issue of isolation
remains a serious problem for many refugees. The initial migration from Kurdistan and
the official dispersal policy in Finland mean that the Kurds in Finland are largely
isolated from personal contacts with compatriots. They are thus in a completely
different situation compared to that of the Kurds living in London. Most interviewees
in Finland emphasised that isolation was a major problem. A family from Iraq who
travelled via Turkey to Finland described their problems:
Mother: I am the one who suffers most of living isolated, but I do not want to
talk about it, it is so difficult to talk about it.
Son: It is really difficult for old people. It is difficult for young people, for us for
example, but it is twice as bad for old people. It is difficult to be used to this
environment.
OW: Is the isolation the most difficult thing?
Son: I think the reason is that you cannot make contact. To have contact is for us
an important thing. It is the language, and for example my mother cannot speak
at all.
Mother: It is social questions. In Turkey, although it was very difficult
financially for us, the social there it was much better, in a social sense.
Son: For young people it is better, you can find something to do, to study or to
work, but it is difficult for older people.
OW: Do you think it would be better for you if there were more Kurds living
here?
Mother: What can you do, where are there more Kurds?
Son: We have been talking to the authorities about moving.
Mother: For example, if you are sick you use to get visits, but here, if I get sick
nobody will arrive to visit me [t].
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England
In England the integration of refugees into the receiving society displayed quite
different features from the Finnish case. The Kurds from Turkey were living in a
Turkish/Kurdish community which in many ways was insulated from English society.
The boroughs of Hackney and Haringey, where the Turkish/Kurdish community in
North London is situated, are areas with a high proportion of ethnic minority
populations. According to the 1991 census, the ethnic minorities accounted for 33.6
per cent of the total population in Hackney and 29.0 per cent in Haringey (Owen
1994). The situation for Kurds from Iran and Iraq is slightly different, since they are
not concentrated to the same extent in particular geographical areas in London. On the
other hand, these groups also tend to live in areas with a high proportion of ethnic
minorities, although not necessarily with other Kurds or compatriots. Consequently,
the possibilities for the Kurds to have contacts with the ethnic majority tend to be
fewer in multi-cultural London than they are in Finland.
In the sample in England, sixteen out of twenty-eight persons felt that they did not
have any English friends at all, although some of the interviewees had friends from
other refugee groups and British ethnic minorities. Also, marriage between Kurds and
persons from the ethnic majority seemed to be relatively uncommon, although it was
not totally exceptional for Kurdish men to have English or British girlfriends. A
middle-aged Kurdish man from Turkey described his contacts with the ethnic
majority:
I have mostly Kurdish friends, because English people do not have the same
culture. If you do not go to pubs you do not meet any. Especially in Hackney and
Haringey there are many Kurds and you do not meet English people. Especially I
went outside London once to a small town, and then I realised that I cannot
speak English, because I did not give enough attention. But in London you can
see every kind of race and people [t].
Since the Kurds from Turkey live in their own community in North London they are
relatively insulated from the ethnic majority. Furthermore, the poor linguistic skills
and educational background among many Kurds from Turkey might be a hindrance to
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social contacts with British people. Those who had English or British friends often met
them through activities in the Kurdish associations or through Kurdish solidarity work.
A Kurdish woman explained how she had met her British friends:
I have more Kurdish friends definitely, I know a few English, it is quite difficult
to have any relation with English people here. And because of the language,
most of the people do not speak English. And the ones who speak English like
me, it is quite typical to have some kind of friendship. I had a friend. She was
learning Kurdish ..., so she is quite aware of the Kurdish question. She wants to
help, that is why we could get a relation with her. And the other English people I
know, they are most of them interested in the Kurdish question. Either they work
with the Kurdish community or they are doing research on the Kurdish
community. ... But apart from that, as a kind of friends I do not have any, and
most of Kurdish women and men, you know, we have each other actually, as a
support group. There are some parties, revolutionary parties, English
revolutionary parties, like SWP, Socialist Workers Party, and Anti-Nazi League,
and Spartacus, these kinds of organisations, you know, you could have friends
from these organisations as well.
As in Finland, the contacts with the ethnic majority in England can in no way
compensate for the close personal contacts the refugees are used to in Kurdistan. A
woman from Turkey described her impression of English people:
They do not bother, they say it is not my business. Even in Turkey and Kurdistan
it is not like that, your next door [neighbours] are like your best and closest
family friends. And you know everything, problems or whatever. But here it is
not like that. I lived in a place where there were about ten flats in one block, and
nobody knew each other, you just smile some time at each other, when you see
each other in the corridor.
The extent of contacts between Kurds and the majority population also became
apparent during the Newroz celebrations (the Kurdish New Year). Kurds often invite
their friends to these parties. In the small parties I attended in Finland it was not
uncommon for almost half of those present to be Finns. In Britain I visited several
large parties in London, and no more than 5% of those at the parties appeared to be
non-Kurdish. It is of course difficult to compare the small celebrations in Finland with
those in London which attract at least ten times more participants. Nevertheless, these
figures give an indication of the levels of contact between the majority population and
the Kurds in the two countries.
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To sum up, the Kurds in Finland usually had at least a few friends among the Finnish
population, while the Kurds in England were sometimes totally without social contact
with British people, although it has to be added that there also were huge individual
variations. However, the new friendships could seldom replace the close social
relations the refugees had had in Kurdistan. Consequently, isolation remains a major
problem for refugees, especially in Finland, where refugees often live far away from
other compatriots. Furthermore, these findings suggest that although the Kurds are
living in a diaspora, they can be socially integrated into the receiving society and they
do not wish to become insulated from the majority. However, how this social
integration occurs does depend largely on the receiving society and its social
structures. The differences in these structures are the main reason for the differences in
the integration achieved in the two countries of settlement
Integration into another Minority Group
What are the Kurdish refugees' social relations with, and integration into, other ethnic
minority groups in the countries of settlement? In the case of the Kurds, one could
perhaps expect that they would become integrated into some larger Middle Eastern or
Islamic community. In Britain one could even imagine that the Kurds would be part of
a larger "black" ethnic minority. Clearly, none of this has happened. The Kurdish
refugees are not part of any new ethnic entity in the countries of settlement. However,
there is still reason to discuss the Kurdish refugees' social relations with Turkish,
Iranian and Iraqi ethnic groups. When discussing this issue, one must again bear in
mind the different situations in Finland and in England.
In Finland there are only a few social groups that can be regarded as ethnic minorities
(Pentikainen and Hiltunen 1995), and the few immigrants in the country do not
constitute well-organised communities. The Kurdish refugees in Finland did socialise
with other refugees and foreigners whom they had met through resettlement and
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training courses, but for none of the interviewees were these relationships more
extensive than their relationships with either Kurdish or Finnish friends.
In England, and especially in London, there are several well-established communities
of "ethnic minorities" and there has been a relatively large immigration from countries
in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, compared with the Finnish case, the Kurdish
refugees in England had more extensive social contacts with other ethnic minorities.
The Kurds in Britain, however, were not a unitary community and the differences
between the Kurds from Iran, Iraq and Turkey were very clear when it came to their
relations with, and integration into, other ethnic minority groups. The Iranian Kurds in
Britain could be seen as largely constituting a part of the broader Iranian community.
In the same way the Kurds from Turkey were an almost inseparable part of the
Turkish/Kurdish community in North London. The Kurds from Iraq, however, were a
different case. Among them only very few persons had any kind of contacts with
Arabs from Iraq.
The relations between the Turks and the Kurds in the Turkish/Kurdish community in
North London presents an interesting issue. Turks and Kurds have lived side by side
both in Turkey and in North London, and on a personal level this has usually not been
regarded as a problem. However, in London there are also persons and organisations
with strong Turkish nationalistic sympathies. This can lead to potential conflicts within
the community. Thus some of the Kurdish refugees living in London might continue to
fear for their own security.
Despite this possibility for conflicts within the community in North London, the
interviewees repeatedly emphasised that there was no conflict between Turks and
Kurds as such, but only between the Kurds and the Turkish government. For example,
during a discussion at one of the Kurdish community centres in North London this was
emphasised by a man from Marash in Turkey:
I want to make a very important point here, we do not have any problem, any
contradictions, with the Turkish people, with the Turkish nation. The only
problem we have with Turkey is with the system of the Turkish state, with the
government of the Turkish state, but we have always been brothers with the
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Turkish people, and have never had any problem with them. Only problem is the
system of the Turkish state [t].
On the other hand, it was clear that the ongoing conflicts in eastern Turkey created
tensions in the Turkish/Kurdish community in North London. In this way the social
integration of that community was related to the situation in the country of origin.
Political changes in Turkey can have an immediate effect on the relations between the
Kurds and Turks in exile.
In summary, in England the Kurds did have extensive social interaction with other
ethnic minorities, mainly with groups from the Kurds' respective countries of origin.
In fact the Kurds from Turkey and Iran were largely parts of the wider Turkish and
Iranian communities respectively. In Finland, on the other hand, there was not much
contact with any other ethnic minority. This difference generally follows Breton's
(1964) theory that the institutional completeness of the community largely decides in
what direction immigrants will integrate themselves. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
Kurds are not integrated into any new ethnic minorities in the countries of settlement.
The interpersonal relations which the Kurds have are only continuations of the same
social relations the Kurds have had in their respective countries of origin. In this sense
the Kurds have not changed their ethnic affiliation or identification upon arrival in the
country of reception.
Integration within the Kurdish Community
This section describes the degree of integration among the Kurds themselves through a
discussion of the refugees' personal relations with other Kurds. Two important
questions are: to what extent is it possible to talk about one Kurdish community, and to
what extent do the Kurds from Iran, Iraq and Turkey form their own separate Kurdish
communities?
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When refugees leave Kurdistan, they do not know where they will finally end up.
Therefore it is common for them to bring with them addresses of friends and relatives
all over the world. In exile the Kurdish refugees use these social networks from
Kurdistan in order to create new social networks. The family and networks of relatives
are important social institutions in Kurdish society, and they continue to be important
also in exile. A young man from Turkey living in Finland described his Kurdish
friends:
I have more in common with Kurds from Turkey [compared to Kurds from other
parts of Kurdistan], because I know persons who have arrived from the same
area as I have. And if I do not know them personally, at least I know their family
and relatives [t].
Hence, already upon arrival in the country of settlement the Kurdish refugees were part
of a wider Kurdish community which could provide the refugees with help and advice.
The social networks that the refugees thus became part of were based on social
relations in the country of origin. There is a salience of pre-migration social networks
within the Kurdish community. This clearly indicates that, to a large extent, the social
relations in the Kurdish refugee communities could be said to be transnational (in
accordance with the previously mentioned definition in Basch et al. 1994). These
transnational social networks are described in more detail in a later section.
Although the Kurdish communities are largely extensions of communities in the
countries of origin, it is still important to remember that there are many factors in the
society of settlement which influence the internal integration and social organisation of
the refugee communities. The social structures in the society of reception, the
resettlement policies, and the extent and forms of racism and discrimination all have an
impact on the social organisation of the Kurdish communities. For example, in Finland
the Kurdish refugees have been resettled in very small groups in municipalities all over
the country. Therefore it is difficult for the Kurdish refugees to keep in touch and to
give help and advice to each other. Furthermore, the quota refugees often arrive in
groups whose members did not previously know each other. In these cases the
resettlement courses provide an opportunity for the refugees to create new informal
networks, and these contacts usually continue after the courses have ended. However,
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there is nothing that can alleviate the fact that the Kurdish refugees in Finland are often
geographically isolated from their compatriots, friends and relatives. In Britain the
concentration of the refugees to London together with other policies creates a totally
different situation where the Kurds can establish their own strong communities. But
rather than creating one united Kurdish community in London, the refugees are
divided into several smaller communities.
Community Divisions
There are some clear differences in the social networks between Kurds from the
different countries of origin. Refugees from different parts of Kurdistan do not have
much in common, and it can be argued that a united Kurdish community does not
exist. The Kurds from Turkey socialised mainly with other Kurds from Turkey,
although some of them might have known some Kurds from Iraq. The Kurds from Iraq
mostly had contacts with other Kurds from Iraq, but many of them also had Kurdish
friends from both Turkey and Iran. The Iranian Kurds usually knew some Kurds from
Iraq, but many of them said that they did not know anybody from Turkey. In the same
way some Kurds from Turkey stated that they had never actually met anybody from
Iran. These divisions of the Kurdish community clearly followed the linguistic
differences among the Kurds. Furthermore, some Kurds pointed out that the borders
between their different countries had been closed, and that there had never been any
possibility for Kurds from different countries to meet before they moved to Europe.
Despite the divisions in the Kurdish community, which are very tangible, it must be
emphasised that there does exist a feeling of unity among the Kurds, which is based on
a common Kurdish ethnicity and nationalism. The Kurdish national project has largely
created an imagined community in the same sense as the nationalism described by
Anderson (1983). Although, to a large extent, the unity of the Kurds is only theoretical,
it still has an impact on interpersonal relations among Kurds. This feeling of belonging
together was mentioned in many interviews. A young man from Turkey compared his
relationship with Kurds from other parts of Kurdistan to his relationship with Turks in
the following way:
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Probably we have much more common things with Turkish people in Turkey,
but I can say that year by year this is decreasing, as much as the war in Kurdistan
is becoming more serious and dangerous. Otherwise... You know, Iranian Kurds
are bit different you know, but Iraqi Kurds, actually I have much more common
things with Iraqi Kurds. But if you say Iranian Kurds, Iranian Kurds are a bit
different, but if you say Iraqi Kurds I can see much more common things. You
know, I do not know, this question is a little bit complicated. Maybe you can say
this question as, how do you feel yourself when you are with Iraqi Kurds or with
Turkish people from Turkey? I can say that I feel much more comfortable with
Iraqi Kurds, I can speak comfortably, I can speak everything easily. But when
speaking to a Turkish friend or people you just feel something... not
comfortably, something like, you try to keep yourself not to talk a lot of things,
or not to talk for example about politics, because you know that in any case it is
going to get separate ways.
It looks as though political divisions are the main basis of the divisions in the Kurdish
community. The allegiances to different political parties in the countries of origin were
closely related to the refugees' interpersonal relations. An Iranian man found it hard to
establish social relations with other Kurds because of potential political disagreements:
I think I am a different case because of politics. There are no persons from my
party here, ... I have problems both with other Iranians and with Kurds. There
are Kurds here and Iranians but I am not a very close to them. Because I am still
afraid of other Iranians, because it can be dangerous. ... There are some Iranians
who were on the side of the Shah and from bourgeoisie parties, and that is
difficult because that is different. Because we have very important political
opinions and wishes [t].
In fact, this person was not a different case. Almost all refugees I met had the same
feelings about the influence of Kurdish politics on their social relations. This political
dimension is perhaps not very surprising since most Kurds in Finland and England
were political refugees. A young man from Turkey seemed to avoid the original
question but still had an interesting answer:
OW: Who do you have more in common with, Kurds from other countries or
Turkish people?
R: What I think is interesting, in my opinion it depends on the political party and
not our situation. For example around this party [PICK] we are friends, we know
each other and we speak to each other because today the Kurds do not have
anything else to speak about than about the Kurdish question. The PKK, because
of that Iraqi and Iranians, Syrian and Turkish Kurds, with all people we have in
common. But there are persons, they are not at all interested in Kurdistan, or
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they do not want to think and do not want to know. But we still would like to be
friends with them, we would like to tell them why we are here in Finland, why,
and what forced us to come to Finland, we want to help them. But at present we
have more in common with Kurds from Turkey [t].
The influence of politics varies according to the refugee's country of origin. The
refugees from Iran and Iraq often felt that politics divided their communities. Many
felt alienated and isolated from their own communities because of the political
disagreements with other Kurds. Among the refugees from Turkey, this feeling was
not as common and many persons felt that politics united the Kurds. Undoubtedly this
has to do with the specific political situations in the countries of origin. The Kurdish
parties in Iran and Iraq are divided and have not managed to achieve their political
goals. In Iraq the Kurdish national movement is torn apart by internal fighting, while in
Iran the divided opposition has largely lost its fight against the government. In Turkey,
on the contrary, there has been a strong ethnic revival during recent years and the
Kurdish refugees seem to be largely united behind one political movement. These
political developments clearly influence the social relations among Kurds in exile.
How these divergent political developments might influence the refugees' relation to
the society of settlement is discussed in a later section discussing diasporic politics.
Transnational Communities
The previous section's discussion of the Kurdish refugees' social networks clearly
shows that the social organisation of the refugee communities follows the various
patterns from the countries of origin. In addition, already in chapter six it was
emphasised that the Kurdish refugees continue to relate to their countries of origin
emotionally and psychologically in various ways. However, the Kurds not only keep
up a psychological relationship to the country of origin and try to recreate their social
networks in the country of exile, but they also quite tangibly continue to keep in touch
with their old friends and relatives in Kurdistan and in other countries all over the
world.
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There are various social relations and networks between the diaspora and Kurdistan, as
well as between the countries in the diaspora. There are personal contacts through
telephone calls, letters and personal visits. In addition the refugees continue to have a
connection with Kurdistan through the mass media, including newspapers, radio and
satellite-television. During recent years fax machines and the intemet have also been
used as channels through which Kurds in the diaspora can keep in touch with each
other. Modem technology has clearly made it easier to sustain transnational social
networks. However, modem technology is expensive and most Kurdish refugees
cannot afford much else besides radio, letters and occasional phone calls to their
relatives. To follow the latest news from Kurdistan sometimes takes up a large part of
the day for the refugees. This was the case for a refugee from Iran who lived in a
provincial town in Finland:
I am following news in foreign languages, all the day I am listening. The French
radio in the Persian language, Voice of America in Kurdish, and also news from
the German radio. It is important to follow what is going on. ... From France we
are also sent the newspaper of Kurdistan Democratic Party, and from Helsinki
and from Sweden I get newspapers. Our cultural organisation has a newspaper as
well [t].
Besides radio and newspapers, television is also an important source of information. A
young man from Iraq living in Finland explained how he got information from
Kurdistan:
I follow the Finnish television and radio, but I do not have any Kurdish
newspapers. I do listen to Voice of America as well as Arabian radio
programmes. However, where we live there are no Kurdish or Arabian
newspapers available. My wife's brother has a satellite dish and we follow
Arabian programmes on his television. They will start a Kurdish channel in
Holland soon and we are thinking about buying a satellite dish ourselves [t].
It was obvious that satellite dishes were seen as an important investment, although
only few could afford it. The man quoted above was obviously talking about the
Kurdish satellite channel MED-TV. The interviews in Finland were all made before
MED-TV started its broadcasts, but during the fieldwork in England the importance of
this channel became clear in many interviews. Besides MED-TV many Kurds,
especially from Iraq, followed satellite programmes from various Arabic-speaking
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countries. Before MED-TV, the only international broadcast in the Kurdish language
was the weekly news on short-wave radio sent by Voice of America in both Sorani and
Kurmanji. Almost all interviewees said that they had followed these radio
programmes.
The Kurds living in exile also keep up personal relations with relatives both in
Kurdistan and in other countries in the diaspora. It is not uncommon that Kurdish
refugees, in order to keep in touch with friends and relatives, make trips all over
Europe. The UK and Finland are situated at the periphery of the European Kurdish
diaspora, and are furthermore situated at almost opposite sides of Europe. Despite this,
there were a lot of contacts between the Kurdish refugees in these two countries. The
same political journals and newspapers (published in Kurdistan, Germany and
Sweden) were read by refugees in Finland and in England. Exactly the same posters
that the Kurdistan Information Centre in Helsinki had on its walls were found along
Stoke Newington Road in North London. There are also a number of semi-
professional Kurdish musicians touring all over Europe. For example, I heard the same
musicians perform at parties in Finland and in England. The extent of personal
contacts between these two countries was amazing. For example, while doing
fieldwork in Finland, I was given addresses of persons and organisations to contact in
Britain.
To keep in touch with relatives in the Middle East often gives rise to problems. In the
case of Northern Iraq, this requires special ingenuity since there are no telephone and
postal services in operation. A middle-aged man living in Finland explained:
[Information about] Kurdistan one mostly gets through the radio or Voice of
America, this is the main source of information and the fresh information,
otherwise you do not get it. Unless somebody comes back from Kurdistan, but
usually their information is old, but still one is interested .... But most of the
letters which I have sent at least and most of the people send it through friend
who go there, and just for instance last week somebody went there back to visit
his family, so I sent a letter with him. This is a normal way, more open way of
sending letters.
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The Kurds from Iraq have had the opportunity to visit Northern Iraq since the
introduction of the "safe haven" protected by the United Nations. In autumn 1994 a
woman from Iraq spoke about her future plans:
R: We have travelled to Kurdistan twice, but it is not enough, we will travel
there again next summer.
OW: Will you travel every summer to Kurdistan?
R: Yes, every summer. If I can afford it I will travel again next summer [t].
During the summers from 1992 to 1994 many Kurds living in exile visited Northern
Iraq. However, because of the unstable political situation any permanent return
migration was out of the question. At the time of writing it looks as if it is no longer
possible to travel to Northern Iraq because of the violent conflicts in the area.
Rethinking Integration
If we return to Breton's three different directions in which the immigrants can be
integrated, it can be concluded that the Kurds are first and foremost integrated into
their own ethnic communities which consist of Kurds originating in the same country
of origin. In Finland, and to a lesser extent in England, there are also some contacts
with the ethnic majority. In England, Kurds might also have contacts with other ethnic
minorities. There are also some Kurds who remain isolated and socially "unintegrated"
to any group. This happens especially in Finland and particularly among those who
have political disagreements with other Kurds.
However, an additional perspective is suggested by this thesis. It has repeatedly been
demonstrated that the refugees, although they are living in exile, have a continuous
relation with Kurdistan and their countries of origin. It can be argued that this not is a
case of "being unintegrated" since the refugees remain "integrated" within their
previous Kurdish social networks. These social relations create a transnational
community not bound by the geographical borders of either the countries of origin or
the countries of settlement (cf. Basch et al. 1994). This type of transnational social
organisation, described in the previous section, is clearly something for which there is
no room in most existing theories discussing integration.
186
The creation of transnational social networks is today less difficult because of various
aspects of the process of globalisation. For example, with the help of modern
technology it is now easy to retain personal relationships over vast geographical
distances. The findings in this study largely support those theories which argue that the
process of globalisation has a profound impact on social relations in the contemporary
world.
One form of transnational social organisation is the diaspora. However, the whole idea
of diasporas challenges conventional ways of understanding integration. Clearly, in a
transnational and de-territorialised social reality it is not possible to see "integration"
as something which happens at a specific geographical location. This adds further to
the confusion surrounding the concept of integration. Therefore, there is reason to go
beyond any simplistic integrationist or assimilationist discourse and rethink the whole
process of refugee integration.
It can be suggested that the concept of diaspora solves some of the theoretical
problems connected with the term integration. On the one hand, the social organisation
of the Kurdish community in exile follows the patterns in Kurdistan, but on the other
hand these patterns are influenced by the social structures in the country of settlement.
The diaspora concept can relate to both the country of origin and the country of
reception, and can bridge the gap between the periods before and after migration. Thus
the diaspora concept, with its connection to both the country of origin and the country
of settlement, is useful for understanding the duality of the social organisation of the
Kurdish communities. However, for the refugees themselves there is of course no
duality, since the diaspora is one real and lived experience. The findings in this thesis
thus support an understanding of migration as continuous process. This clearly relates
to the concept of "migrancy," advocated by Schierup and Âlund (1986), which
describes the migrants' total "social field" of experiences, in which emigration,
immigration, integration, etc. cannot be separated from each other. It also relates to the
arguments presented by Edward Said according to which:
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For an exile, habits of life, expressions of activity in the new environment
inevitably occur against the memory of these things in another environment.
Thus both the new and the old environments are vivid, actual, occurring together
contrapuntally. (Said 1990, 366)
Associations
The patterns of social networks and interpersonal relations in the Kurdish community
have already been decribed. These social networks might be expressed in
institutionalised forms when specific formal organisations are established. This section
describes the formal Kurdish associations in the Kurdish communities in Finland and
England.
This study includes all associations in Britain and Finland which explicitly identified
themselves as Kurdish and were working with, or for, Kurdish refugees. Apart from
the Kurdish associations there were especially in London, many British as well as
Iranian and Turkish organisations which gave valuable help to Kurdish refugees.
However, this research concentrates on the Kurdish communities, and therefore only
the organisations which regarded themselves as Kurdish are included.
Finland
Although, in Finland, there are only a small number of Kurds originating in Turkey,
they are well organised, thanks largely to the activities of the Kurdish Organisation in
Finland (Suomen Kurdiyhdistys r.y.) and the Kurdistan Information Centre in
Helsinki. These organisations were officially founded in 1992 and 1993 respectively
and in practice they shared the same office in central Helsinki. The organisations had
good connections to other Kurdish committees around Europe. The premises also
functioned as a meeting-point for many of the Kurds living in the Helsinki area. In
early 1995 an official Information Centre of ERNK (Entya Rizgarlya Netewa
Kurdistan, National Liberation Front of Kurdistan) replaced the previous Information
Centre. Because of linguistic and sometimes political differences, the contacts with
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Kurdish refugees from other parts of Kurdistan are quite limited, but not totally
lacking.
In Finland the Kurds from Iraq and Iran had several loosely organised local groups
around the country, and there were also attempts to become better organised. There
was a registered nation-wide "cultural organisation" called Ekgertin (or Yekgirtin,
meaning "unity" in Kurdish). Another organisation was The Kurdistan National Peace
and Solidarity Committee, which had an intellectual emphasis and international
connections. There was also a Kurdish-Finnish solidarity organisation (Kurdien
ystiivyysseura - Suomen Kurdistanyhdistys r.y.) with mainly Finnish members.
Since there were so few Kurdish organisations in Finland, not all refugees could find
an organisation that would sympathise with their own political opinions. One Iranian
refugee explained that for political reasons he avoided the organisations in Finland,
and instead had contacts with organisations in Sweden in order to keep in touch with
his political party.
The activities of all the Kurdish organisations in Finland were rather limited. The
Information Centre's aim was, of course, to distribute information about Kurdistan, but
otherwise the Kurdish associations in Finland concentrated on cultural and social
activities for Kurds and their Finnish friends. The Newroz celebration was one of the
most important of these activities. The Kurdish organisations were usually not
involved in giving practical help or advice to newly arrived refugees. Most practical
problems were taken care of by the Finnish authorities, and therefore there was no
need for the Kurdish organisations to provide this service.
The Kurdish organisations in Finland had to struggle with a number of problems. First,
there was the geographical dispersal of the refugees. The Kurdish refugees were
resettled in a number of different municipalities almost all over the country. This
dispersal made it difficult for the Kurds to sustain nation-wide organisations. Usually
the Kurdish organisations in Finland were small local organisations which had more
contacts with organisations in other countries than with each other. Consequently, the
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organisations tended to become both locally and globally based, instead of working on
a nation-wide basis.
A second problem was the funding of the organisations. The refugee associations
could apply for money for cultural activities (e.g. Newroz parties or Kurdish
publications) from the municipalities and from some of the ministries, but there was no
clear structured way of supporting refugee associations and the money available has
generally been very limited. Furthermore it seems that neither the refugees nor the
authorities always knew what opportunities there were and whose responsibility it was
to support the organisations.
An additional problem seemed to exist as a consequence of the Finnish authorities'
selection of quota refugees. Kurdish refugees have been resettled in a third country
after UNHCR has granted them refugee status. A Finnish delegation has interviewed
the prospective candidates for the annual Finnish refugee quota. The selection of
refugees has mainly been made on humanitarian grounds, 3 but in addition to this it
looks as if Finland has chosen refugees who declare that they will not continue to work
politically in Finland. This is of course a rather contradictory policy. Finland agrees to
resettle refugees who have been politically active, but at the same time wants to avoid
to resettle those who wish to continue to be politically active. One quota refugee
recalled his experiences from the interview situation in Turkey:
R: But what it was like, when they asked me why I had left and what I had done,
what usually is asked, there was a kind of-- you got the feeling that they wanted
you to promise that we must not work politically there. Because what they asked
was that do you still work politically, or do you still want to bring up the
Kurdish issue there as well.
OW: What they wanted was that you were supposed to answer no to that
question?
R: You should answer no to the question, or you had to roll it around a little bit
[t].
How dominant this selection criterion has been is difficult to say. Among the refugees
from Iran and Iraq, the quota refugees in Finland were more likely than the refugees in
England to be persons who were alienated from the political struggle and their former
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parties. Although all still supported a free Kurdistan, there were many who explained
that they were no longer active in politics. Some persons even said that they no longer
believed in the politics of the Kurdish parties. This often led to the refugees also
avoiding the Kurdish organisations in Finland. As explained in chapter four, all
organisations in Kurdistan tend to be connected to the political parties. Therefore
refugees in exile might still connect all organisations with politics. By selecting
refugees who do not want to continue to work politically, the Finnish authorities seem
indirectly to have chosen persons who are largely sceptical of all attempts to become
organised. In addition, there are only a few persons who have any experience of
working in organisations. A man from Iran who had been active in various
associations in Finland described the refugees' ordeal with organisations:
The problem is that the Kurds do not have experience of organisations, we do
not have this organisational background that is necessary. We have to function
on our own background, we simply cannot change. This is one reason why there
sometimes are problems with the authorities ... There is a lack of familiarity
with democracy in Kurdistan, this is why Kurds associate organisations with
politics, and politics is associated with power and oppression [t].
However, if you are a Kurdish refugee, it is difficult to stay away from politics even if
you want to. Even those refugees and organisations who try to be non-political might
find it hard to avoid Kurdish politics. As a man from Iraq who had been involved in
starting a non-political local cultural association told me:
OW: Your organisation has mostly cultural activities for local Kurdish refugees,
but has there been any discussion that you also would work as an interest
organisation in order to improve the situation for refugees?
R: Yes, this is true. This is difficult with Kurdish issues when you try to do some
cultural activities to keep in touch and learn to know each other, to do something
for Kurdish culture and language and things like that. But still, when you are a
Kurd, you are political, you are active.
OW: So you think that it is difficult to make a distinction then?
R: No, it still becomes, the whole life is politics. I do not know how it is in the
Nordic countries, how you can separate these. But for us Kurds, we cannot
separate these issues when things like these are happening in Kurdistan [t].
191
England
In England the picture is much more diverse and complex. There were about fifteen
community organisations and advice centres in London with Kurdish members and
clients (the number was not totally clear because at least four of these community
centres were visited by both Turks and Kurds). The community centres often provided
a very wide range of services for their members and clients. Their activities included
advice on welfare, housing and asylum issues, language and training courses as well as
various social and cultural activities. The biggest community centres had bookshops
and restaurants on their premises.
The oldest Kurdish community centre in London is the Kurdish Cultural Centre
(KCC), founded in 1985 and situated in Lambeth. Its members were mainly from
Kurdistan in Iraq. Because of the proximity of the dialects, some Kurds from Iran
visited the centre as well, especially since there was no organisation in England
specifically for Iranian Kurds. As one of the biggest and oldest Kurdish associations in
Britain, KCC has also tried to be an umbrella organisation for other local Kurdish
organisations in the UK. In recent years the tendency has been to establish new local
associations (Greenwich Kurdish Community Association, Kurdish Community in
Ealing, Kurdish Information Centre in Islington and West London Kurdish
Association in Hammersmith) as well as more specialised organisations (Kurdish
Housing Association, Kurdish Disability Organisation, Kurdish Scientific and Medical
Association and a separate organisation for Faili Kurds). This development, together
with the alienation from Kurdish politics among Kurdish refugees from Iran and Iraq,
has led to a decline of the activities of KCC. This has happened despite the fact that
KCC, at least in 1995, was not officially aligned to any specific Kurdish party.
The biggest community centres were found in the Turkish and Kurdish communities in
North London. The Kurdistan Workers Association (KWA) in Haringey had between
3,000 and 5,000 Kurdish members and clients from North-West Kurdistan (Turkey)
while the Turkish and Kurdish Community Centre Halkevi in Hackney had about
4,500 members, of whom most were Kurds. Halkevi, established in 1984, was at first
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called a Turkish community centre and only during the 1990s has it emphasised its
Kurdishness. Both KWA and Halkevi seem to be very vital organisations with many
different activities. During the first half of the 1990s, both centres had elected
management committees which were sympathetic to the Kurdish national struggle in
North-West Kurdistan (i.e. Turkey).
The election of a management committee with sympathies for the PKK happened for
the first time in the Kurdistan Workers Association in 1990, when candidates
sympathetic to the PICK won an overwhelming victory. The elections had been
preceded by conflicts between different political parties, conflicts which are described
in detail by Rachael Reilly (1991). After the election, the persons sympathetic to the
Turkish Kurdistan Socialist Party left the KWA and started what later became the
Kurdish Advice Centre situated in Tottenham.
In addition to the community and advice centres, there were several other Kurdish
organisations in London. These were usually oriented more towards the situation in
Kurdistan, and they were engaged in campaigning, publishing, collecting information,
political lobbying and fund-raising for the Kurdish cause. Often both Kurdish and
British volunteers could be found in these organisations. During the spring 1995 the
following organisations were well-established and active: Hawkarani Kurdistan,
Kurdish Human Rights Committee, Kurdistan Human Rights Project, Kurdistan
Information Centre and Kurdistan Solidarity Committee.
There might be also some small local Kurdish organisations outside London (at least,
there has been one in Manchester), but otherwise all Kurdish organisations in the UK
have been concentrated in the capital area. One problem in identifying the Kurdish
organisations was that new organisations were started and old ones disappeared at a
bewildering speed.
Usually, newly arrived refugees first found the organisations through their friends and
relatives, but some of the big and established organisations in London were even
known in Kurdistan. It should also be noted that some Kurds chose to organise
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themselves in associations that were not wholly Kurdish. Kurdish refugees from Iran
were mostly active in Iranian political organisations and community centres, and, as
mentioned earlier, there were many community centres for both Turkish and Kurdish
refugees and migrants (Day-Mer, Turkish Education Group and numerous other
organisations in North London).
As explained in chapter five, in practice refugee resettlement in Britain is largely taken
care of by various voluntary organisations working within the "community." There is
funding available from a variety of sources for the Kurdish community centres and
other organisations working with refugees. Therefore many Kurdish associations were
able to offer a large number of activities aimed at helping newly arrived refugees. In
addition to paid staff, there were usually also many volunteers, both Kurdish and
British, working in the different organisations. Despite these activities, the services
provided by the associations were often hampered by inadequate funding and a
piecemeal structure. Hence, for obvious reasons, the services available in Britain were
usually not comparable to the more structured and professional resettlement
programmes organised within the public sector in Finland. For example the language
and training courses organised by the associations in England often had problems in
getting enough funding. Additional problems for the course organisers in North
London were that many Kurds got jobs in "sweatshops" and therefore left the courses
because they no longer had the time or interest to learn English. In addition, some
women were not able to attend the courses because of their family commitments.
Among all Kurdish organisations in England there was an often expressed indirect
support for the "Kurdish cause" and the struggle of the Kurdish people. This was most
clearly expressed by the organisations of the Kurds from Turkey, which often
explicitly supported certain Kurdish political parties. The Kurds from Iraq and Iran
often tried to keep their organisations more neutral vis-à-vis the political parties and
their disagreements in Kurdistan. A worker in one organisation in London explained
the political affiliation of Kurdish organisations in the following way:
You know, we are not a football team, or some English organisation like that.
We are political refugees. There is a specific reason why we came here, and that
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reason is political and of course one still wants to continue with something that
earlier has taken up your whole life.
In London the only associations not connected with Kurdish political parties were
small organisations with a very clear and narrow purpose and which have struggled
hard to keep themselves out of politics. These "non-aligned" organisations included
small local organisations and a few highly specialised and professional organisations.
The political character of the Kurdish community in North London is also described by
Reilly (1991). Although the Kurdish associations themselves agreed that they were
associated with certain political parties, the people interviewed at the organisations
usually emphasised strongly that the organisations were open for all and that most of
their activities had a practical orientation. However, this did not prevent other Kurds
from describing organisations according to their political affiliation.
It should be made clear that this politicisation of the community did not mean that the
Kurdish community centres in Britain were run by political parties. The connection
was more complex than this. The community centres had an elected management
committee, and even if persons sympathetic to a certain political party were elected to
the management committee, it did not mean that the party ran the community centre.
The Kurdish political parties' main cause is the liberation of Kurdistan, and they are
hardly interested in running community centres in foreign countries, particularly since
they are unlikely to be in favour of people leaving Kurdistan in the first place. In fact,
some of the Kurdish parties, at least the PUK and the KDP, have their own
representatives in London. These small party organisations are independent from the
community centres and are not involved in practical work with, or for, refugees in
Britain.
The politicisation of the Kurdish associations
What the Kurds in Finland and England have in common is the high politicisation of
all the refugee associations. With few exceptions, the Kurdish associations in both
countries were associated with certain political groups in the country of origin. The
same political allegiances and boundaries that can be found in Kurdistan were thus
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recreated in exile. Upon arrival in the country of exile, Kurdish refugees actively
looked for organisations which shared their political views.
The politicisation of the Kurdish community is a continuation of social networks in
Kurdistan. All organisations in Kurdistan tend to be connected to some of the political
parties. Thus, when the political refugees in exile recreate their social networks and
associations, it would be surprising if these did not continue to be associated with
political parties. This very high politicisation of the Kurdish refugee communities
replicated the political divisions in Kurdistan and divided the Kurds in the diaspora.
Problems frequently arose in the co-ordination of activities among competing
organisations.
The ongoing support for the liberation of Kurdistan was clearly expressed through
different symbols: political posters, pictures of political leaders and the flags of
different political parties. These symbols were found in prominent places in the
refugees' homes, in the community centres, at demonstrations and at the Newroz
celebrations. However, it is important to understand that although refugee associations
are strongly influenced by Kurdish politics, they are not necessarily directly connected
to the political parties in Kurdistan. The politicisation of the Kurdish communities in
the diaspora can mainly be understood as a process whereby people who are
sympathetic to a certain party want to be together with people they feel comfortable
with and who agree with them on political issues. Thus, the politicisation of the exile
communities should not be seen as something planned and directed by the parties in
Kurdistan. Of course, the associations in the diaspora would like to be active and play
an important role in Kurdish politics, but this is difficult to do from Europe. Therefore
the associations' support for the "Kurdish cause" is often more symbolic than rea1.4
One problem connected with the dominance of the political features of the Kurdish
associations is that not politically organised groups, as well as non-political or anti-
political individuals, will easily become marginalised in the Kurdish community. This
is the case for example with Kurdish women, who undoubtedly have a problem in
getting their voice heard in the public sphere. In fact, some of the female informants
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wanted to emphasise that the Kurdish associations are not doing enough to improve
the refugee women's situation. Also Kurdish men who wanted to avoid politics found
that the politicisation of the associations was a problem. As a refugee in London told
me:
For example KCC, it is dominated by a couple of political parties. Also other
organisations have their own political background. Exile communities have
strong rules, strong rules of how you should behave. The organisations give
you help, but they also manipulate refugees, or perhaps not manipulate, but at
least influence them in a certain way. You have to take part in their way of
thinking and in their activities. A lot of people avoid the organisations because
of this.
Clearly, the politicisation of the associations divides the community. Since some
persons choose to avoid the associations, this marginalises parts of the community.
This leads inadvertently to the associations not being able to provide equal services to
all refugees. Thus, the British policy of giving a large responsibility for the
resettlement of refugees to ethnic associations within the community cannot be seen as
a good way to provide equal services to all refugees. The problem here is not that the
associations are mobilised around politics. Rather, the problem is connected to the
community-centred policies in Britain, which will always experience problems in
providing equal services to all individuals, regardless of the particular basis of
mobilisation within the communities.
Nevertheless, in the same way as politicisation divides the communities, it is also a
powerful mobilising force which can be an important resource for smaller groups
within the wider community. In addition to politics, it is also plausible that religion
and kinship could be used as a mobilising force by the associations. These two issues
are discussed in the next sections.
The importance of religion
Ethnic mobilisation is often based on a common religious tradition. Among the Kurds
one would thus assume that Islam could be a powerful force around which social
networks and associations are built, or that the Kurds would use existing wider Muslim
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networks and associations as a resource to solve the problems they experience in their
new countries of settlement. However, this has not happened in the Kurdish refugee
communities. There were no Kurdish associations using religion as a mobilising force.
Few of the persons interviewed, although they declared that they were Muslims, had
any contacts with mosques or religious organisations. This does not mean, however,
that Kurds are not religious. On the contrary, many interviewees said that people in
Kurdistan in general are deeply religious.
It might be that Kurdish religiosity is mainly a private issue which cannot be used as a
mobilising force. For example, none of the main parties in Kurdistan is an explicitly
religious party. 5 Another issue is that Kurdish refugees in Europe cannot be regarded
as representative of Kurds in general. It is not impossible that the political refugees are
less religious than people in general in Kurdistan. Actually, among the interviewees
the women often seemed to be more religious than the politically active men.
The Kurds from Turkey living in London are mostly Alevis, and therefore do not
follow the same religious traditions as Shia or Sunni Muslims. For example, the Alevis
do not have any mosques. This might contribute to the Kurdish community's
detachment from Muslim organisations. However, what is surprising is that not even
the Alevi belief seemed to be used in the mobilisation of the community. Taking into
account the hostility between Sunnis and Alevis in Turkey (McDowall 1992) one
would assume that this would still in exile have an impact on the social organisation of
the community. At least in the Kurdish community in North London this distinction
was not a very relevant one. I was repeatedly told that the Alevi - Sunni distinction
was not important. As I was interrupted by an activist in the Kurdistan Workers
is -Association when I tried to ask him about Alevis: "This s not important, what is
important is that we all are Kurds here."
Among the Iranian and Iraqi refugees we might find different reasons for their
reluctance to join Muslim organisations or use religion as a resource for mobilisation.
The Iranians have fled from persecution by a religious government. Not surprisingly,
many Iranian refugees remain deeply suspicious of religious organisations and in
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practice avoid organisations that are mobilised around Islam. The Kurds from Iraq
might have a complex relationship with religious institutions since Islam and Arab
culture are often associated with each other. The Kurds in Iraq are in conflict with the
predominantly Arab government in Baghdad, and therefore also religious institutions
might be associated indirectly with the persecution faced by the Kurds in Iraq. An
additional factor in all parts of Kurdistan is the influence of Marxist ideologies, which
might make some Kurds suspicious of all religions. However, all these suggestions are
highly speculative, and within the scope of this research it is not possible fully to
investigate the role of religion among Kurdish refugees and in Kurdish society at large.
A further issue which complicates the analysis of the religious influence in the Kurdish
community is that deeply religious persons might not identify themselves as Kurds.
These persons might regard Kurdish nationalism as something that divides Muslims. A
similar issue was that also some of the Kurds who had communist or Marxist
sympathies had an ambivalent relation with Kurdish identification. Kurdish
nationalism was seen by some persons as something which potentially divided the
working class and its united struggle. Therefore it is possible that persons of Kurdish
ancestry who are either religious Muslims or convinced communists prefer not to
identify themselves primarily as Kurds.
The importance of traditional social networks
As explained in chapter four, the traditional social organisation of Kurdistan is largely
based on tribal allegiances. One could thus assume that these traditional kinship
networks would still have an impact on the social organisation of the community in the
diaspora. For example, studies of Vietnamese refugees have shown that the traditional
extended families of Vietnamese culture are recreated in exile. These new extended
families are made up of persons who are not necessarily related, but still the families
will fulfil the same functions as the traditional extended families in Vietnam (Gold
1992; Valtonen 1994).
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As explained in chapter six, among Kurds the family is a very important social unit in
the private sphere of life. Not surprisingly, individual refugees' social networks are
largely based on family allegiances. However, despite this, the traditional tribal
networks do not play a prominent role in the public sphere of life. The research
showed that were no Kurdish associations which would be mobilised on the basis of
what could be perceived as tribal networks. Instead, the social organisation of the
Kurdish communities is dominated by political allegiances. One can perhaps argue that
the tribal networks continue to influence the diaspora indirectly, since it might be
argued that some of the political parties in Kurdistan are largely based on traditional
tribal loyalties. However, to study the extent to which the political parties in Kurdistan
are based on tribal allegiances is totally outside the scope of this research. As
Bruinessen (1992) points out, the tribal structure in Kurdistan has given way over time
to allegiances based on nationalist and socialist discourses. The latter political
allegiances seem to be those which in recent years have also dominated the social
organisation of the diaspora. Consequently, it is evident that politics has been a far
stronger mobilising force than either religion or kinship.
In summary, the previous sections of this chapter show that the Kurdish refugee
associations have a transnational and diasporic character. The social organisation of
the refugee communities is not only on an interpersonal level, but also on the formal
level, a continuation of social and political allegiances in Kurdistan. Although this
divides the communities, these allegiances can also be a useful resource for the
refugees, which is an issue discussed in the following section.
The Role of Social Networks and Associations
Chapter six identified a number of different problems that refugees faced upon arrival
in their new countries of settlement. This section looks more closely at how the
refugees try to solve these problems and discusses the positive functions of social
networks and formal associations.
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In Finland the practical problems were largely taken care of by the authorities. The
refugees' worst problems were instead social and psychological, including issues like
exclusion, isolation, alienation and feelings of displacement. For a variety of reasons
which have been presented earlier, the Kurds in Finland had not developed strong
communities within the country and there were only a few active Kurdish associations.
Not surprisingly, Kurdish associations did not play a decisive role in solving practical
problems for the refugees; they had neither the need nor the resources to do this.
However, the refugees tried instead to use their associations and informal networks to
solve their social and psychological problems. The Kurdish associations were therefore
mainly active in providing cultural activities and social gatherings, although also this
was to a relatively limited extent. Nevertheless, these activities indicate that the social
networks and formal associations among the Kurds can be used as resources to
alleviate the social and psychological problems refugees experience in Finland.
Obviously, for the refugees it is important to continue to have contact with friends,
relatives and compatriots. One way of doing this is to become active in the Kurdish
associations. A young man from Turkey found that his contacts with other Kurdish
refugees and their collective political activities related to their country of origin helped
him to overcome his own problems in Finland:
It was very good [that there were other Kurds in the reception centre in Finland].
And in my opinion, these Kurds, when we were together, it helped me a lot.
Because it could have been really very difficult for me. I could have become
mad or something. But when I was together with other Kurds, it helped me a lot.
I was more interested in the Kurdish issue, and slowly, when I worked together
with other Kurds for the independence of Kurdistan, you could say that I after a
while totally forgot about my own problems and application for asylum, because
the problems in Kurdistan were more important than my problems in Finland.
There was a war, a really terrible war. When I listened to the BBC radio from
London and when we called to Kurdistan they told us about the situation. This
was all more interesting to us than our own life in Finland, because our family
was there and all our relatives and our whole life. Part of our life was there and
we ourselves were here. It was really difficult [t].
Clearly, presenting the opportunity to continue to work politically is one function
which the Kurdish organisations and networks can fulfil. However, this diasporic
political activity also alleviates many other problems related to isolation and other
psychological problems. Political activism might also serve the function of reinforcing
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an identity and a sense of order and purpose in the fragmented lives of the refugees. A
man from Turkey explained how important it was to have an opportunity to meet
people with the same political opinions:
I am extremely satisfied with the fact that in every place there are supporters of
the PKK. And I believe that if this information centre did not exist in Finland, in
that case it could happen that the Kurds would all become mentally ill. But with
the information centre, and when we are working and we are getting information
about our own country, this helps us a lot. It is like morality, our life. For
example, without this party I am nothing. And with the Kurds, with the PICK, we
have contact. This is because of the party, in the name of the party. If there were
no party, no PKIC, we could not perhaps even say hello to the Kurds. But
because of the PICK, because this PICK is the key, and this key opens the door to
all us Kurds, and that is how, with the name of the PICK and with the support of
the PICK [t].6
There were significant differences between the two countries in terms of the more
practical functions of the associations. The informal social networks and associations
in Finland could not fulfil the same functions as in England, where the Kurds lived
geographically close to each other and had strong and efficient organisations.
Associations in England performed a wide range of functions and there was also
extensive public funding available for these functions. The Kurdish refugees were able
to use their associations and their informal networks to overcome their practical
problems. The difficulties refugees encountered upon arrival and the lack of organised
support for refugees in the UK presented the associations with considerable challenges.
The Kurdish community centres in London often had specific workers who gave
advice to newly arrived refugees. A large number of Kurds received most of their
initial advice at some of the community centres. The Kurdish associations in London
had to shoulder a particularly heavy burden during the influx of a large number of
Kurds from Turkey in 1989. A man from Turkey who arrived in the spring 1989 told
me:
The Kurdistan Workers Association helped me. The administration office
where they help Kurds who needs help and advice and cannot speak English, I
came straight away here .... At the airport, somebody was in charge of
Kurdish people, and they brought us straight away here. They gathered the
Kurdish people together, perhaps 30 persons, and brought us to the Kurdistan
Workers Association [t].
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Friends and relatives also played a major role in helping newly arrived refugees with
their problems in England. In fact, the importance of informal networks in giving
practical help seemed to be bigger than that of the associations' role. A woman from
Iran received most of her help from friends who had arrived some years earlier in
Britain:
I do not know if you know, but there is a custom between refugees towards that
those who have been here earlier they help newly arrived, and every individual
among them works as an association. They were so helpful, they were really so
helpful.
The social networks based on social relations in the country of origin are obviously an
important source of help and advice. In particular, relatives play an important role for
newly arrived Kurdish refugees. Although larger networks and associations based on
"tribal" allegiances are non-existent, the extended family remains very important. A
man who had travelled through the Soviet Union and finally ended up in London told
me:
R: My uncle helped me, the first year, just my relative helped me, to do my
work, for example social security or other things, but after that I have done it
myself.
OW: What about, you know, the local council and social security and these
things? Do you think that you have received the help that you needed when
you arrived here?
R: No, because I arrived here without accommodation, I just lived in my
uncle's house, so nobody helped me, not the government or something, only
the social security, I got income support.
Hospitality is in general highly valued among the Kurds (as I myself frequently
experienced). Many refugees explained that if another Kurd asked for a favour, it
would be unthinkable not to provide help. Nevertheless, one has to remember that the
resources as well as the ability to give help and advice are limited within the Kurdish
community.
One very tangible role of the informal social networks in Britain is that of giving help
to refugees looking for a job. Especially in the large Turkish/Kurdish community in
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North London relatives and friends can help each other to find employment and start
businesses. A refugee who had repeatedly worked in the garment factories in North
London explained how to find these jobs:
There is a network, there is a big network. And if you work people come and ask
you about your friends whether you have friends who can work in that place
with you .... In factories, you do not have to know English, and most of the
refugees they work in factories.
All the issues mentioned in this section indicate that although the Kurdish community
is largely a divided community, there are still well-functioning networks and
associations. The Kurdish refugees tried to use their associations and networks as a
resource to solve the different problems they encountered in their new countries of
settlement. Even though the Kurdish refugee associations were based mainly on
political allegiances in Kurdistan, these associations and networks served totally new
and additional functions in the diaspora.
Many studies of refugees emphasise how the communities are characterised by
political divisions (e.g. Bousquet 1991; Gold 1992; Kay 1987; Luciuk 1986; Lundberg
1989; Steen 1992; Valtonen 1996). However, although this is generally true, it is not
the whole truth. Although a community as a whole may be politically divided, the
same politically based networks can unite smaller groups within the community. These
smaller groups and associations are an important resource for the refugees.
In summary, the refugees used their social networks as a resource when they tried to
solve the problems they encountered in their new country of settlement. However, the
associations and networks in Finland are not as efficient and well-organised as the
ones in London. Since the situations in Finland and England are different, the networks
also worked differently. In England the refugees used their networks and associations
to overcome the practical problems they experienced. In Finland the refugees used
their networks and associations to overcome their social and psychological problems.
Thus, although the social networks were based on the distinct patterns in the countries
of origin these networks remain a useful resource for the refugees in their new
countries of settlement. In this way the social networks can actually facilitate the
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refugees' integration into the country of settlement. As this thesis repeatedly argues,
the Kurdish community can be regarded as a diaspora. However, contrary to what one
might expect, this does not lead to non-integration. The various social networks which
constitute the diaspora might be useful resources for the refugees. These networks are
used to solve different problems and might facilitate integration into the new country
of settlement. The process of integration and the formation of a diaspora are not
connected in a simple causal relationship. Hence, to live in a diaspora is not an
obstacle to a positive integration into the society of settlement.
Diasporic Politics
Since politics plays such an important role in the social organisation of the Kurdish
exile communities, there is reason to look a bit closer at the political activism of the
Kurdish refugees. As for example Sheffer (1986 1995) and Shain (1995) point out, the
political activism of diasporas is a topical issue within the area of international politics.
Diasporas can in various ways influence, and be influenced by, the international
political relations between the country of settlement and the country of origin.
The three countries of origin in this study have quite different relations to Western
Europe. Under their present regimes Iran and Iraq are not regarded as the best friends
of the Western world. Turkey, on the other hand, has close relations with the European
Union, NATO and the USA. These relations also have an impact on the Kurdish
refugees' situation in Europe. A refugee from Iran or Iraq might have a less
problematic political relationship with the country of asylum since there is a common
adversary in the government of the refugees' country of origin. On the other hand, the
close relations between Turkey and Western European countries might have negative
consequences for Kurdish refugees from Turkey. The complicated political relations
between country of origin, country of settlement and the diaspora might influence each
other in different ways. As the smallest and weakest of these three political entities, the
diaspora is the one which most clearly is influenced by the other two.
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Kurdish political activism
As has been repeatedly pointed out, refugees in many ways continue to be oriented
towards the country of origin. Politics is one of the areas of life where this is most
obvious. As the European representative of ERNIC, Kani Yilmaz, puts it, "Even though
we are here, every hour we are living in Kurdistan" (Rugman and Hutchings 1996, 92).
The Kurdish refugees' political activism in exile takes different forms. Although all
Kurds tend to be political, the activism of the Kurds from Turkey has recently been
especially evident.
During the fieldwork, there were both in Finland and England demonstrations
organised by Kurdish refugees. Mostly the demonstrations are organised by only one
or two organisations. However, the Kurds are not always divided. The Turkish army's
attacks on Kurdish guerrillas in Northern Iraq in 1995 led both in Finland and in
Britain to a united condemnation from all the major Kurdish organisations. In both
countries the Kurdish organisations agreed to sign a common petition demanding an
end to the invasion. A demonstration on 9 April 1995 in London against tike ruzkis
invasion was supported by twenty different organisations and was attended by Kurds
from all parts of Kurdistan. This exemplifies the fact that the diaspora also provides an
opportunity for Kurds from different parts of Kurdistan to get together despite their
diverse backgrounds. It should be pointed out that political activism is not necessarily
oriented either towards the country of origin or towards the country of settlement.
Some interviewees emphasised that the struggle to make other Kurdish refugees aware
of the Kurdish national issue is an important part of the Kurdish struggle.7
The Newroz celebration was another way of demonstrating support for the Kurdish
cause. This ancient spring celebration among the Kurds and the Persians is now often a
political manifestation celebrating Kurdish identity and culture. The biggest Kurdish
associations organise their own Newroz celebrations. The music, speeches and dances
at these parties often have a strong symbolic meaning for the participants. The banners
displayed at the parties I visited carried phrases like "down with the Turkish state
terrorism" and "stop genocide in Kurdistan" (I find it illustrative of the political
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priorities of the refugees that these political banners did not carry phrases such as
"fight unemployment among refugees" or "fight racism in the neighbourhood"). A
young man from Turkey who used to visit several parties in London said:
Actually, Newroz celebration nowadays is much more political. It is not
something like cultural, maybe much more it is political thing, or this celebration
has been politicised. Because in the Newroz celebration, if you have noticed, all
these people express political messages. Singers, you know, players or other
performers, actors, they all always express political messages: unity, identity,
struggle.
Among all Kurds Newroz is an important celebration. The parties organised by the
Kurdish associations are often very popular. In London, some of the interviewees had
visited several different organisations' parties. These gatherings were important
occasions during which Kurds from different organisations, backgrounds and countries
could meet and enjoy themselves. My own impression is that the emotional and
political character of the celebration was most intense at the parties organised by Kurds
from Turkey. This is perhaps not very surprising since the celebration has officially
been banned in Turkey. After years of denial of their ethnicity in Turkey, all Kurdish
cultural expressions achieve a greater importance in exile. Ethnicity becomes by
necessity a political and not a private issue because of the oppression experienced by
the Kurds in Turkey.
The extent of transnational political activism among the Kurdish communities is
indicated by the density of international contacts that the Kurdish organisations have.
For example, the Kurds from North-West Kurdistan (Turkey) had a well-organised and
well-established network of contacts through committees and information offices all
over the world. The journal Kurdistan Report, published jointly by the Kurdistan
Solidarity Committee and the Kurdistan Information Centre in London, publishes the
addresses of contact organisations in no less than 18 countries. Other recent examples
of transnational co-operation include the Kurdistan Parliament in Exile, which held its
first meeting in The Hague in the Netherlands in 1995. The Parliament was elected by
Kurds in Europe, the former Soviet Union and North America. Although the
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Parliament aims to represent all Kurds, it is mainly persons from northern Kurdistan
who have been involved in its work.
Another interesting form of transnational co-operation with international political
repercussions is the Kurdish television station MED-TV, which started its broadcasts
in the spring 1995. This station produces its programmes in different European
countries and distributes them all over Europe, the Middle East and northern Africa,
thanks to a contract with a British satellite provider using a French satellite. The station
is financially supported by private benefactors in the Kurdish communities all over
Europe. The economic contributions are mainly collected among Kurds from Turkey.
According to a brochure published in London, MED-TV "evolved in response to calls
over recent years, particularly from the Europe-wide Kurdish diaspora, for a television
station of its own" (Hassanpour 1995, 6). The name MED-TV comes from the name of
the Medes, who are regarded as ancient ancestors of the Kurds.
During the spring of 1995 the daily programmes on MED-TV were mostly in the
northern Kurdish dialect Kurmanji or in Turkish, but occasionally other Kurdish
dialects were used. The programmes I have seen did not seem to be very political and.
included children programmes, documentaries, news and discussions. Despite this, the
whole project has enraged the Turkish government, which is perhaps not surprising
bearing in mind the Turkish authorities' reaction to any Kurdish cultural expression.
According to the Turkish government, the station is a PKK organ and they demand
that the station should be closed down. As Hassanpour (1995) writes, the Turkish
government's actions against the station have been both national and international. In
Turkey there are reports that satellite dishes have been smashed in the Kurdish
provinces. In Europe the Turkish authorities launched an intensive diplomatic pressure
against MED-TV. A good example of the relations between the Turkish and the British
governments is the fact that John Major allegedly promised Tancu Ciller that his
government, "would do 'everything within their power' against MED-TV" (Imset
1996, 35). The Turkish diplomatic campaign has been partly successful; there have
been serious disruptions in the production of programmes and problems for the station
208
in securing its licence. However, since MED-TV is working legally, the Turkish
government, at least at the time of writing, has not been able to totally close it.
Within the Kurdish communities the importance of MED-TV can hardly be
overestimated. In the interviews during the spring of 1995, it was clear that most
interviewees wanted to follow the programmes. Although there have been Kurdish-
speaking radio programmes distributed by Voice of America which have been very
popular among Kurds in exile, this is the first Kurdish television station in Europe.
Kurds from Turkey were particularly enthusiastic about MED-TV, but also Kurds
from other parts of Kurdistan tried to follow it. To watch the programmes also seemed
to be a political statement. Even Turkish speaking Kurds who did not understand
Kurdish watched the station's broadcasts.
An even more politically sensitive issue is the fact that the Kurds in exile can play a
role in the independence struggle in Kurdistan. In the case of the Kurds in Turkey, a
large part of the Kurdish parties' finances allegedly comes from Kurds living in exile
in Europe. The ERNK representative Kani Yilmaz indicated this in an interview in
1994, in which, in response to a question on the role of the Kurds in Europe, he
replied: "They give financial support - the donations are voluntary, continuous and
quite high" (Rugman and Hutchings 1996, 94).
An interesting issue is the differences between the Kurds from Turkey, Iraq and Iran in
terms of the extent and type of their political activism. The Kurdish refugees from
Turkey often displayed strong emotional support for the Kurdish national movement in
northern Kurdistan, while Kurds from Iran and Iraq often were more alienated from
Kurdish politics. This is clearly related to the nature of the ongoing struggles in the
countries of origin. Joly (1995a) makes a very useful observation when she describes
how political refugees' forms of organisations and actions can be periodicised:
In the initial period if the conjuncture back home is in turmoil and has not
stabilised, exile is envisaged as a very short episode and all energies are tensed
towards the goal of overthrowing the regime and returning. As the regime in the
homeland stabilises, this is perceived as a consolidation and an indication that
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exile will last longer than initially expected. Although one is not here to stay,
one is here for a while more. (Joly 1995a, 22)
Although the refugees primary aim is to pursue the political project in the homeland,
another secondary project pertaining to everyday issues in the society of reception
might later appear. When this new project will appear is not determined by time and
duration of exile, and even the structure of the society of reception only plays a
secondary role. The important factor is the viability of the political project in the
homeland which is kept alive by the possibilities of its victory (Joly 1995a).
This periodication is clearly visible in the Kurdish communities. The Kurds from
Turkey are still in the initial period in which their activities are oriented solely towards
the liberation of Kurdistan. The Kurds from Iran and Iraq are clearly more
disillusioned about their political projects and, although also their ultimate goal is to
return, they have started to be more oriented towards the country of exile. As Joly
(1995a) points out, this is not a consequence of time, but rather connected to the fate of
the political projects in which the refugees have been involved.
This second project, which comprises orientation towards the country of settlement,
can use the social networks and associations which were established during the first
period of orientation towards the country of origin. In this way the Kurdish refugees
can use their political associations as a resource also in situations which are totally
unrelated to the original political struggle. Although the associations are mobilised
around a political struggle in the country of origin, they acquire new additional
functions related to problems in the country of settlement.
The influence of political developments in the country of origin on the refugees'
relation to the society of settlement, which is described above, is supported by my
empirical findings. However, this seems to be an area where more research is needed
to explain fully the influence of all variables. Obviously, there also are a number of
other differences between the refugees from Turkey and those from Iran and Iraq
which are not related to the political project "back home." These other differences can
also potentially have an impact on the political activities of the refugees and their
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relation to the society of settlement. For example, in Finland the Kurds from Iraq are
quota refugees while the Kurds from Turkey have arrived as asylum seekers. In Britain
the Kurds from Iraq are largely well educated persons who have lived in Britain for a
long time, while the Kurds from Turkey are recently arrived asylum seekers who live
in their own community in North London. Hence, to fully investigate how the political
development in the country of origin influences the refugees' relation to the society of
settlement would require a larger comparative empirical material than was possible to
collect in this study. In addition, even if the political development in the country of
origin continues to have an influence on refugee communities, this is of course not a
reason to forget the major impact which factors in the country of settlement have on
refugee communities. The fundamental importance of different factors within the
country of settlement for the process of integration is repeatedly demonstrated in this
and the previous chapter.
State and government political actions
Clearly, the countries of reception are not very happy about political activism among
Kurdish refugees, especially since they often have lucrative economic relations
(including export of military equipment) with the governments that are oppressing the
Kurds. In Germany the relations between the German state and the politically active
Kurds originating in Turkey have recently been problematic. Germany's approach
towards its Kurdish minority's cultural rights, the diasporic political activities of the
Kurds and Germany's close connections with Turkey have all played a role in the
deterioration of relations. The Kurds have had problems in being accepted as a
linguistic and ethnic group distinct from the Turkish minority in Germany (Senol
1992), and a stigmatisation of Kurds as "less worthy Turks" is largely adopted by the
German authorities. This institutional racism has led to an ethnic revival among the
second generation German Kurds and antagonism between the German state and the
Kurdish community (Blaschke 1991a, 1991b). In early 1990s there were frequent
petrol bombings and sabotage of Turkish property and businesses in Germany, carried
out by people sympathetic to the Kurdish liberation struggle in eastern Turkey. After
this wave of political violence, the PICK and the ERNK were declared illegal in
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Germany and France in 1993. The subsequent closure in several European countries of
a large number of organisations associated with Kurds from Turkey has led to all
Kurdish communities all over Europe being regarded as possible "terrorists." In the
case of the Kurds, European integration seems to mean that the Kurds have to be
equally persecuted all over Europe.
In England many Kurds feel that they have been intimidated and suspected of criminal
activities by the British authorities. There are also suggestions that the Turkish
government and their local supporters are spreading rumours about illegal activities in
the refugee community. During the fieldwork this criminalisation of the community
was a topical issue in discussions with Kurds from Turkey living in London.
Regardless whether it is true that there is a systematic criminalisation of the Kurdish
communities, it is a fact that British authorities in quite concrete ways have
demonstrated hostile attitudes towards Kurdish refugees from Turkey. For example, in
chapter five the radical increase in the number of negative decisions on asylum
applications from Turkey is described. An incident which has upset many Kurds is the
fate of Kani Yilmaz, the ERNK European Representative who was arrested during a
visit in London on 26 October 1994. When arrested he was on his way to a meeting in
the British Parliament to which he was invited as a speaker. Kani Yilmaz was not
charged for any crime but was nevertheless indefinitely detained under the National
Security Act. His legal case has been very complex, mainly because Germany asked
for his extradition. At the beginning of 1997 he was still detained in a British prison.
On the other hand the British general public and many British political organisations
have sympathies for the Kurds and their political struggle. Many MPs have showed a
genuine interest in the Kurdish question. There are also many small British left-wing
organisations who seem to be supporting the Kurds. Organisations like Militant
Labour, Socialist Workers Party and other politically marginal left-wing groups often
have a visible presence at Kurdish demonstrations.8
In any case the situation in London is not as bad as the situation in Germany. For
example attacks on Turkish property are very rare in the UK. The only attack on
212
Turkish property in the UK that I am aware of is one tragic case of petrol bombing of
Turkish banks in the summer of 1994, for which three Kurdish men were imprisoned.
The contrast with the situation in Germany becomes even greater when we look at the
situation in Finland. The small community in Helsinki consisting of Kurds from
Turkey did not seem to have any disagreements with the Finnish authorities regarding
the community's political activities. In fact, all interviewees in Finland had largely
positive experiences of the few contacts they had had with the police. Since refugees
otherwise often had negative experiences of bureaucracy and xenophobia, the
positive experiences with the police were perhaps not totally expected. In 1994 a
person active at the Kurdistan Information Centre in Helsinki described the
organisation's relations with the authorities:
In Finland we have not had any problems with the authorities or the police.
And we do not wish that there will be any in the future. The situation here in
Finland is different from for example Germany where the Kurds do not have
the right to free speech. We work democratically as long as we have the right
to free speech. But in Germany there is problem, because in a situation where
there no longer is democracy then you have to fight [t].
It is possible that the freedom of expression and the traditional understanding of
issues related to minority rights are preventing conflicts from arising in Finland.
Furthermore, the number of Kurds in Finland is very small and, because of the
country's geographical location, the Finnish and Turkish governments' political co-
operation is not very extensive.
The relationships between the authorities and the Kurdish refugees thus seems to be
quite different in the countries here under study in comparison with the situation in
Germany. However, the present attempts to criminalise the Kurdish community in
Britain, and Finland joining the European Union in 1995, can have negative
consequences for the Kurdish refugees in these countries. These issues indicate that the
political actions of the state in the country of settlement are decisive for the forms of
political activism the diaspora will adopt. Although the political activities of the
Kurds in the diaspora is largely perceived as a problem by the authorities, there is
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also reason to remember the positive aspects of the refugees' activism. The positive
aspects of ethnic associations and social networks have previously been discussed in
this chapter.
For the Kurds, who are a persecuted minority in their countries of origin, the
diaspora also offer opportunities for political and cultural expressions which would
not have been possible in Kurdistan. The diaspora presents an opportunity to
develop a common Kurdish ethnic identity among Kurds who in Kurdistan have
only had limited possibilities for mutual contacts. The journal Ronald, published by
Kurdish students at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, includes
the following anecdote written by a student. Although this quotation deals with the
Kurdish national dilemma, it also demonstrates the possibilities for reclaiming a
Kurdish identity which the diaspora entails:
Several months ago, with a friend, I went to the British Library - Oriental
Section - to look for a book written by Ahmadi Khani (1650-1706).
Fortunately we found it. The manuscript called Nubar (a metrical Arabic-
Kurdish dictionary for children) was written in the beginning of the 1700s and
while we were looking through the faded pages of it, I was lost in thought--
After almost three hundred years, two students from different parts of
Kurdistan were for the first time coming across a book of a leading Kurdish
poet and scholar in a library in London. If there is a disgrace for the Kurds, is
this not to be enough? (Boz 1995, 20)
The examples of political activism in the diaspora which are discussed in this section
point to the possibilities presented to the Kurds in the diaspora for uniting behind the
Kurdish cause. The diaspora also offer opportunities to meet Kurds from other parts
of Kurdistan and freely to exercise a Kurdish identity and culture. This new unity in
the diaspora can also serve as a platform allowing the Kurds to get their voice heard
and work for the improvement of their situation in their new countries of settlement.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the social organisation of the Kurdish refugee
communities is largely a continuation of social relations in Kurdistan. Already in
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chapter six it was shown that the refugees have a continuous relationship to their
countries of origin, and this chapter has looked at the social consequences of that
relationship.
The same political allegiances that exist in Kurdistan are recreated in the social
organisation of the refugee community and its associations. Because of this
continuous relationship, one can also find differences in the social organisation and
political activism between different parts of the Kurdish refugee community. The
different political developments in Turkey, Iran and Iraq continue to influence the
Kurds from those countries and can explain differences in the activities and priorities
of the Kurdish associations in exile.
Because of the nature of this continuous relationship to the "homeland" the refugee
community can be described as a diaspora. This chapter, together with chapter six,
has shown that the refugees, "continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that
homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and
solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship" (Safran
1991, 84). Furthermore, this chapter argues that two more of Safran's characteristics of
a diaspora are evident among the Kurdish refugees. First, although this chapter has
only given a brief picture of diasporic political activities, it still describes how the
refugees, "believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or
restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity" (Safran 1991,
84). Actually, as Cohen (1997) points out, this issue can also involve the actual
creation of a homeland. Secondly, it is also evident that the Kurds, "retain a
collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland - its physical
location, history, and achievements" (Safran 1991, 83). Clearly, the diaspora
discourse is useful for an understanding of the refugees' own definition of their
situation
Although the community can be regarded as a diaspora, this does not automatically
mean that the community is not integrated into the society of settlement. On the
contrary, these diasporic relations can have a positive influence on the ability to
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become integrated. The associations and social networks, which largely constitute
the diaspora, can be useful resources which the refugees can employ to solve the
new problems they face in the country of settlement. Although diasporic relations
might influence the refugees' motivation to settle down, they can also provide the
community with the means it needs to become integrated.
Furthermore, the main obstacles to a positive integration of the refugees are not their
diasporic social relations but the social structures in the receiving society. The
diaspora discourse, with its emphasis on the relation to the country of origin, should
not forget the major impact which the exclusionary or inclusionary social structures
in the country of settlement have on the social organisation of refugee communities.
The differences between the processes of social integration in Finland and England,
which are described at the beginning of this chapter, clearly exemplify the major
impact of official policies and social structures in the countries of reception.
Thus, although the concept of diaspora is useful, it should not lead to a negligence of
the influence of various exclusionary and inclusionary structures in the countries of
settlement. However, the diaspora concept can take this duality into account. Since
the concept describes a transnational social reality it can bridge the gap between the
country of origin and the country of reception. This diasporic conceptual framework
can embrace an understanding of the influence from both the country of origin and
country of settlement. Furthermore, this suggests a rethinking of simplistic
perceptions of the concept of integration.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This study focuses on newly arrived Kurdish refugees from Turkey, Iraq and Iran, who
live in exile in Finland and England. The research forms the basis for a discussion
about the concept of "diaspora" and the concept's relevance for a sociological study of
refugees in the country of exile. It is argued that the concept diaspora, understood as a
transnational social organisation relating both to the country of origin and the country
of exile, can provide a deeper understanding of the social reality in which refugees
live. In a way, the concept of diaspora can bridge the gap between pre-migration and
post-migration. From a sociological point of view it is not possible to clearly separate
these two moments. Refugees do not start their lives from scratch when they arrive in
the country of resettlement, as so often seems to be assumed. The concept of diaspora
encompasses the refugees' own definition of their situation and provides a tool for
understanding the transnational social relations found in refugee communities.
As is repeatedly argued in this thesis, the Kurdish communities in exile can be
regarded as a diaspora. The previous chapters have indicated that even Safran's (1991),
precise definition of a diaspora is well suited for describing the Kurdish refugees'
situation. All the criteria for a diaspora can be found in the Kurdish refugee
communities: forcible expulsion, myths and memories of the homeland, alienation in
the host country, the wish to return, ongoing support for the homeland and, finally, a
collective identity importantly defined by the relationship to the homeland. Since the
Kurds clearly fulfils the requirements of even the strict definition of a diaspora
suggested by Safran (1991), it is suggested that there are sufficient grounds for
speaking of a Kurdish diaspora.
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This thesis highlights the social dimension of a diaspora by looking at the importance
of formal and informal associations and social networks. To live in a diaspora not only
involves issues of consciousness, identity or psychology, it also has a profound
influence on the social organisation of the community (cf. Cohen 1995, 1996). A
diaspora can be seen as specific type of social organisation which is characterised by
transnational social relations. As Lie (1995) and TOltilyan (1991) point out, the study
of transnationalism is an important feature of the new diaspora discourse. This
transnationalism includes the various social, political, economic and cultural relations
which migrants create and develop between country of origin and country of
settlement (Basch et al. 1994), as well as between exile communities in different
countries. Clearly, this tendency towards transnationalism is related to more general
processes of globalisation and de-territorialisation in contemporary societies. Although
globalisation, transnationalism and de-territorialisation can be regarded as general
social processes, the formation of diasporas is a feature which is more specific to
refugee communities. Obviously, not all diasporas regard themselves as refugee
communities, and not all refugee communities become diasporas. Nevertheless, the
diaspora concept does highlight some of the typical features of the social organisation
of refugee communities. Hence, this thesis goes beyond a limited understanding of
diaspora as a psychological relationship by emphasising that a diaspora can also be
regarded as a social organisation. The transnational and de-territorialised relations
between the country of origin and country of settlement have a profound influence on
the social organisation of refugee communities.
Safran's more precise definition of a diaspora has been used in this thesis in order to be
able to operationalise the concept as an analytical tool. Yet, there are other ways of
using this concept, but these have not been found useful for the subject matter of this
thesis. For example, the celebration of contemporary diasporas by writers like Paul
Gilroy (1991), Stuart Hall (1993) and Avtar Brah (1996) largely emphasises features
like syncretism, diversity, "hybridity" and resistance among groups of migrant origin.
However, the type of diasporic consciousness in the relatively well established
minority communities described by these authors is somewhat different from that
which was displayed by recently arrived Kurdish refugees.
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As Marienstrass (1989) points out, time is an important factor in defining a diaspora
(cf. Chaliand 1989; Cohen 1997), and this is indeed a poignant reason why one might
hesitate in regarding the Kurds as an established diaspora. All the Kurdish
communities in Europe have a relatively short history and all the refugees studied in
this research had arrived in the country of exile very recently. It might argued that
there is reason to be cautious in using the notion of diaspora before a considerably
longer period of time has passed. One cannot rule out the possibility that the diaspora
might disappear over time. There is still a possibility that political changes in the
Middle East in the near future will make a return migration possible. The future
developments of the Kurdish diaspora also depend on the structures and policies of the
country of exile. Future generations may, if they are accepted by the host-society, be
assimilated into the societies in which they live. On the other hand, the xenophobia,
discrimination and racism directed against all visible ethnic minorities might
effectively rule out any assimilation. Thus, although the Kurds in exile today clearly
live in a diasporic relation, only time will tell if they will become a permanent
diaspora. Despite these cautious remarks, my argument is that a sociological analysis
of contemporary Kurdish refugees has much to gain from the concept of diaspora and
the diaspora discourse. The point is that regardless of whether the Kurdish refugees of
today can claim to be a "real diaspora" or not, the concept of diaspora can throw some
light on the refugees' specific relationships to their countries of settlement and their
countries of origin.
The label "diaspora" is, perhaps, especially appropriate in the case of the Kurdish
refugees because of the influence of Kurdish nationalism which commits many
Kurdish refugees to the restoration of their homeland. However, I would suggest that
the concept of diaspora can also be a useful analytical tool in the study of other refugee
communities, this is because the concept can at the same time relate to both the
country of settlement and the country of origin. In this way, it can also describe the
transnationalism of the social organisation of refugee communities in general.
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This thesis has examined the situation of Kurdish refugees both in Britain and in
Finland. Despite the large differences between these two host-societies several features
remained constant in both cases. Things that all Kurdish refugees had in common
included their wish to return, their feeling of displacement and various psychological
problems owing to their refugee experiences. All refugees also created and maintained
transnational social networks. These networks included contacts with Kurds in
Kurdistan and in other countries in Europe. These features were found in all Kurdish
refugee groups, regardless of the refugees' countries of origin or countries of exile.
However, in some matters this research has also found notable differences between
refugee groups depending on the refugees' countries of origin and countries of exile.
Clearly, the social organisation of refugee communities is influenced by both the
relationship to Kurdistan and the relationship to the countries of settlement. Thus, it is
possible to regard the country of origin and the country of exile as independent
variables which affect the refugees and their associations in various ways.
The Country of Origin as an Independent Variable
This study indicates that there are specific differences between the refugee
communities depending on whether the refugees originated in Turkey, Iraq or Iran.
Since similar patterns of difference have been found in both Finland and England,
there is reason to believe that these differences can be attributed to factors related to
the countries of origin.
Although all Kurds share a common ethnic identity, several factors simultaneously
separate them from one another. Kurdistan is today divided between a number of
different states, each with its own specific political situation and history. There are
political as well as ideological disagreements dividing the Kurdish political
movements within these countries. The Kurds are also separated by a variety of
dialects, many of which are not mutually intelligible, and there are of course gender,
class and cultural differences that have to be taken into account. Old tribal allegiances
and religious divisions in some parts of Kurdistan make the picture even more
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complex. The heterogeneity is also found in the Kurdish diaspora, where different
patterns of migration from the countries of origin also highlight some of the
differences. The Kurds in the diaspora are mainly political refugees and thus the
political divisions become especially apparent in the diaspora. There is, nevertheless, a
Kurdish nationalism which today has influenced many Kurds, this nationalism can, to
some extent, overcome the differences among the Kurds.
The different Kurdish refugee groups show different patterns of integration within the
larger Kurdish community as well as in respect to their degree of integration into other
minority groups in the society of settlement. While Kurds from Iraq largely identified
themselves only as Kurds and mainly socialised with other Kurds, the Kurds from Iran
and Turkey were in practice largely part of a wider Iranian and a wider
Kurdish/Turkish community. However, the most important factor explaining the social
organisation of the Kurdish refugee community was political allegiances based on
political parties in Kurdistan. This factor was especially salient among Kurdish refugee
associations, which were largely organised and mobilised according to patterns drawn
from Kurdistan. The political developments in the countries of origin influenced the
diasporic political activities of the refugees. These developments also affected
refugees' plans for a return. Refugees from Turkey were relatively optimistic about
their chances to return, while refugees from Iran and Iraq largely felt that the political
situation in their countries of origin had developed in a negative direction.
Because of the refugees' continuous relation to Kurdistan it is not easy to understand
the Kurdish refugee community as an ethnic group within the context of the countries
of exile. In fact, the refugees' ethnicity continues to be based primarily on relations
within the context in their countries of origin. As I argue in chapter six, the ethnicity of
the Kurdish refugees is not defined through their relationship to the majority in the
country of settlement. Instead, the ethnicity of the refugees is mainly based on the
experience of being an oppressed group in the countries of origin. This is something
that will probably change over time, but among the relatively recently arrived refugees
in this study, this feature is very evident. Theories of ethnic relations can therefore only
give a limited understanding of refugees and their situation. Instead, the diaspora
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concept is a more suitable tool for an understanding of the special relationships that
refugees have with both the society of origin and with the society of settlement. The
diasporic conceptual framework sheds some light on the largely transnational and de-
territorialised social reality in which refugees live.
This continuous relation between developments in the country of origin and the social
organisation of the refugee community also adds a new perspective to theories arguing
that there is a connection between the type of migration and the migrant's relation to
their new country of settlement. Kunz (1981) links the processes of integration and
assimilation with classifications of different types of refugee migration. However, his
model seems unable to sufficiently take into account the refugees' continuous and
transnational relations to their countries of origin. The initial reason for flight, or
political activism before flight, is not the only question which has an influence on the
refugee in exile. The relation between the refugee and the country of origin is also a
continuous relation where contemporary political developments have a direct influence
on refugees who have lived in exile for a long period of time. Instead of constructing
elaborate classifications of various types of refugee migration, it. seems to be enougfi to
say that the refugees' political projects in the countries of origin continue to influence
the refugees and their communities in the country of exile. The continuous
transnational flow of information, people, capital and ideas creates a relationship
between the diaspora and the homeland which continues for a long period of time after
the initial migration. The formation of a diaspora and the process of integration is not
only dependent on the "situation before flight," the refugees' "background" or their
"cultural luggage." Certainly, the formation of a diaspora cannot either be regarded as
a question of the individuals' own free choice, as Sheffer (1995) seems to suggest.
Instead, the social reality in which refugees continue to live for a long time is a
transnational situation where both factors in the country of origin and in the country of
exile play a decisive role.
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Country of Settlement as an Independent Variable
Although the refugees social reality largely can be understood as de-territorialised and
transnational, it is still necessary to remember that in many decisive ways the society
of settlement influences the refugees and the social organisation of the refugee
communities. There is a danger that the new interest in transnational diasporas (cf. Lie
1995) with its emphasis on globalisation, transnationalism and de-territorialisation will
overlook the local context in which migrants and refugees live. Therefore this thesis
advocates a framework which takes into account the relations with both the country of
origin and the country of settlement.
This thesis revealed a number of important differences between the refugees'
experiences in Finland and in England. It can be argued that neither country has fully
understood the specific nature of refugee migration, although they approach the issue
from totally different perspectives. The UK adopts a traditional communitarian and
multi-cultural approach, while in practice Finland has a more assimilationist
resettlement policy. Since most of the refugees in Finland and England have identical
backgrounds and share similar experiences of Kurdistan, it is possible to argue that the
differences which can be observed in the two cases can be attributed to factors related
to the society of settlement.
As described in chapter six, there are notable differences between the two countries in
terms of the practical problems experienced by refugees. Not surprisingly, the way the
resettlement of refugees is organised largely determines what kinds of difficulties the
refugees will experience. In Finland, the official resettlement programmes and the
structures of the welfare state greatly diminished the practical problems related to
housing, education and income support. The refugees in Finland even experienced
fewer problems connected to language than the refugees in England. On the other
hand, in London the strong Kurdish communities and the Kurdish social networks
were important resources for the refugees. The refugees were more isolated and their
associations were less well organised in Finland than in England, which led to a range
of difficulties for the refugees in Finland. The ethnic labour market in London was
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often able to facilitate the refugees' employment. However, the only jobs available in
London were poorly paid jobs with very bad working conditions. In Finland, the
severe unemployment situation in practice closed out refugees from the labour market.
Xenophobia and racism were more visible features of society in Finland than was the
case in the multi-cultural environment of London.
Resettlement policies were widely different in the two countries. The Finnish policy
was to resettle refugees in small groups dispersed all over the country, while in Britain
almost all Kurds lived in London. Obviously, these differences made it impossible to
establish large and well-established communities and associations in Finland on the
lines of those found in London. This led to notable differences in the social networks
and the types of social integration found in the two countries. Although all Kurdish
refugees used their networks and associations to solve problems they faced in the
country of settlement, the role played by social networks and associations was
completely different in the two countries. In these areas, the official resettlement
policies played a decisive role.
Kurdish refugees' political activities and their support for a Kurdish homeland are
certainly not welcomed by the governments of their host-countries. However, if one
compares the situation in Finland, England and Germany it seems as though the
different policies of the receiving countries have an influence on what forms the
refugees' diasporic political activities will take.
All these results suggest that to a large extent the structures and policies of the
receiving society determine the process of integration into the receiving society. By
stressing the importance of structures this study avoids the danger of using theoretical
frameworks where immigrants are mainly seen as choosing whether or not to integrate.
Such a theoretical framework forgets the profound importance of various exclusionary
structures and discourses within the receiving societies. For example, issues like
racism and systematic discrimination have to be taken into account. On the other hand,
it is important to remember that the refugees are independent actors and that there is an
interaction between structure and agency.
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Obviously, various inclusionary and exclusionary processes within the receiving
society still have a profound importance on the social organisation of the refugee
communities, despite the refugees' transnational and de-territorialised social relations.
This suggests that the new diaspora discourse still needs to take into account earlier
sociological research about international migration and ethnic relations.
Integration into the Receiving Society and the Diaspora
What then is the relation between the process of integration into the receiving society
and the process of diaspora formation among Kurdish refugees? The existence of a
diaspora may, for example, suggest that refugees do not want to, or are unable to,
integrate or assimilate into the receiving society. Thus the existence of a diaspora
could easily be used as an argument for exclusionary policies by anti-immigration
political groups. The formation of diasporas could, for example, be used. as an
argument for more restrictive asylum regulations since "refugees will anyway never
become native inhabitants."
I would argue that it is important to understand that to live in a diasporas does not
automatically mean that the person is not integrated into the wider society. The process
of integration into the society of settlement and the process of diaspora formation are
largely unrelated processes, and are certainly not connected in any clear and simple
causal relation. With the risk of over-simplifying, it can be argued that integration into
the society of reception mostly depends on factors within that society. The minority's
relation to the society of origin is in this case not totally without importance, but does
not play as decisive a role as factors in the society of settlement. On the other hand, the
question whether a minority community forms a diaspora or not, depends largely on
the type of relation which exists with the country of origin and only to a lesser extent
on the type of relation to the country of settlement. Yet, to get a full understanding of
the social organisation of the communities, both dimensions have to be taken into
account.
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A look at some established diasporas can clarify the relation between diasporas and
integration. The classical example of a diaspora is, of course, the Jews, but overseas
Chinese are also commonly referred to as a diaspora. These two groups are often well
integrated and might have an important and strong socio-economic positions in the
societies where they live. Clearly, to live in a diaspora does not automatically entail
non-integration. On the other hand, neither is there any guarantee that a diaspora would
automatically be well-integrated. There are also diasporas which experience
discrimination and which tend to be relatively superficially integrated into their
societies of settlement, the Gypsies being one example which easily comes to mind.
Diasporas are often communities who to some degree are isolated from the wider
society. This can in some cases lead to a lack of skills and resources which will
hamper an integration into the wider society. This case is exemplified by the Kurds
from Turkey living in North London who have difficulties to find a job in the
mainstream economy because of insufficient language skills. The disadvantages which
are connected to living in an insular community are, however, often compensated for
by other advantages. For example, in North London there is an ethnic labour market
employing Turks and Kurds. Furthermore, the most important issue to remember is
that disadvantages associated with insular communities are often of marginal
importance compared to the profound effect on the minority of the social structure of
the wider society. In the example from North London it is for instance clear that the
lack of a minimum wage and other features of the labour market creates a situation
with poor salaries and bad working conditions in the "sweat shops." A more general
problem related to the social structure of the wider society is the various forms of
racism and discrimination facing most refugees. The type of exclusion exemplified by
racism and discrimination can be regarded as a far more important reason for non-
integration than any tendency to live in insular ethnic communities.
There can also be a relation between integration and diaspora formation in the sense
that non-integration might lead to a need for a stronger ethnic community. This may
happen as a defence strategy in order to compensate for the discrimination and inferior
position in which the minority often finds itself. This defensive community may or
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may not be a diaspora. It is easy to agree with Clifford (1994, 312) who argues that
diasporic consciousness often is a question of making the best of a bad situation. The
refugees' exclusion from the wider society is not a product of their own diasporic
consciousness, this exclusion can instead be seen as one of many reasons for the
formation of a diaspora. In the case of the Kurdish refugees it seems that to some
degree all groups have tried to strengthen their own community in order to solve
different problems they experience in the country of settlement. Both informal social
networks and formal associations are important resources for a community. For
example, the well-organised associations in London today play many different roles
for the Kurdish community.
New Kurdish refugees from Turkey are easily integrated into the well-established
Kurdish/Turkish community in North London. This development generally supports
Breton's (1964) argument that the institutional completeness of a community is
decisive for the direction of the process of integration. In cases where strong
communities do not exist and the refugees are divided, there might be many persons
who instead attempt to assimilate into the majority as fast as possible (cf. Kunz 1981).
This pattern was discernible among some of the politically divided Kurdish refugees
from Iraq and Iran. However, this option is open only for a few highly qualified
persons. Many refugees instead become isolated and marginalised from the majority
because of the their lack of linguistic and educational skills and as a consequence of
racism and discrimination.
The Kurdish refugee communities are divided largely because the political divisions in
Kurdistan have a profound influence on the social organisation of the communities in
exile. However, at the same time as the Kurds are divided politically, similar forces
can also unite those refugees who shared the same political beliefs and background in
Kurdistan. The associations and informal networks growing out of this unity can be
used as a resource to solve the problems facing the refugees in their new country of
settlement. Minority organisations and networks might actually be important in
facilitating integration into the receiving society. Thus, rather than hampering
integration, diasporas may in fact facilitate integration. The Kurdish refugees in this
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study live in a diaspora where their associations and informal networks are largely
oriented towards the country of origin. Despite this, the associations and networks can
be used as a resource to solve problems refugees experience in the country of
settlement.
Despite the above-mentioned qualities of diasporic communities, the formation of
diasporas should not be seen as a totally positive process. Although diasporas are often
defined in relation to nation-states, it must be remembered that a diaspora cannot
provide its members with the same services and opportunities that the state is able to
provide to its citizens. Consequently, although a strong and independent community
has its advantages, there is no reason to see diasporas as a positive and sufficient
alternative to egalitarian welfare states. For example, the voluntary work and the lack
of resources in the Kurdish community centres in London cannot be compared with
the official reception programmes and the relatively good facilities provided for
refugees in Finland.
Both the formation of diasporas and the processes of integration should be seen as
complex processes that are difficult to describe by any static models. In this research it
has not been possible to identify and measure all the different variables affecting the
social organisation of the refugee communities. Obviously, there is a need for more
research in this area. This study has suggested a number of variables and their relation
to one another. Furthermore, this study has presented an analytical framework in which
these issues can be discussed. It is argued here that the concept of diaspora retains an
understanding of refugees' specific experiences and transnational social relations.
In any case, the refugees' transnational social reality suggests a rethinking of the
concept of integration. The contemporary diaspora discourse is a way to further an
understanding of refugees' transnational and de-territorialised social reality. The
concept of diaspora can be a useful tool for an understanding of the social relations of
refugees in a new country of settlement where their social organisation depends both
on features in the country of origin as well as in the country of exile. The concept of
diaspora goes beyond simplistic notions of integration, since the concept takes into
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account this duality of refugees' social relations. For example, within this conceptual
framework it makes perfect sense that people wish to return to their countries of origin
at the same time as they want to integrate into their new countries of settlement.
The diaspora discourse highlights the refugees' continuous relation to their countries
of origin. Despite this, the relation to the country of settlement should not be
forgotten. Although the diaspora discourse adds an important transnational
dimension, there is still reason to remember older theories relating to inclusion and
exclusion within society in more traditional terms. Thus, the diaspora discourse
needs to take into account earlier sociological research and theories about ethnic
relations and international migration. Understanding a diaspora as a social
organisation and not only as a psychological relation is one step in the right direction.
This thesis has sought to show that the concept of diaspora, seen as a transnational
social organisation, is a useful analytical tool for understanding the special
relationships that refugees have with both the country of origin and the country of
settlement.
In summary, this thesis describes the social organisation of Kurdish refugee
communities in Finland and England. It argues that the Kurds in exile can be regarded
as a diaspora. This concept depicts the transnationalism which characterises the social
organisation of the Kurdish refugee communities. In many different ways refugees
living in exile have a continuous relation to their societies of origin. Transnational
social networks and associations based on this relation can be important resources for
refugees. However, there is also reason to remember the importance of social
structures and exclusionary policies in the country of settlement, since these continue
to have a great impact on how the integration of refugees will happen. Consequently, a
study of refugee communities needs to take into account the relationships with both the
society of origin and the society of settlement.
APPENDIX
Interview Guideline
Date, time and place:
Persons present (male/female, age): .
PERSONAL DATA. What part of Kurdistan? (Turkey/Iraq/Iran/other) Do you speak
Kurdish? Other languages? How long have you been living in Britain/Finland? If
married, to a Kurdish partner? Number of children?
HISTORY OF MIGRATION. Refugee status in Britain/Finland? Official status as
convention refugees or exceptional leave to remain? When did you get your official
status? Family-reunion? Do you have a passport/ what citizenship? How did you travel
from Kurdistan, straight from Kurdistan or some other way (camps)? Living in any
other countries?
COUNTRY OF DESTINATION. Did you plan to come to Britain/Finland?
Connections to Britain/Finland? Did you have any relatives here when you arrived?
RECEPTION. Who did help you when you arrived in Britain/Finland? What kind of
help did you get? Can you tell me what happened from the first day when you arrived
here. Did you apply for asylum already at the border when you arrived or later?
Refugee agency? What were your major problems when you arrived in the
UK/Finland.
RESETTLEMENT. Help from social workers? Local councils? Community centres?
How did you find your accommodation? Changed accommodation several times?
Schools for the children and help you with that? Nursery? How did you learn to know
the neighbourhood? What do you feel about the way you have been received by the
authorities in this country? Have you received the help you needed when you arrived?
How would you yourself have organised the reception of refugees in this country if
you could decide about it?
KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH. Did you speak English when you arrived? Have you
ever used an interpreter? How often? Who did pay for the interpretation? Have you
received any language training, any lessons in English? When and for how long? Do
you feel that you have a sufficient knowledge of English?
EMPLOYMENT. Are you at present working in Britain/Finland? When did you get
this job. Is your employer English/Finnish? Are there any other Kurds at the
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workplace? Have you ever been unemployed in Britain/Finland? For how long? Who
helped you to get your job? Help from jobcentres/employment offices?
SOCIAL NETWORK. Do you have many English/Finnish people as friends? How did
you meet them? For how long have known them? Do you have more
Kurdish/(country of origin) or more English/Finnish friends. Where do you meet your
friends? Do Kurdish men/women have a place to meet where you live? Do you visit
Kurdish friend and relatives in other towns and countries?
MEDIA. Do you read British/Finnish newspapers? television? radio? Kurdish
newspapers? radio? (country of origin) newspaper? radio?
WAY OF LIFE IN KURDISTAN. Family size? Rural/Urban? Education? Housing?
Employment? Friends/social life? Were you a politically active person? If so, was this
the reason for leaving Kurdistan?
CHANGES IN WAY OF LIFE. In what way has your life changed since you moved
to England? If you compare the roles men and women have in Kurdistan and the way
you live today, what are the differences? Role of Family? (if children:) Children's
upbringing? Do you eat pork?
(if woman: is there any special problems that you have faced because being a refugee
and a woman)
ORGANISATIONS. Are you active in Kurdish organisations? Which one? What
about British organisations? Organisations based on country of origin? Are there any
Kurdish organisations or community centres where you live? What kind of activities
do the Kurdish organisations have? Do you meet your friends in these organisations?
Are you active in politics?
OPINION ABOUT ORGANISATIONS. Are you pleased with the Kurdish
organisations or are there something you would like to change? Should the Kurdish
organisations in Britain/Finland be concerned about the situation in Kurdistan or
should they try to work to improve the situation for people who are living here in
Britain/Finland, or should they do both?
RELIGION. Do you visit mosques? How often? What is the role of religion in your
life? Do you pray?
RACE RELATIONS. Have you experienced racism in Britain/Finland? Any kind of
discrimination, by the authorities or otherwise? When was this and how did it
happened? Examples? Are you afraid of racist attacks or assault in the streets? What
do you think that people in general in England think about Kurds and Kurdistan? Do
you experience that there has been any change in the relations with the British during
the time you have been living here? Do you feel like a guest in Britain/Finland?
INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS. Where do you get your information about the
situation in Kurdistan? Do you still keep in touch with your friends and relatives in
Kurdistan? Letters, telephone? Difficult or easy to keep in touch? Does any of the
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Kurdish organisations help you to keep in touch and get information about Kurdistan?
Have you visited Kurdistan since you moved to England/Finland. (If later married in
Kurdistan ask about this.)
IDENTIFICATION. How would you describe yourself? Do you today consider
yourself to be Kurdish, (land of origin) or British? Do you today feel that you have
more in common with Kurds from neighbouring countries than with non-Kurds from
your own country. While you where living in (land of origin) what did you consider
yourself to be and has this changed since you moved here? Did you participate in the
1991 Census? What did you answer on the ethnic question in the census/ethnic
monitoring in general? Do you yourself use the terms "black" and "ethnic minority"?
MAINTENANCE OF CULTURE. Do you try to preserve your own culture or are you
trying to become English. Do you celebrate Nawroz? How and where do you do that?
Can the Kurdish organisations help you to maintain your own culture? Do they? Can
England/Finland in any way help you to maintain your culture? Do they? Do you think
English/Finnish people want you to become British/Finnish or do you think they want
you to preserve your culture?
FUTURE PLANS. What are your plans for the future? Would you like to have
English/Finnish citizenship? Would you move back to Kurdistan if it today would be
possible? Under what circumstances would you do that?
Can you give me some examples of on one hand good things, and on the other hand
bad things in the British/Finnish society?
SECOND GENERATION (if children): Do your children speak Kurdish? Do you
speak Kurdish at home? Are your children taught in the Kurdish language? Where do
they receive this teaching? Do you want your children to become Kurdish or
English/Finnish? Future plans for children? It is possible for you to imagine that your
children would many an Englishman/woman/Finn? Do they have English/Finnish
friends? Kurdish friend? Where do they meet English/Finnish children? Kurdish
children?
Is there anything I have left out? Or something you would like to add?
NOTES
Chapter 2 Theory and Literature Review
i Of course, there are also other definitions of "social organisations." According to
Weber (1968, 48), a definition of an organisation (Verband) is that there is a leader and
organised action. An even more specific and functional definition is described by
Parsons (1960), who emphasises an organisation's attainment of a specific goal.
Needless to say, this is not the way social organisation is understood here.
2 One does not need much imagination in order to see similarities in "race-relations" in
early post-war Britain and the present situation in Finland. However, as I argue in
chapter five, this is not a valid comparison.
3 Miles (1989, 1993), in his discussions of Barker (1981 , does not wove otie .\se
of the concept new racism. Miles (1989) argues that the concept of new racism defines
racism in too broad a way since it cannot identify what is distinctive about racism as an
ideology, and that it thus confuses racism with other ideologies like sexism and
nationalism. Furthermore, Miles (1993) points out that it is not clear what the supposed
differences are between the vaguely defined new and old racisms. Despite this, Miles
finds that "race" and nation can be "overlapping categories, each functioning to define
the parameters of the other" (1993, 59), although he argues that a difference is that
nationalism includes a political project which racism does not.
4 The origin of this widely used phrase is unknown, but it seems to have been first
mentioned by Troyna and Williams (1986).
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Chapter 3 Methods
The symbolic interactionism of Herbert Blumer was largely a reaction to the
dominance within sociology of structural functionalism, represented by Talcott
Parsons, during the 1950s and 1960s. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that
Blutner emphasises agency at the expense of structures.
2 The developer and owner of the copyright of the computer program Atlas/ti is
Thomas Muhr, Scientific Software Development, Berlin, Germany.
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Chapter 4 Politics and Forced Migration in Kurdistan
Estimating the size of the Kurdish population is difficult since there are very few
reliable sources and official figures. Bruinessen (1992a) estimates that in 1975 the
Kurds numbered 13.5 to 15 million persons. Sheilchmous (1994) estimates that the
total number of Kurds both in Kurdistan and in the diaspora in 1994 had risen to
between 28 and 29 millions.
2 Symptomatic of the cultural persecution of the Kurds in the Middle East is the fact
that a large part of all literature published in Kurdish during this century has appeared
either in the Soviet Union or, more recently, in the diaspora in Europe. The largely
state-sponsored literary activities in Sweden deserve to be especially mentioned
(Sheikhmous 1989).
3 There are also Muslim political organisations, including the Islamic Movement in
Iraqi Kurdistan. It is also clear that many Kurds in Turkey are active in Islamic
organisations. However, as explained in chapter seven, I have not found any Muslim
political organisations in the Kurdish diaspora. Their political importance in Kurdistan
also seems to be marginal. Therefore they are not included in this short presentation of
Kurdish politics.
4	 •With an exception for the Stalin-period, the Kurds in Soviet Union were not
discriminated in the same way as the Kurds in the Middle East. "In the mid-1970s the
Soviet Kurds were among the most prosperous citizens of the USSR" (Kendal 1993b,
205). It is possible that the relative prosperity and cultural freedom (although not
political freedom) of the Kurds in the Soviet Union also have influenced the Kurds'
opinions about socialism.
5 The Turkish sociologist Ismail Besikci has published several articles and books about
the Kurdish question. Because of his publications he has repeatedly been sentenced to
imprisonment and his books have been banned and confiscated by the Turkish state.
6 In the 1980s Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou worked as the General Secretary of the
Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party. He was assassinated in Vienna on 13 July 1989
during negotiations with Iranian emissaries. It is commonly assumed that the Iranian
government was behind the assassination.
7 The ethnic mosaic in contemporary Turkey is comprehensively described by Peter
Andrews (1989).
8 The term genocide is of course a very strong accusation and it has a defined meaning
in international law (cf. Andreapoulos 1994). The mass murder of Armenians is,
however, commonly described as a genocide (e.g. Hovarmisian 1994). During the
conflict between Christian and Muslims at the end of the Ottoman Empire both
Armenians and Muslims were killed, and some Kurds actively participated in the
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genocide of the Armenians. According to Chaliand (1994), the Kurdish participation in
the conflict was largely made in the name of Muslim solidarity in order to re-create the
Ottoman Empire.
9 Amnesty International has published numerous reports on the human rights situation
in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. For practical reasons only the most important reports are
found in the list of references. A complete list of the reports on the subject can easily
be obtained from Amnesty International in London.
10 According to McDowall (1992), this is the number of Alevis in the usual Kurdish
definition of Alevis. Some Turkish definitions, however, include at least eighteen
million people in several different countries.
11 According to recent publications, there is good reason to believe that the Iraqi Anfal
campaign fulfils the legal definition of a genocide. Bruinessen (1994) points out that
the killings of civilians during the chemical war against the Kurds in Iraq during 1987-
1988 were massive, indiscriminate and excessively brutal. According to him, the
question of whether these massacres should be called genocide or not goes back to the
irrelevant issue of whether the massacres fulfil the legal definition of intent.
Bruinessen's article was written before the introduction of the "safe haven" in
Northern Iraq and before the organisation Human Rights Watch had the opportunity to
make a thorough investigation of the Anfal campaign. In a case study of the destruction
of the village Koreme the organisation is still cautious, and while declaring that the
report does not prove genocide, it states: "Research increasingly leads to the
conclusion that the Iraqi government's Anfal campaign amounted to the crime of
genocide within the meaning of the genocide convention" and "certainly the campaign
was a crime against humanity within the meaning of customary international law"
(Human Rights Watch 1993a, 2). In another report Human Rights Watch clearly calls
the Anfal campaign a genocide and declares that the Kurds "were systematically put to
death in large numbers on the orders of the central government" (Human Rights Watch
1993b, xiv). The intent of the Iraqi government is also described in the eighteen tons of
official documents on the Anfal Campaign that were seized by the Kurds and later
shipped to the USA (Human Rights Watch 1994).
12 However, in February 1997 there were unconfirmed reports on the internet
indicating that the two branches were reunited.
13	 •This was the procedure in Turkey during the time when the refugees in this study
left Turkey. According to some reports (e.g. Amnesty International 1994b) Turkey
may in future determine the status of all refugees without involvement by UNHCR,
which of course would be the normal procedure. Amnesty International (1994b) is
concerned about the fact that Turkey still seems to wish to keep the geographical
limitation of the Refugee Convention. Taking into account the Turkish policy towards
its own Kurdish minority, this might be disastrous for Kurdish refugees from Iran and
Iraq.
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Chapter 5 The Countries of Reception
During the period of the cold war another issue which partly explains the small
numbers of asylum seekers was the sensitive political relations between Finland and
the Soviet Union. For example, even if a Soviet citizen did manage to cross the heavily
guarded border to Finland, it was possible at least until the 1970s, that he or she would
be returned immediately by the Finnish authorities.
2 The Ministry of Social and Health Affairs has information about the exact number of
refugees who have arrived in Finland. Information about migration and citizenship is,
however, collected by the Registration Offices. According to Finnish law it is not
possible to compare statistics from these different sources on an individual level.
Therefore the exact number of refugees living in Finland cannot be ascertained.
3 The differences between Britain and the "Nordic welfare states" in the case of
refugee reception are also described by Ann-Belinda Steen (1992) in her study of
Tamil refugees in Denmark and England.
4 The description of the resettlement policies in Finland is based partly on my own
experiences working with the resettlement of refugees during 1992 and 1993, as well
as being influenced by the fieldwork for my MA thesis (Wahlbeck 1992).
5 The estimation of the number of Kurds living in Finland is based on my own
fieldwork and a variety of other sources. According to official statistics, there were
1,147 persons living in Finland at 31 December 1994 whose mother tongue was
Kurdish (Korkiasaari 1995). However, not all persons who define themselves as Kurds
are speaking Kurdish as their first language. Furthermore, it is not clear how reliable
these statistics are. For example, have all newly arrived refugees really understood that
in Finland they can declare Kurdish as their first language? According to figures from
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs published in Pakolaisinfo and Monitori, the
total number resettled in the municipalities during the period 1990-1994 from either
Iran, Iraq or Turkey was 2,112 persons (of which only 148 were from Turkey). It can
be assumed that a large number, but not all, of these persons are Kurds. Makela (1993)
estimates in her MA-thesis that there were only 500 Kurdish refugees living in Finland
by the beginning of the year 1992. However, she has only taken into account those
Kurds from Iran and Iraq who have been officially resettled in municipalities. The
study of refugees in Finland by Ekholm (1995) uses data from most Finnish
municipalities, a source which I am grateful to have been allowed to study. Although
the material has its limitations, it can be estimated that almost 800 Kurdish refugees
from Iran and Iraq were received in the municipalities by the autumn of 1993. In
addition to Ekholm's numbers, according to Monitori there were about 200 Iranian and
250 Iraqi refugees resettled in the municipalities during the last quarter of 1993 and the
whole year 1994. It can be assumed that most of these persons were Kurds. In addition
to all these numbers one has to take into account Kurdish refugees who arrived in
Finland before the 1990s as well as all those Kurds who are living in Finland but who
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officially are not regarded as refugees. Finally, the number of Kurds from Turkey is
very difficult to estimate because this group includes persons with a wide variety of
legal statuses. According to the Kurdish Information Centre in Helsinki, the total
number of Kurds from Turkey living in Finland is about 500 persons (interview made
17 August 1994). Therefore, my estimation is that at the end of 1994 there were 300-
550 Kurds from Turkey, 550-800 Kurds from Iraq and 400-650 Iranian Kurds living
permanently in Finland.
6 It should be noted, however, that only a small proportion of the Turkish citizens
living in Finland between 1990 and 1992 officially were refugees.
7 In the years 1990-1992 there were 376 marriages between Finnish female citizens
and Turkish male citizens, closely followed by 352 marriages with Moroccan males.
Finnish men, on the other hand, seem to prefer women from the former Soviet Union,
since 1,493 such couples were married between 1990 and 1992 (Nieminen 1994).
8 Usually a person with exceptional leave to remain may be granted indefinite leave to
remain only after seven years of residence, and then the person often has to wait for
twelve months before an application for registration can be considered.
9 In recent years several Kurdish asylum seekers have organised hunger strikes and
made suicide attempts in the detention centres. On 5 October 1989 two Kurds who
were in detention set fire to their room after hearing that they would be sent back to
Turkey. One of the men, Siho Iyiguven, subsequently died in hospital while the other
suffered severe bums (Collinson 1990; Crisp 1989).
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Chapter 6 The Refugee Experience
It is surprising to hear, for example, that in Finland some persons from Turkey, with
residence permits on humanitarian grounds, were forced to visit the Turkish Embassy
to renew their passports. In Britain I was told that the Home Office has allegedly
checked personal details of asylum seekers through contacts with Turkish
organisations and authorities. Several interviewees told me stories about hostile and
non-professional interpreters. In Britain I heard about a case where the Turkish
interpreter, during an interview at the Home Office, did not want to interpret the
statement that democracy does not exist in Turkey "since Turkey is a democratic
country." Similar cases of non-professional and hostile interpreters are described by
Reilly (1991) and Collinson (1990). According to the Refugee Council (1996), some
Kurdish asylum seekers in Britain have even been interviewed with an interpreter from
the Turkish Embassy.
2 The fact that refugees can become an asset even in cases where it would not be
expected, is demonstrated for example by Van Hear (1995) in his study of the
involuntary mass migration of Palestinians to Jordan in the wake of the Gulf crisis.
Contrary to initial expectations, this massive migration seems to have contributed to
the economic recovery in Jordan.
3 This interview is translated from the Finnish language which uses the same word,
hiin, for the terms she and he.
4 The strong wish to return home to Kurdistan as soon as possible is also found by
Richard Black (1995) in his study of newly arrived Kurdish refugees from Iraq living
in Greece.
5 Totally equal integration of immigrants in the labour market was, however, not the
case even when there were jobs available in Finland. Jaalckola (1991) has shown that
there was already an ethnic hierarchy and segmentation among foreigners in the labour
market at the end of the 1980s. However, Jaalckola's study was carried out before the
serious economic recession which hit Finland in the 1990s. During this research the
employment situation among refugees was quite different compared to the situation in
the 1980s.
6 The tragic incident in the Finnish town of Turku on the night of 29 January 1993 also
contributed to the fear of racist attacks. Receb KaragOz, a Kurd from Turkey, spent the
night out with his Turkish friend. They became involved in a fight with a group of
Finnish youths outside a restaurant. Receb's friend managed to escape, but Receb
Karagea was stabbed and he died some days later in hospital. A seventeen year old
Finnish boy was arrested by the police after the incident. It was commonly assumed
that he had a racist motive, although this was never proven. This tragedy is well known
among the Kurds in Finland.
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Chapter 7 The Kurdish Refugee Community
Often the Finnish Red Cross programme with "friend families" for refugees is seen to
be unsuccessful since many friendships do not appear to last very long. However, I
would argue that these friendships are a very valuable resource for the refugees and
that these relations serve as an important connection to Finnish society. Taking into
account the fact that these friendships are created in a totally artificial way, any of
them that stands the test of time should be regarded as a success.
2 Alitolppa-Niitamo (1994) describes similar research findings in her study of Somali
refugees in Finland. Her informants regarded unemployment among the refugees and
negative attitudes among the Finns as significant factors which reduced the personal
contacts between the two groups. Because of problems like these, the good language
skills which refugees acquired during the language courses might decline over time
(Valtonen 1996).
3 In defence of the Finnish policy, it has to be mentioned that while many countries
have only chosen refugees for resettlement who have been suitable for the their labour
market, the Finnish selection has largely been based on humanitarian criteria. In fact,
the Finnish quota has included many disabled and elderly persons whom UNHCR has
found it difficult to resettle elsewhere.
4 A couple of the interviewees even felt that it was not possible to do anything
significant for the Kurdish cause in the diaspora. There are also examples of persons
who have returned to Kurdistan in order to join the armed struggle. Kurdistan Report
(no. 13, no. 19) has saluted three PKIC guerrillas who lived in London for several years
in the 1980s and who died in the fights in northern Kurdistan.
5 According to some informants, this has to some extent changed in the 1980s and
1990s. Because of the influence from Iran, religious issues have to an increasing extent
become political issues, and there is now an Islamic party in Kurdistan in Iraq.
6 Although this person implies that the information centre in Helsinki is an
organisation for PICK supporters this is not the official policy of the organisation.
This is similar to the pattern of political activism found by Joly (1996) in her study of
Chilean refugees.
8 In my own opinion this support from small left-wing groups is rather unhelpful since
firstly, many of these organisations seem to use Kurdish demonstrations as mainly a
way of spreading their own political message and literature. Secondly, support from
these small marginal political groups can also marginalise the refugees and the whole
Kurdish struggle from mainstream politics in Britain.
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